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My thesis examines state-religious relationship in secular authoritarian Singapore by 
analysing fatwas (Islamic religious decrees). In particular, I focus on the role of 
‘official’ fatwas in negotiating against state and state-linked interests. 
The prevailing narrative concerning authoritarian Southeast Asian states like 
Singapore is that they closely regulate realms of contestation in order to preserve state 
dominance. As the state co-opts potential challengers (including religious ones) within 
its fold, religious bureaucracies are reduced to instrumentalised nation-building 
projects. 
Using this body of literature as a starting point, I argue that these authoritarian 
measures lead to several unintended consequences for the state. The co-optation of 
religious institutions – through the establishment of a religious bureaucracy – results 
in fatwas being given sufficient legal-bureaucratic authority to affect state decisions. 
As the role of the religious bureaucracy is broadened to oversee more religious 
matters, it also results in the expansion of fatwas’ authority in the legal system. These 
developments entrench the role of fatwas in state and legal structures, an ironic 
outcome for the self-declared secular state. 
My argument is developed in case studies of Singapore fatwas in three areas: (1) state 
policies, (2) court judgements, and (3) a recent legal enactment on religious teachers. 
These cases test the extent of fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic capacity to negotiate state 
demands, and also reveal the significance of their traditional-societal role. 
My research draws upon confidential state fatwa minutes of meetings, interviews with 
muftis, as well as archival research of key documents. Through the analysis of fatwas’ 
function in relation to state bureaucracy and the legal system, my research contributes 
unique insights into the negotiation of religious demands in a modern state. It also 
expands the application of policy feedback – which discusses the impact of policies 
on politics – to examine an understudied constituency of state bureaucracy: religious 
institutions. The ultimate outcome of this state-religious negotiation is conceptualised 
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To ensure consistency throughout the thesis, transliteration of Arabic words into the 
Roman script is adapted from the American Library Association – Library of Congress 
format. Note that this only applies to Arabic words that are not recognised in the 
English language. Recognised loanwords – such as ‘fatwa’ and ‘madrasah’ – are spelt 
and pluralised according to their English language usage. 
Romanised Arabic Romanised Arabic 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Issuing Fatwas in the Name of the State 
In September 2017, a Singaporean man appeared in a video produced by the radical 
militant group Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). The video showed the man 
in military fatigue loading ammunition shells and encouraging viewers to join armed 
fighters in East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.1 He then fired an artillery gun before 
directing his message to Great Britain’s Prince Harry who was scheduled to visit 
Singapore. The man said that instead of going to Singapore to “tell sad stories to gain 
sympathy about London terror [attacks]”, the prince should fight ISIS so “we can send 
you and your Apaches to hellfire.”2 
Militant propaganda videos are nothing new. This one, however, is different because 
for the first time it featured a Singaporean. The video and its reporting in the media 
prompted several responses from the state and religious authorities in Singapore. The 
main Islamic religious institution in Singapore known as Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura (Islamic Council of Singapore or MUIS) promptly condemned the man’s 
action.3 The Mufti of Singapore – the highest Islamic religious official in the country 
– also weighed in, warning that such videos “misinterpret and manipulate the teachings 
of Islam” and “influence and convert those who may not be able to discern the truth 
from the untruths.”4 He told the Singapore Muslim community to “stay vigilant” and 
report to the authorities those who show signs of being radicalised.5 
The role of the mufti in this scenario should not be understated. As the head of a body 
that provides official Islamic religious instruction in the country, a mufti possesses the 
authority to inform and shape religious praxis through religious edicts known as 
fatwas. One might imagine that this traditional form of religious instruction – issuing 
fatwas – had become obsolete, especially in a modern state like Singapore that 
professes secularism.6 However the relevance of fatwas persists; in Singapore and 
 
1 Inside the Khilafah 4, vol. 4, Inside the Khilafah (Al-Hayat Media Center, n.d.), accessed 19 
February 2018. 
2 Inside the Khilafah 4. 
3 Nur Asyiqin Mohamad Salleh, ‘Muis Condemns ISIS Video Featuring Singaporean’, The Straits 




6 The declaration of Singapore’s Inter-Religious Harmony Circle explicitly “recognise[s] the secular 
nature of our State.” See ‘Establishment of a Permanent Landscape Symbolising Religious Harmony 
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many other countries, fatwas are not merely Islamic religious instructions, they are 
also embedded in the country’s legal statute that guarantees their modern relevance 
and authority. 
Despite the link of these religious institutions to the state, their relationship is not 
always mutually reinforcing. Differences occur even in Singapore where the state 
tightly controls platforms of potential political contestation.7 In order to maintain 
authoritarian endurance, the state closely regulates domains such as labour 
movements, the media, academia, and even religion. As a way to manage religious 
affairs, Islamic religious elites and institutions – including the fatwa-issuing body – 
became co-opted into the state-sanctioned religious bureaucracy. 
This then begs the question: how do co-opted Islamic religious elites and institutions 
function in an authoritarian secular state? What role do they play in negotiating 
religious demands, especially those that can be perceived as going against state 
interests? 
My research is principally concerned with the politics of contestation, and the role co-
opted religious institutions plays in it. Focusing on a facet of the Islamic religious 
bureaucracy in Singapore, I examine how co-optation created new modes of 
contestations against the state. As religious elites are tied to the state through legal-
bureaucratic links, they also gain some forms of authority that enables them to shape 
state decisions. This then not only affects how Islamic religious praxis is shaped, but 
 
in Singapore at Stamford Green, Fort Canning Park’, Singapore Government Media Release (National 
Archives Singapore, 19 July 2008), http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-
html?filename=20080719997.htm; however others have described Singapore’s brand of secularism to 
be ‘quasi-secular’. See Li-ann Thio, ‘Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: Managing Religious 
Harmony in Singapore’s Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State’, Hastings Const. LQ 33 (2005): 197–254; 
See also Jaclyn L Neo, ‘Secularism Without Liberalism: Religious Freedom and Secularism in a Non-
Liberal State’, Michigan State Law Review, no. 333 (2017): 333–70. 
7 William Case, ‘New Uncertainties for an Old Pseudo-Democracy: The Case of Malaysia’, 
Comparative Politics 37, no. 1 (October 2004): 83–104, https://doi.org/10.2307/4150125; Kikue 
Hamayotsu, ‘Islam and Nation Building in Southeast Asia: Malaysia and Indonesia in Comparative 
Perspective’, Pacific Affairs 75, no. 3 (2002): 353, https://doi.org/10.2307/4127290; Robert Hefner, 
Remaking Muslim Politics : Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization (Princeton  N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Garry Rodan and Caroline Hughes, The Politics of Accountability in 
Southeast Asia: The Dominance of Moral Ideologies, First Edition, Oxford Studies in 
Democratization (Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014); Bryan 
S. Turner, ‘Soft Authoritarianism, Social Diversity and Legal Pluralism: The Case of Singapore’, in 
The Sociology of Shari’a: Case Studies from around the World, ed. Adam Possamai, James T 
Richardson, and Bryan S. Turner (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015), 69–81, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09605-6_5; Meredith Weiss, ‘Of Inequality and Irritation: New 




also increases the legal-bureaucratic relevance of fatwas or religious decrees within 
the structure of a secular authoritarian state. 
This introductory chapter outlines the aims and objectives of the thesis and is 
structured as follows. After this opening remarks, Section 2 will outline the research 
puzzle and objective of this thesis which concerns fatwa-making in a secular state. 
Section 3 explains the importance of fatwas in analysing state-religious relations and 
the peculiarities of the secular authoritarian Singapore state that makes it the focus of 
this thesis. This is followed by Section 4 which provides a brief overview of the 
analytical framework and key concepts I advance in this thesis. Building on the 
concept of autonomous state whose decision-making is self-serving and not 
particularly dependent on other interests, I argue that its decisions can be influenced 
through policy feedback from – in this case – its religious constituents. This 
consequently shapes a localised, amalgamated form of religious praxis to which I refer 
throughout this thesis as Statist Islam. Section 5 will outline the methodology I employ 
in this thesis as well as the selection of fatwas in the case studies. It will also highlight 
the main contributions of this thesis, among them the expansion of the policy feedback 
concept to examine the role of the religious bureaucracy in the modern state, and the 
development of Statist Islam as an original concept to explain the amalgamation of 
statist and religious interests, instead of a term denoting state-sponsored Islam or 
national Islam.8 The concluding part will provide the structure of the thesis and a 
detailed chapter outline. 
Before moving on, I wish to note that this thesis uses the term ‘religious elites’ to refer 
to ulama or Islamic religious scholars, regardless of their affiliation to the state or 
otherwise.9 On occasions, ‘religious elites’ may also refer to non-ulama figures such 
as Islamist political party members, although these are infrequent and the context of 
the usage should clarify its referent. Meanwhile the term ‘religious bureaucrats’ is 
used to refer to a more specific group of ulama who are bureaucratically tied to the 
 
8 Maznah Mohamad, ‘Making Majority, Undoing Family: Law, Religion and the Islamization of the 
State in Malaysia’, Economy and Society 39, no. 3 (2010): 360–84; J Saravanamuttu, ‘Encounters of 
Muslim Politics in Malaysia’, in Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia, ed. J Saravanamuttu (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2010), 85–105; Farid F Saenong, ‘Statist Islam and Folk Islam Ethnohistory 
and Muslim Practices in Bantaeng’, Journal of Islamic Civilization in Southeast Asia 4, no. 2 (2015): 
76–99. 
9 The concept of Islamism uses ‘ulama’ to refer to state-linked Islamic religious scholars. This will be 
explained in Chapter 2. 
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state. Therefore when discussing the ulama who are linked to the state religious 
bureaucracy, the terms ‘religious elites’ and ‘religious bureaucrats’ can be used 
interchangeably. ‘Religious actors’ is a wider term to denote both elite and non-elite 
religious individuals and groups.  
I also wish to note that this thesis defines fatwas as answers to religious questions. I 
will also use several other expressions interchangeably with fatwas, namely ‘religious 
decrees’, ‘religious edicts’ and ‘religious instructions’. Unless otherwise stated, they 
serve as synonyms to fatwas. 
2 Research Puzzle 
My thesis looks at how religious decrees – known as fatwas – issued by state-linked 
religious institutions can resist, negotiate, and inform the decisions of the Singapore 
state. These religious institutions are not only recognised by the state but are also 
bureaucratically co-opted to become part of the state bureaucracy. This co-optation 
amplifies the role of these religious institutions as it weaves religious demands with 
state resources and creates a site where state-religious negotiation takes place. I must 
note here that in using the term “co-opt”, I share Abdullah’s caveat that it does not 
denote a negative or positive judgement on the nature of state-religious relationships.10 
Rather it should be taken as a neutral term that describes the practical (albeit 
asymmetric) engagement of the state with co-opted actors. 
In Singapore, the co-opted Islamic religious bureaucracy plays a significant role in 
managing religious affairs. It is made up of several religious institutions including the 
fatwa-issuing body which instructs Muslim religious life. In addition to directing the 
social life of Muslims, the fatwa body is also placed at an advantageous position to 
affect state decisions. But how exactly do these state-linked religious institutions affect 
state decisions? And what are the consequences of this relationship? 
These lines of inquiry form my research puzzle, which is twofold: 
 
10 Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, ‘Religious Representation in Secular Singapore: A Case Study of MUIS 




Firstly, I question how state-linked religious bodies function within an authoritarian, 
self-declared secular state like Singapore. In particular, what kind of autonomy do they 
exercise in such a setting? And how is this autonomy asserted? 
State-linked religious institutions have often been described as “co-opted” actors,11 a 
result of being bureaucratised under state hierarchy. Numerous observations on state-
sanctioned religious bodies characterise them as instruments of nation-building 
projects.12 Recent developments within this literature qualify the role of the state in 
national religious projects and identify the function and agency of religious 
bureaucrats.13 My research builds on these observations by examining how heavy-
handed state policies that seek to regulate religious affairs also create new 
opportunities for state-linked fatwas to assert religious “sectoral”14 demands against 
the state. 
Fatwas maintain a strong claim to religious tradition and can be issued by both 
independent ulama (religious scholars) and state-linked ones. Recent technological 
development allows fatwas to cross borders and reach new audiences with ease, as the 
internet facilitates a phenomenon where Muslims can pick and choose online fatwas 
that reflect their personal opinion.15 The evolving role of fatwas in instructing Muslim 
 
11 M. B. Hooker, ‘Syariah Law in Contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia’, Reform Journal 10, no. 80 
(2002): 47–51; Abdullah, ‘Religious Representation in Secular Singapore’; Bilge Yabanci and Dane 
Taleski, ‘Co-Opting Religion: How Ruling Populists in Turkey and Macedonia Sacralise the 
Majority’, Religion, State and Society, 11 December 2017, 1–22, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2017.1411088; Thio, ‘Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: 
Managing Religious Harmony in Singapore’s Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State’. 
12 Hamayotsu, ‘Islam and Nation Building in Southeast Asia’; Joseph Liow, Piety and Politics: 
Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Kerstin 
Steiner, ‘Governing Islam: The State, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) and Islam in 
Singapore’, Australian Journal of Asian Law 16, no. 1 (2015): 1–16; Kerstin Steiner, ‘Madrasah in 
Singapore: Tradition and Modernity in Religious Education’, Intellectual Discourse, no. 19 (2011): 
41–70; Hooker, ‘Syariah Law in Contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia’. 
13 Maznah Mohamad, ‘Legal-Bureaucratic Islam in Malaysia: Homogenizing and Ringfencing the 
Muslim Subject’, in Encountering Islam: The Politics of Religious Identities in Southeast Asia, ed. 
Yew-Foong Hui (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), 103–32; Maznah Mohamad, 
‘The Ascendance of Bureaucratic Islam and the Secularization of the Sharia in Malaysia’, Pacific 
Affairs 83, no. 3 (September 2010): 505–24; Abdullah, ‘Religious Representation in Secular 
Singapore’; Tuty Raihanah Mostarom, ‘The Singapore Ulama: Religious Agency in the Context of a 
Strong State’, Asian Journal of Social Science 42, no. 5 (1 January 2014): 561–83, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/15685314-04205005. 
14 Thomas Pierret, Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 163–64, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139207720. 
15 Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Online Fatwa in Indonesia: From Fatwa Shopping to Googling a Kiai’, in 
Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, ed. G. Fealy and S. White (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 159–73; Saminaz Zaman, ‘From Imam to Cyber-Mufti: 
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religious life deserves closer scrutiny – not only beyond state structures, but also 
within them. 
This brings me to my second research objective: what does the co-optation of Islamic 
religious institutions in a secular setting mean for the state-religious relationship? In 
other words, my thesis examines the capacity of state-linked fatwas in affecting not 
only religious praxis, but its attendant consequences on state-religious dynamic. As 
the configuration of religious bureaucracy within the state creates new avenues of 
resistance, negotiation, and contestation, I investigate how this relationship results in 
the amalgamation of interests and demands, and a unique brand of Islamic religious 
praxis in a country, which I refer to as Statist Islam. 
Here, I would like to briefly mention two sets of literature that form the starting point 
of my examination of state-sanctioned religious institutions. They are: (1) Islamism 
which analyses the agency and demands of religious elites vis-à-vis the state, and; (2) 
state co-optation of religion, a loosely-linked set of writings that concerns the 
relationship between the state and religious bureaucrats. 
The first body of literature, Islamism, seeks to explain how and why religious 
intervention in politics occurs.16 Islamism discusses the interaction of Islam and 
modern politics, and is underpinned by the culturalist view that pits religious 
movements against state power.17 It shows religious elites’ engagement in politics 
through a wide range of actions, from establishing welfare services, to taking part in 
democratic elections, to resorting to militancy, all with the broad objective of 
establishing an Islamic state or a form of it.18 Although it is a literature of broad 
 
Consuming Identity in Muslim America’, The Muslim World 98, no. 4 (October 2008): 465–74, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2008.00240.x. 
16 Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar, eds., Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2010); Shahram Akbarzadeh, ed., Routledge Handbook of 
Political Islam (Abingdon, Oxon ; N.Y., N.Y: Routledge, 2012); Olivier Roy, ‘The New Islamists’, 
Foreign Policy, 16 April 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/16/the-new-islamists/; Olivier Roy 
and Amel Boubekeur, eds., Whatever Happened to the Islamists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and 
the Lure of Consumerist Islam (London: Hurst and Company, 2012); Frédéric Volpi, Political Islam 
Observed (London: Hurst and Company, 2010). 
17 Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (Routledge, 2003). 
18 Olivier Roy, The failure of political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994); Olivier Roy, Globalized 
Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (Columbia University Press, 2006); Roy, ‘The New Islamists’; 
Gilles. Kepel, Jihad: the trail of political Islam (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006); David Belt, 
‘Islamism in Popular Western Discourse’, Policy Perspectives, 2009, 1–20; Graham E Fuller, The 
Future of Political Islam. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Lisa Anderson, ‘Fulfilling 
Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism’, in Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or 
Reform?, ed. John L. Esposito (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 17–31; Zulkifly 
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relevance to this thesis because it assesses the agency of religious elites and how their 
religious demands are advanced against the state, it is nonetheless a body of 
scholarship that has been predominantly concerned with Middle-Eastern empirical 
cases, and in particular Islamic political parties.19 
Islamism is complemented by Post-Islamism, a perspective that was introduced to 
explain an emergent form of individualised religiosity in the Muslim society, a 
supposedly contemporary trend in which religious objectives have shifted from state-
centric to society-centric goals.20 This moves the subject of empirical cases from mass-
based religious movements to smaller groups of individuals who assert various forms 
of religiosity, and can incidentally affect political outcomes.21 And yet, despite the 
expansion of Islamism to Post-Islamism to explain these new forms of religious 
activism, its culturalist origin does not sufficiently accommodate the function of 
religious institutions that are co-opted by the state, nor explain the subsequent 
reconfiguration of state structures that expressly restricts, and inadvertently 
empowers, these religious co-optees. 
This brings me to a second set of literature concerning religious co-optation by the 
state, which largely explores the asymmetrical relationship between the state and 
religious institutions in Southeast Asia. In these writings, the co-optation of religious 
elites by the modern state is viewed through an instrumentalist lens to examine – to 
some extent – the functions and dynamics of state-linked religious bureaucracies.22 A 
 
Abdul Malek, ‘From Cairo to Kuala Lumpur : The Influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on 
the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM)’ (Georgetown University, 2011). 
19 Roy, The failure of political Islam; Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah; Kepel, 
Jihad; Anderson, ‘Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism’. 
20 Asef Bayat, ‘The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society’, Critique Critical Middle East Studies, no. 9 
(1996): 43–52; Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn, 
Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 2007); Asef Bayat, ed., Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
21 Roy and Boubekeur, Whatever Happened to the Islamists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the 
Lure of Consumerist Islam. 
22 Abdullah, ‘Religious Representation in Secular Singapore’; Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, ‘Managing 
Minorities in Competitive Authoritarian States: Multiracialism and the Hijab Issue in Singapore’, 
Indonesia and the Malay World 44, no. 129 (3 May 2016): 211–28, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2015.1129818; Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in 
Contemporary Malaysia; Mohamad, ‘The Ascendance of Bureaucratic Islam and the Secularization of 
the Sharia in Malaysia’; Mohamad, ‘Legal-Bureaucratic Islam in Malaysia: Homogenizing and 
Ringfencing the Muslim Subject’; Thio, ‘Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: Managing 
Religious Harmony in Singapore’s Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State’; Syed Muhd Khairudin 
Aljunied, ‘The Ulama in Singapore and Their Contemporary Challenges’, PERGAS Working Paper, 
no. 1 (2015): 1–7. 
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common narrative proposed by this literature is that the co-optation of religious 
institutions provides a way for colonial and post-colonial states to domesticate religion 
for nation-building efforts.23 This set of writings also corresponds with the theme 
‘bureaucratisation of Islam’, a largely anthropological account that examines the 
consequences of religious bureaucratisation on the society.24 Focusing on the 
Southeast Asian region, bureaucratisation of Islam provides a more balanced 
assessment in analysing the effects of state co-optation of religious bodies and symbols 
which evokes a range of responses from religious actors in the society, who chose to 
accommodate or resist state penetration in various ways. Yet as a collection of 
literature that addresses the relationship between the state and religious institutions, 
limited attention was given to the agency and function of religious bureaucrats. The 
causes and consequences of religious co-optation, and more notably the role of 
religious bureaucrats in state-sanctioned religious projects, remain an under-
researched area. 
The objective of my research is therefore to provide a more nuanced understanding of 
the role of state-linked religious institutions: that it is precisely because of state co-
optation that the relationship between the state and religion becomes ostensible. 
Combining these two bodies of literature (as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 2) 
accommodates the various instrumentalist and culturalist perspectives of state-
religious dynamics. Briefly put, I will demonstrate how both perspectives contribute 
to a synthesis between the culturalist slant of Islamism and the instrumentalist 
perspective of religious co-optation. My research acknowledges the state’s 
instrumentalist motivation for co-opting religious elites, at the same time recognises 
the co-optees’ bureaucratic advantage as a way to advance their supposed culturalist 
intent. 
 
23 Hamayotsu, ‘Islam and Nation Building in Southeast Asia’; Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in 
Contemporary Malaysia; Steiner, ‘Governing Islam: The State, the Administration of Muslim Law 
Act (AMLA) and Islam in Singapore’; Steiner, ‘Madrasah in Singapore: Tradition and Modernity in 
Religious Education’; Hooker, ‘Syariah Law in Contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia’. 
24 Dominik Müller, ‘Sharia Law and the Politics of “Faith Control” in Brunei Darussalam: Dynamics 
of Socio-Legal Change in a Southeast Asian Sultanate’, International Quarterly for Asian Studies 46, 
no. 3/4 (2015): 313–45; Dominik Müller, ‘Hybrid Pathways to Orthodoxy in Brunei Darussalam: 
Bureaucratised Exorcism, Scientisation and the Mainstreaming of Deviant-Declared Practices’, 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 37, no. 1 (2018): 141–83; Dominik Müller and Kerstin 
Steiner, ‘The Bureaucratisation of Islam in Southeast Asia: Transdisciplinary Perspectives’, Journal 
of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 37, no. 1 (2018): 3–26; Patricia Sloane-White, Corporate Islam: 




Bringing together these two bodies of literature also speaks to constructivist notions 
of unintended consequences,25 as formal co-optation creates unforeseen circumstances 
that change the capacity of both the state and the religious institution. I argue that the 
link established through state co-optation enables religious elites to broker their 
religious demands and expand their religious influence through legal-bureaucratic 
channels. The legally- and bureaucratically-recognised fatwas become a useful mode 
for religious elites to assert their authority through a form of policy feedback, i.e. by 
negotiating demands that consequently shape state decisions. I contend that this 
relationship also changes the role that religion plays in the state as religious relevance 
grew within state structures. As a result, a unique projection of state-religious interests 
manifests in what I call Statist Islam. The phrase Statist Islam is here used to describe 
the manifestation of religious interest that is shaped within statist restrictions, which 
then leads to a unique form of Islamic praxis in a specific country context. 
Indeed, my research utilises several concepts in political sociology to assess the 
autonomy of the state, the agency of religious elites, as well as the linkages that explain 
the constant negotiation that results in a unique form of religious praxis. Therein also 
lies my contribution, as the concepts that I use (e.g. state autonomy and policy 
feedback) are often overlooked in exploring the intricacies of state-religious 
relationship, as I will discuss in the next chapter. 
3 The Case for State Fatwas in Singapore 
3.1 State Fatwas 
Fatwas are answers to religious questions and can be issued by Islamic religious 
scholars also known as ulama.26 Among the ulama, those who issue fatwas are 
typically called muftis (lit. one who issues fatwas). Fatwas provide a normative frame 
for how Islamic religious praxis is observed. While individual followers are generally 
 
25 See, for example Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); cited in Marlene Wind, ‘A Constructivist Account of 
Institutions and Social Change’, in Sovereignty and European Integration: Towards a Post-
Hobbesian Order, ed. Marlene Wind (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2001), 68–69, 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403901040_5. 
26 Although ulama is the plural form of the word alim, which means Islamic scholar, in this thesis I 
will treat ulama as both singular and plural. 
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free to follow or reject these religious edicts, fatwas have been shown to play a 
significant role in the observance of the Islamic faith today.27 
When the word fatwa is mentioned, perhaps the first thing that comes to mind is the 
1989 fatwa issued by the Iranian Supreme Leader calling for the death of Salman 
Rushdie – the author whose book The Satanic Verses was deemed blasphemous to 
Islam – which led to attempts on his life. This shows that despite the non-binding 
nature of fatwas, they can be very influential in the everyday life of Muslims. Fatwas 
respond not only to questions of worship and ritual, but also to popular culture, 
economic transactions, and a whole plethora of other everyday tasks. Fatwas can 
define the religious position on a diverse range of subjects such as social conduct, 
environmental concerns, as well as political issues. There are therefore fatwas 
addressing whether Muslims should join social gatherings which serve alcoholic 
drinks, or open banking accounts that give out interest (interest is prohibited in Islam), 
or to provide a more current example, whether Bitcoin transactions are permitted. 
Fatwas also aim to regulate how Muslims conduct themselves in relation to the state 
and politics more broadly; fatwas have been issued to support certain political 
candidates and parties,28 validate tax hikes,29 and even justify war.30 Fatwas can 
therefore play an influential role in reasserting the state’s position and its policies. 
Clearly the function of fatwas in interpreting and instructing Islamic religious praxis 
underlines their susceptibility to various societal and state demands. Nonetheless, 
 
27 Gary Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas, and Cyber Islamic Environments, 
Critical Studies on Islam (London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2003); Nico Kaptein, ‘The Voice of the 
ˋUlamâ’: Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia’, Archives de Sciences Sociales Des Religions, 
2004, 115–30; Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and Fatwas 
of the Dār Al-Iftā, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia, v. 59 
(Leiden ; New York: Brill, 1997); Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Morris Messick, and David 
Stephan Powers, eds., Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, Harvard Studies in 
Islamic Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996); Zaman, ‘From Imam to Cyber-
Mufti’. 
28 Kaptein, ‘The Voice of the ˋUlamâ’: Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia’; P. Gillespie, 
‘Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwa No. 7 
Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism and Secularism’, Journal of Islamic Studies 18, no. 2 (9 February 
2007): 202–40, https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/etm001; Mohd Fadli Ghani, ‘Wajib Sokong, Pilih Parti 
Islam [Compulsory to Support, Choose Islamic Party]’, Harakah Daily, 8 May 2018, 
http://www.harakahdaily.net/index.php/berita/15-tanah-air/6600-wajib-sokong-pilih-parti-islam. 
29 ‘Fatwa Berhubung GST [Fatwa on GST]’, Jabatan Hal Ehwal Khas, accessed 18 May 2018, 
http://www.jasa.gov.my/bm/gallery/lang-bm-arkib-lang-lang-en-archive-lang/23-isu-terkini/246-
fatwa-berhubung-gst.html. 
30 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, ‘Operation Desert Storm and the War of Fatwas’, in Islamic Legal 
Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and 
David S. Powers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 297–309. 
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developing an understanding of how fatwas come to be accommodated within the state 
is not straightforward – and a key aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the complex 
ways through which the authority of fatwas is complex and is continually contested 
both inside and outside of the state. Works such as those by Masud, Messick and 
Powers’ go some way in developing an understanding of the adherence of fatwas to 
traditional religious positions as well as their  adaptability to demands by sections of 
the society as well as the modern state.31 The chapters in their book – Islamic Legal 
Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas – show how a fatwas’ religious position can 
change in order accommodate various factors, such as public benefit,32 or petitioners’ 
demands and cultural norms.33 Some fatwas also endorsed (to some extent) ribā’ or 
interest derived from banks even though it is commonly prohibited by Islamic 
scholars, which shows the adaptability of fatwas to modern state and societal 
demands.34 The work of Masud, Messick, and Powers undeniably provides an 
important anthropological survey of how fatwas operate and gives a broad overview 
of fatwas’ complicated position as an instrument of religious instruction in society. 
The examination of fatwas in the modern state puts great emphasis on the former as a 
vehicle that connects between religious tradition and modern religious ideals (and 
rightly so). However the layers upon which fatwas function in furthering religious 
ideals were glossed over in the book, in particular fatwa’s bureaucratic position in the 
modern state and the secular legal framework that it operates in. It therefore lacks a 
particular insight in explaining how, in spite of arguably secular nature of the modern 
state, the religious authority of fatwas remains relevant today. My thesis builds upon 
the broad empirical focus of this work and narrows it to the subject matter which 
captures the unique relationship between fatwa and the state. This focussed case study 
enables me to examine deeper into the bureaucratic linkages of official fatwas in the 
 
31 Masud, Messick, and Powers, Islamic Legal Interpretation. 
32 Vardit Rispler-Chaim, ‘Postmortem Examinations in Egypt’, in Islamic Legal Interpretation: 
Muftis and Their Fatwas, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Morris Messick, and David 
Stephan Powers, Harvard Studies in Islamic Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1996), 278–85. 
33 Aharon Layish, ‘The Fatwa as an Instrument of Accommodation’, in Islamic Legal Interpretation: 
Muftis and Their Fatwas, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Morris Messick, and David 
Stephan Powers, Harvard Studies in Islamic Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1996), 270–77. 
34 Chibli Mallat, ‘Tantawi on Banking Operations in Egypt’, in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis 
and Their Fatwas, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Morris Messick, and David Stephan 




modern state, which I argue makes it both susceptible to state demands while opening 
up new venues to mark the boundary of its religious authority. 
Clearly states are aware of the influence that fatwas wield as they retain close 
associations with fatwa issuers and regulate them through various laws and 
bureaucratic supervision. As fatwa issuers are incorporated in the state apparatus, they 
issue what are popularly known as “state fatwas”,35 a term which will henceforth be 
used in my thesis to refer to state-linked or state-sanctioned fatwas. I must stress that 
my usage of ‘state fatwas’ does not mean that these religious decrees represent the 
official state position, rather it is to denote that the authority they wield is due to their 
recognition by the state. After all, the purpose of this research is to investigate how 
state fatwas can contest governments or other arms of the state. Skovgaard-Petersen 
demonstrates, for example, how Middle Eastern muftis, while occupying state-
appointed positions, exercise a degree of autonomy by balancing between the demands 
of the state, the society, as well as religious interests.36 He views state muftis “less a 
representative of the state… but rather an ally of a faction of the regime” that is in 
power, as they utilise the state as “an instrument for their pious and devout religious 
policies.”37 These points demonstrate that state fatwas combine a number of factors, 
including scholarly disputes, wisdom of the jurists, and modern realities, which lead 
to analogical extensions of the body of legal knowledge. Muftis were therefore the 
“creative mediators” of the “ideal and the real of the shari'a”.38Attention drawn in these 
works on fatwas points to the complex state-societal considerations behind the issuing 
of fatwas. Just as importantly, they show that there are limits to how much a fatwa can 
deviate from the mainstream traditional position as it seeks to balance scriptural, 
traditional, and modern demands. As Messick puts it: “In this gap between divine plan 
and human understanding lay the perennially fertile space of critique, the locus of an 
entire politics articulated in the idiom of the shari'a… [T]he community confronted 
 
35 Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, 1997; Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, ‘A 
Typology of State Muftis’, Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity, Eds Y. Yazbeck Haddad & 
B. Freyer Stowasser, Altamira Press, Walnut Creek, Ca, 2004, 81–97. 
36 Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and Fatwas of the Dār Al-
Iftā, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia, v. 59 (Leiden ; New York: 
Brill, 1997); Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, ‘Fatwas in Print’, Culture & History, no. 16 (1997): 73–88; 
Skovgaard-Petersen, ‘A Typology of State Muftis’. 
37 Skovgaard-Petersen, ‘A Typology of State Muftis’, 81. 
38 Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society 
(Univ of California Press, 1996), 151. 
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the problems of developing a more detailed corpus of rules and procedures while 
continually adjusting to new social realities.”39 
State fatwas are positioned as an extension of state bureaucracy and designed to 
instruct how Muslims live their religious lives. They also demonstrate how co-opted 
religious institutions affect not only religious praxis in society, but also state decisions. 
The recognition of fatwas by the state represents a crucial indicator of how state-
religious negotiation takes place today. It is worth noting that in many Muslim-
majority countries today, the position of the mufti is a public office, a practice that can 
be traced as far back as the tenth century CE.40 But more interesting is that this office 
is also established in several secular non-Muslim majority countries today, including 
in Singapore.41 
A common position held by many observers is that the appointment of muftis by the 
state, be it in the Middle East or Southeast Asia, is an effort to curtail their 
independence.42 While these observations hold some truth to it, my thesis qualifies 
such a statement. The focus on religious restrictions imposed through state legislations 
and institutions can indeed curb the effectiveness of religious bureaucrats, yet this does 
not mean that the negotiation of religious demands rests solely on the domain of non-
state religious elites (such as Islamist political parties or religious activists). Religious 
co-optation and bureaucratisation are often examined from the standpoint of the state 
and consequently discuss the restriction of religious demands, which then 
inadvertently diminishes the agency of religious bureaucrats, including muftis. My 
research, however, focuses on the perspective of co-opted entities, and therefore 
 
39 Messick, 17. 
40 ‘Ifta’, n.d., http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/opr/t125/e978; Richard W. Bulliet, ‘The Shaikh 
Al-Islām and the Evolution of Islamic Society’, Studia Islamica, no. 35 (1972): 53–67, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1595475. 
41 Examples include Thailand, Russia, and Romania. See: Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and 
Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western 
Burma/Myanmar (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2002); Imtiyaz Yusuf, ‘Islam and Democracy in 
Thailand: Reforming the Office of “Chularajmontri/Shaikh Al-Islam”’, Journal of Islamic Studies 9, 
no. 2 (1998): 277–98; Galina Yemelianova, ‘Russia’s Umma and Its Muftis’, Religion, State and 
Society 31, no. 2 (June 2003): 139–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/09637490308285; Jørgen S Nielsen, 
ed., Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 
42 M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatāwā, Asian Studies 
Association of Australia Southeast Asia Publications Series (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2003); Steiner, ‘Governing Islam: The State, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) 
and Islam in Singapore’; Skovgaard-Petersen, ‘A Typology of State Muftis’. 
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examines how state regulation can be affirmed, negotiated, and resisted. I advance this 
by analysing the functions of state fatwas.  
My area of research focus beings about significant benefit as it provides a more 
nuanced analysis on the negotiation of religious demands by bringing in the 
perspective of religious elites who are already embedded in state bureaucracy. This 
matters because in light of studies mentioned earlier on state-religious demands, which 
tend to take a binary view of the outcome, my research expands the middle ground 
between these two sets of interest. These interests intersect through state fatwa 
institutions that issue religious instructions while being situated within the modern 
state bureaucracy. Furthermore in the literature I mentioned, the agency of religious 
bureaucrats is often conflated with their official role as state functionaries,43 something 
which my thesis intends to qualify since these religious actors also possess 
considerable authority to contest state decisions. My research expands on the 
relationship of fatwas in particular to the realities of the modern state. This especially 
concerns a particular aspect of fatwa-making that is subject to the demands of an 
overarching state. State fatwas have to operate within state regulations that empower 
them, yet also constrict their functions. The mediation between sacred and secular 
interests also bolsters the role of fatwas in the modern secular state as they latch on 
and expand their bureaucratic and legal positions. I therefore demonstrate how state 
fatwas navigate such pressure from ‘above’ as they juggle ancient traditions and 
modern demands. What this negotiation results in is the amalgamation of state 
policies, law, and bureaucratic restrictions as seen through religious edicts, which I 
conceptualise as Statist Islam.  
State fatwas embody elements of bureaucratic, legal, and traditional authority, which 
allow them to both legitimise and challenge state decisions. Especially in investigating 
state-religious dynamics, fatwas should not be neglected just because they are linked 
to the state. Rather because of this link, fatwas should be examined as a formalised 
representation of demands by co-opted religious elites. This macro-analysis allows me 
to examine to what extent state control of religion is pervasive, and what, if possible, 
do fatwas do to mitigate this effect. 
 
43 I will elaborate on this point in Chapter 2. 
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Moreover, state fatwas represent how a traditional religious body (i.e. the fatwa-
issuing institution) asserts its authority, and in the process becomes relevant to the 
various nation-building projects of the modern state. For example, the co-optation of 
such institutions can foster perceptions of legitimacy to the government.44 Yet it also 
means that these institutions are involved in the decision-making process of creating 
state-sanctioned religious projects. In this sense, state fatwas are central to state 
projects because their primary function is to inform and define the authoritative 
normative position of Islamic religious practices for Muslims.45 
The study of state fatwas in nation-building projects is important, yet – with Indonesia 
as the only exception – it is something that has been overlooked in Southeast Asian 
countries. Academic work has largely been restricted to examine state fatwas’ 
jurisprudential analysis and procedural limitations, rather than their political outcomes 
and consequences.46 In other words, there is a lack of research on the political 
undercurrents involved in the establishment of state fatwa institutions, the effects of a 
highly bureaucratic fatwa-making process on state-religious relationship, as well as 
the impact of state fatwas on state-society dynamics. This is despite the fact that state 
fatwas have been shown to “constitute an important form of dialogue” between state 
and religious interests,47 if not influence state policies in Muslim-majority countries.48 
Even in places where Muslims form the minority, fatwas in general remain relevant 
 
44 Robert Hefner, ‘Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia’, Islam in an Era of Nation-States, 
1997, 75–127; Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia; Seyyed Vali Reza 
Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
45 Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, 1997; Masud, Messick, and Powers, 
Islamic Legal Interpretation; R Robet, ‘Perda, Fatwa and the Challenge to Secular Citizenship in 
Indonesia’, in State and Secularism Perspectives from Asia, ed. Michael S. H Heng and C. L Ten 
([Hackensack] New Jersey: World Scientific, 2010), 263–78, 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=731207; Kaptein, ‘The Voice of the ˋUlamâ’: 
Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia’. 
46 Hasnan Kasan, Institusi Fatwa Di Malaysia [The Fatwa Institution in Malaysia] (Bangi: Penerbit 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2008); Ahmad Hidayat Buang, ‘Analisis Fatwa-Fatwa Semasa 
Syariah Di Malaysia [An Analysis of Contemporary Shariah Fatwas in Malaysia]’, Jurnal Syariah 10, 
no. 1 (2002): 39–52; Rahimin Affandi Abdul Rahim, ‘Ijtihad Dalam Institusi Fatwa Di Malaysia: Satu 
Analisis [Ijtihad in Malaysia’s Fatwa Instiution: An Analysis]’, Jurnal Syariah 17, no. 1 (2009): 195–
222; Othman Ishak, Fatwa Dalam Perundangan Islam [Fatwa in Islamic Legislation] (Kuala 
Lumpur: Fajar Bakti, 1981); Mohamed Fatris Bakaram, ‘Theories of Iftā’ in Islamic Law with Special 
Reference to the Shāfi‘ī School of Law and Their Application in Contemporary Singapore’ 
(University of Birmingham, 2009). 
47 Hooker, Indonesian Islam, 87. 
48 Jeremy Menchik, ‘The Co-Evolution of Sacred and Secular: Islamic Law and Family Planning in 
Indonesia’, South East Asia Research 22, no. 3 (1 September 2014): 359–78, 
https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2014.0220; Syafiq Hasyim, ‘Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Pluralism in 
Indonesia’, Philosophy & Social Criticism 41, no. 4–5 (2015): 487–95. 
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as they address a diverse range of everyday issues. This holds true even in Western 
Europe and North America,49 and of course the subject of my thesis: Singapore. 
3.2 Singapore 
Singapore is the smallest country in Southeast Asia (by land area) and home to a 
minority Muslim population. Out of its 5.6 million residents, only 15% are Muslims, 
the vast majority of whom are of the Malay ethnicity.50 Muslims in Singapore are 
therefore typically referred to as ‘Malay-Muslims’. Singapore declares itself a secular 
country, and even describes itself as “strictly secular”.51 Here, my research provides 
an insight for analysing minority Muslim aspects, which resonate with other Muslim 
experiences in a secular environment, such as those in the West. 
Singapore makes for a fascinating case study because despite the state’s self-
proclaimed commitment to secularism, it employs a “paradoxical” role in regulating 
religious behaviour by actively determining the limits of Islamic orthopraxy and 
orthodoxy in the country.52 The contrast between the secular interest of the state and 
the religious interest that fatwas represent allows me to clearly mark out where the 
differences between the state and the fatwa institution lie. While such a scenario is not 
impossible to capture in Muslim-majority countries, state-religious differences can be 
obscured by the shared interests of state-linked religious elites and a government that 
acts in the interest of its Muslim-majority electorate. Therefore in a secular Muslim-
minority state, the cleavage between state and religious (i.e. Islamic) interests becomes 
more pronounced. 
Singapore’s version of secularism manifests itself in a very authoritarian manner. 
Areas where potential contestations against the state can emerge are highly 
regulated.53 This leads the state to manage contestations through a series of measures, 
 
49 Zaman, ‘From Imam to Cyber-Mufti’; John R. Bowen, ‘Beyond Migration: Islam as a 
Transnational Public Space’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, no. 5 (September 2004): 
879–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183042000245598; Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age. 
50 Singapore, ed., Census of Population 2010 (Singapore: Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010). 
51 A previous Home Affairs Minister of Singapore said: ‘No single religion can be said to be the 
dominant religion, nor is any religion an official religion of the State because Singapore is strictly 
secular.’ Thio, ‘Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: Managing Religious Harmony in 
Singapore’s Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State’, 203. 
52 Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, Muslims as Minorities: History 
and Social Realities of Muslims in Singapore, Cet. 1 (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia, 2009); cited in Steiner, ‘Governing Islam: The State, the Administration of Muslim Law 
Act (AMLA) and Islam in Singapore’. 
53 Case, ‘New Uncertainties for an Old Pseudo-Democracy’; Hamayotsu, ‘Islam and Nation Building 
in Southeast Asia’; Hefner, Remaking Muslim Politics : Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization; 
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including “pre-emptive institutional initiatives” that co-opt societal actors within the 
fold of the state.54 Included among these co-opted entities are religious elites and 
institutions. Yet as my thesis argues, this brings about an ironic outcome because co-
optation also strengthens the legal-bureaucratic position of the co-optees in the state. 
In Singapore, the co-optation of religious institutions was made possible through 
bureaucratisation, which enabled state control over religious projects. As I mentioned 
earlier, the co-optation of religion is one theme that underlines my research, as it 
explains – albeit partially – how the relationship between the state and religious 
institutions developed over time as a result of authoritarianism, political pragmatism, 
as well as religious activism. There are several reasons behind the creation of an 
Islamic religious bureaucracy in Singapore, which I will elaborate in Chapter 3. I will 
briefly point out some of them here. Firstly, Singapore is located in a region that is 
rich in Islamic history, where Islam has been present and observed for several 
centuries. Where the modern religious bureaucracy is concerned, its development is 
relatively recent and can be traced back to 1880 when special laws were enacted by 
the British colonial power to standardise the administration of religious affairs. 
Secondly, Singapore has inextricable links to its Muslim-majority neighbours, 
especially Malaysia. Prior to British colonisation, Singapore was part of the Sultanate 
of Johor, the southmost state in Malaysia today. Johor until today is ruled by a Malay-
Muslim sultan where, just like the rest of Malaysia, Islamic institutions remain part of 
state machinery and Islamic law forms parts of its legal system. Furthermore between 
1963 to 1965 Singapore merged with Malaysia and its constitution borrowed heavily 
from Malaysia’s, which designated special recognition to the Islamic faith. Thirdly, 
Singapore is sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia, two prominent Muslim-
majority countries where religion – specifically Islam – continues to play an influential 
role in politics. Even as a Muslim-minority country, Singapore can be susceptible to 
Islamic religious trends due to proximity to its neighbours. As a result in order to 
preserve dominance, the secular Singapore state closely regulates avenues where 
religious contestations can occur. One of the ways it does this is through the co-
optation of religious institutions, which then channels religious demands through the 
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religious bureaucracy. The creation of a religious bureaucracy – while giving religious 
institutions access to state resources – facilitates the state to assert its interests through 
a series of legal-bureaucratic regulation. 
It is important to note that the regulation of religious affairs in Singapore should not 
be taken as a distinct policy that is specifically targeted at Muslims.55 The regulation 
of the Islamic faith was the result of various factors and circumstances (some which I 
mentioned above) that culminates together with the establishment of a modern state. 
While it is undeniable that the native Muslim community seems to bear the brunt of 
state scrutiny on religious affairs,56 I must also caution that this should be seen as part 
of a larger authoritarian state policy that seeks to regulate all potential avenues of 
political contestation, be it religiously-motivated or otherwise.57  
It is not only Muslims who have their religious affairs scrutinised or managed by the 
state. Hindus, who form 5% of Singapore’s population, also have a recognised 
statutory body created in 1968 called the Hindu Endowments Board (HEB). The core 
function of the HEB is the management of Hindu temples and various other assets.58 
There is also the Hindu Advisory Board which advises the state on Hindu religious 
issues, thus constructing a version of “proper Hinduism”59 as the state-religious 
authorities converge. For the larger groups of Buddhists/Taoists and Christians, who 
account for 44% and 18% of the population respectively, there is strikingly no specific 
government department or statutory body that regulates their affairs. However this 
does not make them exempt from state involvement in their faith. Various measures 
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have been taken by the state to manage these religions as well. To illustrate, Religious 
Knowledge was a subject introduced in Singapore secondary schools in the 1980s, 
which covered various faiths including Christianity. However the state feared that this 
led to increased religiosity among Christians (and Muslims), and the subject was 
scrapped after just four years.60 Then there is the case involving supposed ‘Marxist 
Conspirators’ who allegedly tried to subvert the state. These ‘conspirators’ were 
arrested, among them a Catholic priest. Other priests criticised the arrests but were 
reprimanded by the state.61 Singapore also bans Jehovah’s Witness partly due to its 
members’ refusal to sing the national anthem and serve in the uniformed conscription. 
Several other churches were also banned by the state, citing political interference as a 
reason.62  
Various legal mechanisms have also been introduced to further legitimise state 
regulation of religion, such as the 1990 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act which 
criminalises religious institutions and leaders from, among others, “carrying out 
activities to promote a political cause, or a cause of any political party while, or under 
the guise of, propagating or practising any religious belief.”63 (Emphasis mine) These 
examples underline the paranoid approach that the state takes in managing religious 
affairs. Above all, these cases signify the state’s suspicion of potential religious-
motivated contestations against its authority and conformity, which leads to the 
pervasive management of religious practice. 
Yet across all organised religions in Singapore, the management of the Islamic faith 
is the most visible due to it being the most bureaucratised religion in the country. This 
highly bureaucratised form of religious administration provides a distinct entry point 
in examining the state-religious relationship in Singapore. This is because by 
bureaucratising religious institutions, the Singapore state endows them with 
“positional authority” 64 that can both curb and boost the power of such institutions. In 
 
60 Charlene Tan, ‘From Moral Values to Citizenship Education: The Teaching of Religion in 
Singapore Schools’, in Religious Diversity in Singapore, ed. Lai, Ah Eng (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies & Institute of Policy Studies, 2008), 321–41. 
61 Thio, ‘Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: Managing Religious Harmony in Singapore’s 
Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State’. 
62 Kevin Y.L. Tan, ‘Law, Religion, and the State in Singapore’, The Review of Faith & International 
Affairs 14, no. 4 (October 2016): 65–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2016.1248537. 
63 ‘Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act’ (1990), sec. 8, https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/MRHA1990. 
64 Michael Saward, ‘Cooption and Power: Who Gets What from Formal Incorporation’, Political 
Studies 38, no. 4 (1990): 588–602. 
20 
 
this sense, the co-optation of religion through bureaucratic mechanisms cannot be read 
simply as an instrument of control, but also as a process that enables certain religious 
groups to gain a level of legitimacy and authority within an ostensibly secular state. 
Among the beneficiaries of this bureaucratisation is the fatwa-issuing body – typically 
referred to as the Fatwa Committee – responsible for issuing religious decrees for the 
Muslim community. 
I should be clear that I place fatwas at a juncture that is legally and bureaucratically 
connected to the state, yet somewhat removed from its clutches. It is true that the 
fatwa-issuing body is situated under the Islamic administrative body MUIS, and MUIS 
itself is a statutory board that is positioned under a government ministry. Yet MUIS 
itself cannot be simplistically defined as The State. It may be linked to The State, but 
its establishment and bureaucratisation – in its original purpose and intent – is as a 
statutory board that is expected to exercise some degree of autonomy. Hence the state-
linked religious bureaucracy can, at the very least, claim semi-state autonomy.65 For 
the Fatwa Committee that is linked to semi-state MUIS, it also possesses an added 
degree of separation from the state as its members include volunteer ulama that further 
removes them from state logic. I will elaborate more on this aspect of the Fatwa 
Committee in Chapter 3 when I trace the legal-bureaucratic development of state 
fatwas. In addition to this qualification of state fatwas’ bureaucratic dynamic, their 
actual function also provides an insight on this relationship to the state. As I will show 
in later chapters, state fatwas demonstrate a high degree of autonomy despite their 
bureaucratic connection. 
4 A Brief Conceptual Outlook 
In order to examine the functions of fatwas in the modern state, this thesis invokes 
specific concepts related to political sociology. Although religion is an important 
theme in this research, I must be clear that I do not set out to survey its ontological or 
epistemological definition in political sociology.66 Instead my thesis explores the role 
of state fatwas that represent the demands of religious elites, demands that go beyond 
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“a set of doctrines binding to the individual,”67 but as an “ideology, as a blueprint for 
social reality.”68 A key element in examining such demands are religious institutions 
including fatwa issuers, which were bureaucratised to become a part of the state. While 
bureaucratisation undeniably facilitated state control of religion,69 it also made these 
state-sanctioned religious bodies to become a conduit for advancing the demands of 
religious elites. Going further, I will probe how these demands can affect state 
decisions and expand the legal-bureaucratic relevance of fatwas in the modern state 
structures. 
A key assumption underpinning statist intervention in the religious domain is the idea 
of the autonomous state. The autonomous state refers to the notion that the state should 
be understood not so much as an arena of contestation,70 but as an autonomous actor 
in itself. Here, the autonomous state is described as a Weberian organisation whose 
goals and objectives are separated from other interests. In other words, state interest is 
not necessarily “reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or 
society.”71 In analysing state-societal relations, state decision-making and the 
formulation of policies is therefore taken to be largely independent of other non-state 
interests. 
The bureaucratisation of religious institutions is then considered a project of the 
autonomous state to assert its authority over religious elites. It allows the state to tie 
religious elites to state logics and enables the state to manage various religious matters. 
Yet the association of religious institutions to the state is not a one-way street, as co-
opted religious elites can also use this link to assert their demands. To conceptualise 
this, the relationship between the state and the religious co-optees is examined through 
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the lens of policy feedback, which in this case refers to how state policies create new 
avenues and constituents that can affect future state decisions.72 Policy feedback is 
rooted in Schattschneider’s observation that “Whoever decides what the game is about 
decides also who gets into the game”.73 Here, the state sets ‘the game’ by advancing a 
policy to closely regulate religious affairs. In doing so, religious institutions were co-
opted within its fold. 
Yet by getting into ‘the game’, the co-optees are also granted valuable access to state 
resources. Focusing on state fatwas therefore enables me to analyse how the demands 
of these co-opted religious elites are advanced within the workings of the state 
machinery. As state fatwas bear the metaphorical stamp of state approval, they not 
only instruct religious praxis for the local Muslim community but can also negotiate 
and inform state decisions through their legal-bureaucratic recognition. 
Co-optation and bureaucratisation therefore allowed state fatwas to shape ‘the game’, 
made possible through the ‘positional authority’ that they gained. To be more precise, 
I identify two forms of authority which state fatwas assert: (1) legal-bureaucratic 
authority and (2) traditional-societal authority. 
Legal-bureaucratic authority is derived from the formal recognition of fatwas by the 
state. The running of the modern state necessitates acts of co-optation to be formalised 
through bureaucratic as well as legal recognitions. Bureaucratically, the fatwa-issuing 
body is situated within an institution that administers Islamic religious affairs known 
as MUIS. MUIS itself is a statutory board under the purview of a government ministry. 
Legally, fatwas are recognised through the Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA), a legal enactment that encompasses Islamic affairs in Singapore. AMLA 
details the various aspects of state fatwas, such as their legal jurisdiction and the fatwa-
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making process. This legal-bureaucratic advantage boosts the position of state fatwas 
in society as it elevates them over other non-official fatwas. 
Another aspect of fatwas that should not be ignored is their traditional-societal 
authority, which remains crucial to their core function as a form of religious 
instruction. While legal-bureaucratic authority grants state fatwas important modern 
relevance, it also restricts their function by tying them to formal regulations. Despite 
that, state fatwas can function beyond these regulations. After all at its very basic, a 
fatwa is simply an answer to a religious question, given by a religious teacher or 
scholar. This is a normative, even expected, aspect of religious tradition as laypeople 
seek instructions from religious specialists on how to practice religion. Fatwas are 
issued by a wide range of religious scholars, the vast majority of whom are not backed 
by the modern bureaucratic authority. Therefore, most fatwas are non-binding because 
they function as straightforward answers on religion, separated from the modern legal-
bureaucratic realm. This also grants them the flexibility to freely address religious 
issues without being tied to modern regulations. Herein also lies the unique influence 
of fatwas as the religious scholars who issue them rely on their traditional recognition 
as successors of a religious legacy and interpreters of sacred texts. This is what I refer 
to as fatwas’ traditional-societal authority, which allows them to directly instruct the 
Muslim community in spite of state and legal procedures. Traditional-societal 
authority is a form of authority based on long-standing Islamic religious tradition, and 
inherent in the very function of fatwas as a mode of religious instruction.Although 
traditional-societal authority remains a key feature of fatwas, even when associated 
with the modern state this does not necessarily impede their authority. I contend that 
the state-linked legal-bureaucratic links can also amplify their influence on the Muslim 
community.  
It is important to note that the bureaucratisation (or indeed co-optation) of fatwas by 
the modern state is not a classical juristic phenomenon. Early Islamic polity saw a 
robust practice of iftā’ (fatwa-making) as fatwas were solicited from religious scholars 
who rose to prominence having established their own jurisprudential school of 
thought, which largely shaped the outcome of Islamic legal discourse until today. Over 
time with the evolution of state bureaucracy, the position of muftis became embedded 
into state structures. The most notable development was recorded circa the 10th century 
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as the seat of the mufti officially became public office.74 The position of state muftis 
evolved with the advent of the modern nation-state system. Some countries also 
incorporated traditional religious institutions into the modern state bureaucracy, as the 
latter subsumed the administration of Islamic affairs. This includes the management 
of charitable religious endowments, collection of alms, and even administration of 
madrasahs and mosques. For the fatwa-issuing body, this resulted in the state 
recognition muftis which then cemented their official position in the modern state. 
This recognition granted state-linked authority not only to the mufti, but also the 
fatwas that he issues, which is the focus of this thesis.  
Despite the proximity of the modern fatwa institution to the state, I do not take the 
position that their proximity to the state negates their autonomy, a common 
assumption in addressing modern religious bureaucracies in the Southeast Asia.75 Yet 
my thesis also does not deny that co-optation takes place. Rather what it does is that it 
qualifies the exact nature of this state-religious co-optation; state fatwas exhibit 
particular autonomy not only by issuing fatwas against state policies and court 
decisions, but gradually became bureaucratically and legally entrenched to be able to 
define the ‘right’ kind of religious praxis in Singapore 
Identifying these two distinct channels of authority is crucial in developing an 
understanding of how state fatwas function in a modern state.  My research underlines 
that state-linked religious institutions can resist state decisions, and more importantly 
it demonstrates how these forms of resistance take place in a highly-regulated 
authoritarian milieu. I do this by inspecting the effects state fatwas have on state 
decisions and vice versa. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, state policies can encroach on 
how religious praxis is observed. In cases where the government engaged state fatwas, 
they can influence the direction of policies. However when fatwas were omitted from 
the policymaking process – i.e. when their legal-bureaucratic authority is ignored – 
their traditional-societal authority was invoked in order to retain control over the 
direction of religious praxis in the Muslim community. Another set of fatwas which I 
examine concerns the authority of state fatwas in the court of law (Chapter 5). This set 
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of cases reveals the extent of state fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic authority vis-à-vis the 
judiciary. Yet despite losing in court, the fatwa body flexed its traditional-societal 
authority by taking several measures to preserve these court-overruled fatwas. These 
examples demonstrate the ways in which religious resistance takes place among co-
opted religious institutions. Contesting state policies or court judgments might be an 
expected behaviour of Islamist political groups, but not so for state-sanctioned 
religious bureaucrats. These case studies, of fatwas and state policies and of fatwas 
and civil law, therefore highlight the overlooked consequences of co-opting religious 
elements. As fatwas – which originally function outside state regulations – become 
tied to legal-bureaucratic regulations, they not only gained the advantage to shape state 
decisions, but also benefited from having their authority and relevance expanded 
through these very regulations that were meant to control them. This has become even 
more apparent as security concerns stemming from radicalised individuals have 
caused the state to regulate even more religious issues. As I will explain in Chapter 6, 
these developments changed the institutional capacity of the state as it relies on state 
fatwas to counter radical online fatwas. As a result, state fatwas became the basis to 
police boundaries of acceptable religious teachings in Singapore. They became the 
legal benchmark of religious praxis, and this ultimately means that the legal relevance 
of state fatwas expanded and became more entrenched in state structures. Thus the 
combination of informal traditional-societal authority and formalised legal-
bureaucratic authority allows fatwas to affect not only societal religious praxis, but 
also the state’s interpretation of it as well.  
Overall, the outcome of these forms of resistance, negotiation, and contestation is 
conceptualised as Statist Islam. In essence, Statist Islam represents the fusion of 
religious and statist interests. However beyond its normative use to refer to religious 
projects driven by the state,76 my conception of Statist Islam recognises the complex 
negotiation between state and religious interests, as well as its intended and unintended 
consequences. To be more precise, Statist Islam is the amalgamation of state and 
religious interests, arrived at through the negotiation of issues involving the state and 
state-aligned religious bureaucrats, and at times other domestic and exogenous factors. 
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Examining Statist Islam means examining the various forms of authority that are 
invoked in these negotiations to reveal the changing capacity and function of state 
fatwas in directing religious praxis. The nature of state-religious relationship through 
the co-optation of religious institutions, and the subsequent resistance and negotiation, 
underlines how Statist Islam manifests in Singapore. 
5 Methodology and Contributions 
In order to examine the effects of co-optation and bureaucratisation of religious 
institutions on the decisions of the modern state, my research has focused on the legal 
and bureaucratic dynamics between fatwas and the state. In Chapter 4, I will scrutinise 
how fatwas affect state decisions by focusing on public policies that relate to health 
and reproduction issues. These are themes that fatwas typically address because 
developments concerning health and medicine can often challenge traditional religious 
positions. Another pertinent area is the position of state fatwas in the legal system, 
especially because their claim of relevance to the modern state is rooted in modern 
legal statutes. My case study – in particular Chapter 5 – will show the differences 
between the Fatwa Committee and the court in interpreting Singapore’s legal statute 
on Islamic affairs AMLA, and what it means in terms of how state fatwas function. 
As my thesis focuses on the politics of state fatwas, the only way I could pursue it is 
by relying on sources that record how fatwas and state interests intertwine. No 
previous research on the politics of fatwas in Singapore exists and as such, I had to 
rely on confidential documents that shed light on the fatwa-making process in 
Singapore. These documents are the Fatwa Committee’s minutes of meetings which 
showed the deliberations and considerations of committee members (that are not 
necessarily explained when a fatwa is publicised). Clearly this is an advantage that 
allowed me to take an in-depth look into the complexities of fatwa-making, and 
identify how negotiation and resistance take place through state fatwas. 
This thesis utilises a three-pronged methodological approach. It consists of (a) tracing 
and mapping state fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic and traditional-societal authority, (b) 
analysing the official fatwa-issuing processes and unofficial responses, and (c) 
examining the legal impact of state fatwas. To elaborate: 
a. A key approach I utilise is tracing and mapping state fatwas’ 
institutional and bureaucratic relationship with the state. Tracing the 
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establishment of an official fatwa institution and the relevant statutory laws not 
only demonstrates how fatwas fit within the structure of the state, but also gives 
a strong indicator of their intended purpose. Next, examining the text of state 
fatwas, mufti statements, societal reactions, news reports, newspaper forums, 
and policy references to state fatwas enables me to analyse the extent of their 
function beyond the formal legal and bureaucratic duties. They also allow me 
to analyse the reactions of members of the society and their attitude towards 
state fatwas, which then reveals the societal expectation of these official 
religious decrees. In other words, these sources reveal both the legal-
bureaucratic and traditional-societal functions of state fatwas. 
Relevant sections are supported by biographical and semi-structured 
interviews with key figures, including the current and former Muftis of 
Singapore, as well as several other religious elites. While the interviews were 
used only for a small section of this thesis, they were nonetheless useful to 
confirm my interpretation of events that occurred, and also to understand the 
dynamics between fatwas and the state. Interviews were conducted mainly in 
the Malay language, but given the nature of the subject matter, the Arabic 
language was also used to explain the religious reasonings behind fatwas. My 
background in Islamic Studies and familiarity with Islamic religious 
nomenclatures proved instrumental in this regard as it allowed me to appreciate 
the nuances of Islamic religious terminologies and concepts. 
Parts of this thesis heavily referenced the Fatwa Committee’s minutes of 
meetings. These minutes are a set of unique and confidential documents that 
are not open to the public, and to which I have been granted access by the Mufti 
of Singapore. Although MUIS – the religious administrative body – was 
initially hesitant that these details are used in my thesis, they eventually 
relented, although by then I have decided to have the thesis embargoed so as 
to give me time to expand on certain chapters while considering publication. 
These minutes of meetings recorded the discussions and deliberations of the 
Fatwa Committee and contained details from the very first meeting held in 
October 1968 until the most recent ones. For my research, I analysed these 
documents, which were written mostly in the Malay language, with some 
sections containing hand-written Arabic texts. Only the more recent minutes 
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are recorded in English. While these documents are somewhat organised, they 
are not digitised. This means that in order to find the right sources, I had to 
physically sieve through thousands of pages of the documents, appendixes 
containing newspaper and book clippings, letters from fatwa petitioners, as 
well as correspondences from the various state ministries, politicians, overseas 
muftis, and the likes.77 
Another point to raise here is that going through these minutes of meetings 
gave me unfettered access to all Singapore state fatwas that were ever issued. 
Only a small percentage of state fatwas in Singapore were publicised, and even 
less were digitised, making searching for them a tedious affair. Publicised state 
fatwas cannot be found in one place, rather they are scattered across 
newspapers, booklets compiling selected fatwas, and also internet archives 
(which preserve fatwas that were once published online but taken down). Yet 
because not all fatwas were published nor publicised, there is no single central 
database for Singapore state fatwas except through the minutes of meetings. 
Herein lies the benefit of bureaucratic record-keeping: each fatwa that was 
issued – publicised or not – had to be discussed, and since every discussion is 
recorded, the minutes become the only source that combines all fatwas that 
were ever deliberated. Access to the minutes of meetings is therefore a treasure 
trove that can propel more research in the future, because aside from fatwas 
they also show how different institutions and individuals within the religious 
bureaucracy interpret Islamic rulings differently, revealing discrepancies 
between institutional policies (that can contradict state fatwas), and underline 
the robust room for negotiation when it comes to official religious policies in 
a secular country. 
I must also be clear that despite the nature of my access to materials and people 
(i.e. the interviewees) related to the fatwa institution, I am not in any way 
constricted in my freedom to write what I feel is right. This point is 
demonstrated in my thesis in several ways. My interviews had included the 
current and former muftis of Singapore who provided useful background and 
historical information especially on the development of the fatwa committee 
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(see Chapter 3). However they were not the only interviewees, as I also 
interviewed several asatizah particularly concerning the regulation of Friday 
sermons in Singapore mosques (see Chapter 6). I also relied on written 
materials such actual fatwas and the minutes of meetings which exhibited the 
layers of complex state-religious negotiation taking place. While MUIS 
registered their disagreement over how I interpreted the minutes of meetings, 
these minutes were clearly cited in my thesis, which demonstrated the freedom 
I possess to access and analyse these documents and present them here without 
fear of repercussions. 
b. The thesis analyses the official fatwa processes and unofficial 
responses, which showed how fatwas were invoked, and to what extent they 
can inform, define, and also resist statist restrictions of religious praxis. Statist 
restrictions are mostly overt and clear measures designed to standardise 
decision-making processes and outcomes. This is the bureaucratic aspect that 
fatwa-making certainly abides by. However a deeper examination shows that 
state fatwas can also resist bureaucratic confines, and these forms of resistance 
are even found in fatwas that were amended to comply with court judgements. 
These ‘unofficial responses’ also come in the form of individual rejoinders by 
members of the Fatwa Committee that challenged state policies and court 
decisions. 
I examined these official and unofficial disputes by exploring various 
documents including state archives, legal texts and enactments, and court 
judgements. I also rely on Singapore newspapers especially the Malay-
language Berita Harian (lit. Daily News) that discusses Malay-Muslim issues, 
a popular platform for public discussion prior to today’s era of social media. I 
have to note that while newspapers in Singapore are digitised and indexed 
online, there is a peculiar restriction in place in which access to more recent 
decades are not available except via microfilm. So while I can fully read and 
cite Singapore newspaper articles dated in the 1800s from my home office in 
the UK, articles from the 1980s onwards can only be accessed by manually 
combing through microfilms in the National Library of Singapore (one of the 
reasons why I had to travel to Singapore repeatedly for my fieldwork). These 
materials found in the local newspaper archives proved immensely useful 
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because they shed light on the public debate taking place on religious issues, 
which also demonstrated the traditional-societal authority of fatwas on the 
Singapore Muslim community. 
c. A significant part of the research focuses on how fatwas as a whole are 
being recontextualised to suit new purposes. Examining the change in the 
function of state fatwas – from non-binding religious answers to benchmarking 
religious opinions and approving religious teachers – demonstrates how their 
legal-bureaucratic relevance developed to define and inform Statist Islam. This 
aspect of my research entails in-depth study and discourse analysis through 
newspaper archives, legal enactments, and recent social, religious, and 
political developments. 
Examining the functions and limitations of state fatwas reveals the role they play in 
negotiating, informing, and defining the boundary of acceptable Islamic practice in 
Singapore. This is conceptualised in what I referred to earlier as Statist Islam. 
5.1 Selection of Fatwas 
The case studies focus on how state fatwas relate to three key issues in Singapore: 
state policy, court judgements, and the evolution of fatwas’ legal relevance. The 
common thread between all these issues is that they test the extent of state fatwas’ 
capacity to negotiate state demands through their legal-bureaucratic position, which 
also reveal state fatwas’ continued reliance on their traditional-societal authority. 
Exploring the legal-bureaucratic function of state fatwas, their entrenchment in state 
structures, as well as the extent to which they are able to circumvent and later define 
this entrenchment, provides useful insights on a secular country that highly regulates 
domains of contestation. In working within the limited space to contest against state 
authority, state fatwas rely on their informal traditional-societal authority on the 
Muslim community as an alternative channel to contest state and legal decisions. 
I would like to briefly note that because the fatwa body functions in an authoritarian 
context, agenda setting is considered in the examination of state fatwas’s hierarchical 
authority in relation to the state. While the case studies that were selected highlighted 
the ‘peaceful competition’ that occurred in the authoritarian democracy,78 I posit that 
 
78 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 6. 
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contestations nonetheless occur as the fatwa institution attempts to assert power and 
authority within a highly restrictive environment. Drawing upon this point, agenda 
setting – the second face of power according to Lukes79 – is useful in explaining the 
areas in which state fatwas (and the religious bureaucracy in general) contest the state. 
Agenda setting naturally relates to the dominant feature of the Singapore state, one 
that seeks prolong status quo political standing through the close management of 
domains of contestations.80 As a result, the multiple platforms of contestation were 
constricted from proper democratic competition. Yet in such domains, selected 
institutions were given – or at least tolerated – a degree of autonomy to exercise their 
authority. In the case of the fatwa institution, this means that they can assert their 
authority through religious decrees. This is, as one would expect, contingent on these 
institutions not crossing the invisible line that marks the boundary of state power. 
However, the notion that the state controls everything should be properly scrutinised. 
Are institutions operating within state bureaucratic hierarchy, or indeed co-opted by 
the state, only able to affect change within pre-determined domains and issues? And 
even if we take this point as true, what consequence does this legal-bureaucratic co-
optation bring about for their authority in the state? My thesis takes the position that 
despite the authoritarian nature of the Singapore state, not everything is cast the way 
the state desires it. The examples that I chose recognise the existing legal-bureaucratic 
restrictions set by the state yet highlight the various ways in which constant 
negotiations and contestations take place through state fatwas. In other words, the 
selection of cases in this thesis underlines important ways in which Singapore state 
authority is contested, while examining the development of fatwas’ authority in 
modern the state. While I the state might have placed limits for state fatwa institutions, 
in that they might be restricted from publicly addressing certain topics, the issues 
which fatwas can address demonstrate how these restrictions were exploited to contest 
state decisions through existing legal-bureaucratic channels. The examination of these 
 
79 Lukes, Power. 
80 See for example: Beng Huat Chua, ‘Multiculturalism in Singapore: An Instrument of Social 
Control’, Race & Class 44, no. 3 (January 2003): 58–77, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396803044003025; Lily Zubaidah Rahim, ‘Governing Islam and 
regulating Muslims in Singapore’s secular authoritarian state’, Text, Australian Policy Online, 1 
October 2009, http://apo.org.au/node/19184; Turner, ‘Soft Authoritarianism, Social Diversity and 




contestations reveals that negotiations within areas approved by the state can indeed 
boost the positional authority of co-opted state fatwa institutions.  
I argue that this co-optation repositioned not only their positional authority vis-à-vis 
the Muslim community, but also redefined their role within the state structure, one that 
significantly places fatwas closely to the centre of the state where decision-making 
power ultimately lies. I do not claim state fatwas are they completely insulated from 
state demands, and neither are they skewed such that they simply succumb to state 
directives. Rather, what I contend here is that stemming from the legal-bureaucratic 
relevance of fatwas in the modern state, there are structural limitations as well as 
advantages that must be recognised, which both limit or expand the effectiveness of 
fatwa institutions’ authority against state decisions. The case studies I mention here 
represent unique opportunities where fatwas contest state authority in Singapore. As 
these contestations involve the most authoritative Islamic religious instructor in the 
land (i.e. the fatwa institution), they result in the shaping of a unique religious praxis 
which embodies the negotiation between state and religious demands. This 
particularity, which I term Statist Islam, manifests through the way in which Islam is 
practised, so much so that when examined closely enough it becomes evident that 
facets of Islamic religious observance in Singapore can be distinguished from its 
neighbouring countries. 
5.1.1 Case Study Set I 
I investigated state policies’ engagement with state fatwas as a nexus that reveals the 
latter’s bureaucratic relevance. Building on the concept of the autonomous state, the 
state’s petitioning of fatwas is taken as an attempt at legitimising policies. Although 
the state manages dissent by marking areas where contestations occur, these 
contestations can yet lead to fascinating consequences and compromises, as this set of 
case studies pertaining to health issues demonstrates. Two health-related policies with 
significant social implications are selected here, both of whom were objected by state 
fatwas. 
The first one concerns Singapore’s anti-natalist birth policy which introduced 
incentives as well as controversial penalties for those who intended to have big 
families. This episode exemplifies the dynamics involved in fatwa-making when state 
decisions and state fatwas stood on opposite ends of an issue. In essence, both insisted 
on their respective positions without much consideration for the other party. I will 
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probe how state fatwas exercised traditional-societal authority against a financially-
appealing state policy. This case study can also be representative of other issues where 
state decisions and fatwas do not see eye to eye. For example, state fatwas’ insistence 
on the compulsory nature of particular religious rituals for Muslims, and opposing 
state policies that complicate, if not oppose, the observation of these rituals. Therefore, 
this case study exemplifies parallels behind other instances where state fatwas are at 
odds with the state.81 
The second case study relates to the Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA) that 
automatically assumes organ donation consent from all adult Singaporeans. The organ 
donation fatwas showed how, when engaged by policymakers, both state policy and 
fatwas moderated each other’s position. While the state created a separate policy for 
Muslims to accommodate fatwas prohibiting organ donation, state fatwas also evolved 
over time to eventually permit Muslims to be included in the nationwide organ 
donation system. Analysing these policies and the policy feedback effect that occurred 
highlights the dynamics in the negotiation between state and religious interests, and 
underlines the role of state fatwas in shaping Statist Islam. 
5.1.2 Case Study Set II 
The second set of case studies examines state fatwas which were later overruled in the 
civil court. This is important because the Singapore state relies on the legal system as 
a way to control and manage the diverse religious interests as well as to preserve its 
own power.82 Yet building on the argument of pre-approved spaces of contestation, it 
becomes apparent that not all legal areas are closed off from disputes, such as Islamic 
inheritance law. 
 
81 Those familiar with recent state-religious issues in Singapore might question why I did not choose 
to examine the hijab controversy, in which the state refuses to allow students and uniformed workers 
from wearing the hijab. Aside from the fact that no fatwas were issued on the matter, the state has 
arbitrarily designated the right of Muslim women to wear the hijab as an issue that is closed off from 
contestations. My research however focuses on issues that are still contestable by fatwas. However, I 
will still address the hijab controversy in some detail in the concluding chapter. 
82 Steiner, ‘Governing Islam: The State, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) and Islam in 
Singapore’; Li-ann Thio, ‘Constitutional Soft Law and the Management of Religious Liberty and 
Order: The 2003 Declaration on Religious Harmony’, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 2004, 414–
43; Li-ann Thio, ‘Soft Constitutional Law in Nonliberal Asian Constitutional Democracies’, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 8, no. 4 (2010): 766–99; Li-ann Thio, ‘Between Eden and 
Armageddon: Navigating Religion and Politics in Singapore’, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 
2009, 365–405; Jaclyn L Neo, ‘Secular Constitutionalism in Singapore: Between Equality and 
Hierarchy’, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 5, no. 3 (2016): 431–56; Turner, ‘Soft 
Authoritarianism, Social Diversity and Legal Pluralism: The Case of Singapore’. 
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Briefly, estate distribution in Islam covers several instruments, among them Islamic 
intestate law (farāiḍ, alt. faraid), Islamic will (waṣiyyah, alt. wasiat), and also 
charitable endowment (waqf, alt. wakaf). The scope of my research is limited to cases 
that relates to farāiḍ because of its default status for Islamic estate distribution, 
consistent with its established position in the Shariah (alt. Syariah) as well as AMLA. 
Therefore the farāiḍ garners a wider practical and religious application than the rest, 
as shown by the public attention to Singapore court cases challenging farāiḍ.83 
Waṣiyyah will be addressed in a very limited manner in my case studies. Although 
waqf is another important instrument, its function as a charitable endowment limits its 
immediate appeal to a smaller, albeit wealthier, demography. Also there were prior 
studies which examined the Singapore experience in waqf and its inter-dependency 
with various legal, social, economic, and religious considerations, with limited 
references to fatwas.84 
This set of case studies therefore examine court cases related to Islamic estate 
distribution. The court provides a legal platform for members of the society to contest 
religious authority, and court judgements hold the power to define the legal status of 
state fatwas. Both the civil court and the fatwa body rely on AMLA – the statute that 
provides the legal framework for religious administration in Singapore – and these 
cases highlight their respective positions. In interpreting AMLA, the court drew upon 
the secular-legal viewpoint, while the Fatwa Committee relied on the religious 
perspective. The court eventually ruled against these fatwas, but my research does not 
end with the judgement; I examined how state fatwas circumvented this restriction by 
asserting their traditional-societal authority through a number of channels including 
amended fatwas, thus contesting Statist Islam on their own terms. 
5.1.3 Case Study Set III 
The mushrooming of online websites is strongly reminiscent of the rise of print media 
in the early 20th century when the ulama saw it as a threat to their position as 
“guardians of the Revelation”.85 The prevalence of online fatwas today, despite stark 
contextual differences, problematises Islamic legal rulings which tend to fit specific 
 
83 This point will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
84 Shamsiah Abdul Karim, ‘Contemporary Shari’a Compliance Structuring for the Development and 
Management of Waqf Assets in Singapore’, Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 3, no. 2 (2010): 
143–64; Shamsiah Bte Abdul Karim, ‘Contemporary Shari’ah Structuring for the Development and 
Management of Waqf Assets in Singapore’, 2010. 
85 Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, 1997, 95. 
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contexts and localities. This is further compounded by online radical fatwas that call 
for violence in the name of religion. 
The third set of case studies therefore examines how, in an attempt to address 
challenges posed by radical online fatwas, Islamic religious education is regulated and 
state fatwas are turned into legal markers of acceptable religious teachings.  
The religious bureaucracy took steps to discredit radical foreign fatwas not only by 
relying on the pulpit, but also making compulsory the registration of all Islamic 
religious teachers in Singapore. Called the Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS), it 
became legally mandatory for all Islamic religious teachers to be vetted and to undergo 
training every year. It also introduces a code of conduct that must be adhered to or the 
accreditation risks getting revoked.  
This third case study demonstrates the effects of policy feedback in the expansion of 
state fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic claim, as they become the legal benchmark that 
defines acceptable religious teachings. This development ultimately underlines a key 
function of state fatwas in shaping Statist Islam: their transformation into a legal tool 
to allow or restrict religious content. In effect, this reconfigures the institutional 
capacity of the state as it now monitors and polices religious classes according to 
fatwas, thus strengthening the position of these official religious decrees in state 
structures. 
5.2 Contribution 
This thesis makes a combination of empirical and conceptual contributions. 
Empirically, I had access to material that is not open to other researchers. The Fatwa 
Committee’s minutes of meetings shed light on an important aspect of the 
bureaucratisation of religion in Singapore. While some previous studies did cite these 
fatwa minutes, their scope of examination was almost exclusively limited to 
theological religious discussions.86 Furthermore these studies did not discuss state 
fatwas in terms of their political causes and consequences; I believe my thesis is the 
first to examine the politics of fatwas in Singapore. 
 
86 Bakaram, ‘Theories of Iftā’ in Islamic Law with Special Reference to the Shāfi‘ī School of Law and 
Their Application in Contemporary Singapore’; Shamsiah Abdul Karim, ‘Contemporary Shari’ah 
Structuring for the Development and Management of Waqf Assets in Singapore’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of Durham, 2010). 
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Conceptually, I work within the field of political sociology to expand the concept of 
policy feedback to other uses. Because policy feedback largely addresses broad-based 
policies such as economic programmes,87 taking the concept and applying it to my 
case studies demonstrates its potential in explaining niche policies, and in particular 
how religious demands are negotiated at the state level. Policy feedback is parti cularly 
instructive in evaluating how the state and its fatwa institution can be responsive to 
each other. This helps to explain how the autonomous state, as it attempts to shape 
religious projects, cannot be completely independent even of its own bureaucratic 
constituents.  
Furthermore policy feedback also allows me to shift away from the common narratives 
portraying the relationship of religious elites to the state. Through an examination of 
the demands of religious bureaucrats in state decisions, policy feedback complements 
the theory of Islamism/post-Islamism to recognise the often-dismissed political role 
of state-sanctioned religious institutions. Identifying the agency of religious 
bureaucrats also moderates analyses on religious co-optation which has thus far been 
rather partial to state elements rather than the co-optees. This essentially bridges 
between the theory of Islamism/post-Islamism and religious co-
optation/bureaucratisation; policy feedback provides vital links in connecting notions 
of religious activism to state co-optation.  
My thesis also unpacks how policy feedback occurs by conceptualising the authority 
of religious bureaucracy vis-à-vis other actors that it engages with. In relation to the 
state, I identified legal-bureaucratic authority as the main vehicle that formalises 
fatwas’ relationship to the state. This is due to a combination of factors, namely 
historical legacy as well as political expediency during the formation of an 
independent Singapore in 1965. I also identified another form of authority that 
embodies state fatwas’ relation to the Muslim community, and that is their traditional-
societal authority that manifests in their role as a form of religious instruction. These 
types of authority will be further explained in Chapter 2, along with their empirical 
application in the relevant case study chapters. 
 
87 For an overview on policy feedback literature, see: Daniel Béland, ‘Reconsidering Policy 
Feedback: How Policies Affect Politics’, Administration & Society 42, no. 5 (September 2010): 568–
90, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399710377444; Andrea Louise Campbell, ‘Policy Makes Mass 
Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 333–51. 
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The most significant contribution that this thesis makes is the novel conceptualisation 
of Statist Islam which recognises as well as qualifies the ‘statist’ element in religious 
projects to accommodate the role of other actors in informing, shaping, and defining 
them. Unlike common usage of the term that is restricted to either state-led religious 
projects or projects to Islamise the state,88 my definition takes into account both the 
agency of the state as well as the demands of the religious bureaucrats. This of course 
does not mean diminishing the role of other non-state and non-religious elites and 
actors, rather my thesis examines the particular function of state-linked religious 
bureaucrats in shaping the religious agenda despite these other actors. Statist Islam 
therefore provides a more nuanced conception of religious projects constricted by 
statist demands and restrictions, which is especially useful in places where religious 
institutions are vigorously co-opted by the state. 
All these underlines the religious and socio-political roles of state fatwas, useful in 
comparing the experiences of various countries in Southeast Asia in particular, and 
the Muslim world in general. State fatwas provide an entry point for the examination 
of religious bureaucrats through the investigation of state-sanctioned institutions. Also 
due to the status of the religious bureaucracy as a statutory board, my thesis 
problematises the presumed acquiescence of similar entities to the government – 
religious or otherwise – and opens up new avenues of research. 
6 Thesis Structure 
My thesis focuses on how the co-optation and bureaucratisation of religious 
institutions allowed state fatwas to negotiate religious interests via policy feedback. 
This is achieved by assessing state fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic authority which 
formalises their relationship to the state. Their traditional-societal authority is also 
examined, as it gives them an important channel to circumvent state restrictions. 
Beginning with the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the research, my 
argument proceeds by investigating the history of fatwas and the fatwa institution in 
Singapore which provides the necessary background context for what comes after. It 
then moves on to the three sets of case studies mentioned earlier that underline the 
relationship of state fatwas to state policies, court judgements, and recent legal 
 
88 Mohamad, ‘Making Majority, Undoing Family: Law, Religion and the Islamization of the State in 
Malaysia’; Saravanamuttu, ‘Encounters of Muslim Politics in Malaysia’; Saenong, ‘Statist Islam and 
Folk Islam Ethnohistory and Muslim Practices in Bantaeng’. 
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developments. I will conclude by providing a brief assessment on the application of 
Statist Islam in examining fatwas in Malaysia and Indonesia, and highlight the future 
direction of the research. 
Chapter 2 therefore reviews literature pertinent to the analysis of the state and religious 
bureaucracy. In order to discern the agency of religious bureaucrats, I will synthesise 
elements derived from literature discussing Islamism and state co-optation of religion. 
Working within the discipline of political sociology, I will conceptualise the 
relationship between the autonomous state and the religious bureaucrats through 
policy feedback. This is linked to the development of religious bureaucracy and the 
forms of authority that state fatwas and state fatwa institutions possess, which is 
pertinent in the examination of state projects that co-opt religious elites through the 
religious bureaucracy. Especially in Singapore where religious elites are endowed 
with legal-bureaucratic power – arguably an abnormal feature in a secular state – this 
places them in a difficult position; answering to secular political leaders yet 
maintaining appeal to the Muslim community. These complexities manifest in the 
negotiation of secular-religious demands and are subsequently conceptualised in what 
I call Statist Islam. The combination of these elements is then presented as an 
analytical framework to approach the empirical chapters that follow. 
Next, this thesis outlines the social and political history of the religious bureaucracy 
in Singapore, with emphasis on the state fatwa institution and the relevant laws and 
enactments. Chapter 3 thus analyses the broader historical context by looking at the 
colonial and post-colonial development of the religious bureaucracy in Singapore 
including two key events whose impact remains salient until today: the 1880 
Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance and the 1966 Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA). This chapter also provides a more detailed discussion of the fatwa-making 
process. I argue that the bureaucratisation of religious elites and enactment of Muslim 
law within the secular legal framework not only regulated religious demands, but also 
transformed fatwas into legally- and bureaucratically-relevant religious instructions. 
Fatwas became recognised through AMLA, which then sets out how official religious 
decrees operate in the Singapore state. The bureaucratisation of Islamic religious 
institutions, which formalised fatwas’ relation to the state, also placed them within 
state hierarchy and binds them to bureaucratic logic. This consequently sets the tone 
for state fatwas in contesting and shaping Statist Islam. 
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After examining the establishment of state fatwas, Chapter 4 investigates their 
function in interactions with the state. This chapter contains the first set of case studies: 
how fatwas contest and inform state policies. This is achieved by examining two health 
policies with deep-seated social impact: family planning and organ transplant. The 
legal-bureaucratic authority of state fatwas, while enabling them to inform state 
decisions, remains an unpredictable aspect of fatwas’ relation to the state. Meanwhile 
the traditional-societal authority that state fatwas command over the Muslim 
community – despite it being unwritten and informal – remains a more reliable form 
of power even in the modern state setting. 
The examination of state fatwas is then expanded to discuss their legal authority. 
Chapter 5 examines the legal relevance and limitation of state fatwas. I focus in 
particular on fatwas judged by the court and the consequences as several state fatwas 
were deemed repugnant to the law. This chapter reconstructs how state fatwas persist 
in shaping Statist Islam by exercising their traditional-societal authority over court 
judgements in the aftermath of their legal defeat. 
The case studies I mentioned above underlined the extent of state fatwas’ legal-
bureaucratic relevance and the attendant effects as they rely on more traditional forms 
of authority. However these cases do not fully capture how these ‘restricted’ legal-
bureaucratic channels can also be exploited to expand the function and authority of 
fatwas in society. Chapter 6 therefore scrutinises the expansion of fatwas’ legal 
authority. As the internet allows new actors to engage with and challenge state fatwas, 
the state and religious bureaucracy took legal measures to combat radical decrees by 
preserving the local brand of religious praxis. These measures demonstrated the 
extensive reach of state fatwas to legitimise local norms and discredit foreign ones, as 
their acceptance among religious teachers is formalised through a legal enactment, 
thus entrenching the role of state fatwas in defining Statist Islam. 
The thesis ends with Chapter 7 which re-assesses the analysis given in the earlier 
chapters and provides brief empirical comparisons to the function of fatwas in 
neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia. I will also outline the opportunities and avenues 
for other researchers to expand and build upon my research. 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the interactions 
between religious elites and the modern state today. Many studies cited earlier take 
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the view that state-sanctioned religious institutions, including the fatwa body, are at 
the behest of the state. My thesis however will argue that state fatwas are an anomaly 
in the state bureaucracy; although they rely on state powers to effectively assert 
religious authority, they exhibit autonomy to express religious demands against the 
state and its apparatus. 
Religious demands that capture attention in the news are usually reduced to those 
espoused by the likes of the Singaporean militant mentioned at the start of this chapter. 
However, the response of the state-appointed mufti highlights another interesting 
story: one that oscillates between the ancient and the modern, balancing between 
sacred and secular interests. This chapter suggests (as the rest of the thesis affirms) 
that as the highest religious instructor in the country, the function of state muftis and 
state fatwas are linked to historical religious tradition, and backed by not only societal 
relevance, but in the case of Singapore, legal authority and bureaucratic order. This 
thesis sets out to scrutinise how these contrasting elements are negotiated through state 
fatwas. The mufti’s statement therefore should not be seen as a sole person arguing 
against radical militancy; it exhibits the persistence of an age-old religious institution 





Chapter 2: Religious Co-optation in Authoritarian States: State 
Fatwas as a Mode of Contestation 
1 Introduction 
The very nature of fatwas is an exercise of power and authority because they instruct 
how religion is observed. As a form of religious instruction, fatwas address not only 
overt religious issues but also Muslim conduct within the larger society, the state, and 
politics. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, fatwas can be issued by independent 
muftis as well as those linked to the state. For the latter, modern state muftis are public 
officials tied through bureaucratic connections and recognised through legal 
provisions. 
Given how fatwas can have a legitimating effect, they therefore represent a crucial 
way of managing state-Islam relations. They are also highly sought after by political 
authorities, evident in how the fatwa institutions of many countries today are closely 
managed by the state.89 The combination of traditional religious authority, together 
with legal and bureaucratic relevance in the modern nation-state is what makes state 
fatwas and fatwa-making a politically interesting topic; as state fatwas become 
coveted instruments of legitimacy, they can get invoked to justify state decisions. 
However state fatwas can also retain their role as a mode of religious contestation 
against state demands. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual synthesis that builds on literature 
explaining the rationality of the state, religious elites and institutions, and the 
dynamics of their authorities, culminating in a localised version of religious practice 
i.e. Statist Islam. It offers the empirical, theoretical, and conceptual basis for 
examining the functions of state-sanctioned religious elites. This will provide an 
analytical framework for what comes in later chapters: the development of the fatwa 
institution, the function of fatwas and its evolution, and how exactly state fatwas affect 
the state and society. By highlighting the relational authority of state fatwas – i.e. the 
different authority they invoke in relation to other actors – I will explain how their 
relevance and reverence are asserted, and will conceptualise the relationship between 
 
89 Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, 1997; Skovgaard-Petersen, ‘A 
Typology of State Muftis’; Haddad, ‘Operation Desert Storm and the War of Fatwas’; Hooker, 
‘Syariah Law in Contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia’; Timothy Lindsey and Kerstin Steiner, Islam, 
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the state and religious elites. This emphasis on relational authority is, of course, not to 
be confused with their positional authority. Positional authority is the advantageous 
position state fatwas gain by virtue of being bureaucratically and legally connected to 
the state, which also elevates their traditional-societal standing in the Muslim 
community. 
This chapter explores the role state fatwas play in mediating state-societal relations, 
and in doing so, I identify key patterns of Islamic politics that emerge. Beginning with 
Islamism – a perspective that evaluates the agency of religious elites in Muslim-
majority countries and therefore particular to the mainly Middle-Eastern experience – 
I will then shift my attention to Southeast Asia to examine the manifestation of state 
control of religious institutions. Even in different settings, we see similar themes 
where religious elites (including the fatwa body) come into the fold of the state. My 
concept will synthesise elements inspired by Islamism (which recognises the agency 
of religious elites) and state co-optation of religion (that identifies the association of 
religious elites to the state). It will therefore provide a more complete picture on the 
dynamics of state-sanctioned fatwas. 
The chapter will be organised as follows. I shall begin by examining in some detail 
the two empirical notions that are central to the development of my conceptual 
framework: Islamism and state co-optation of religion. The consideration of both 
Islamism and state co-optation of religion – the former examining the agency of non-
state religious elites and the latter discussing religious bureaucracy in the modern state 
– results in a synthesis that identifies the agency of co-opted religious elites. This is 
then drawn together into an analytical framework. The key components of the 
framework begin with a neo-Weberian standpoint in political sociology, in which the 
state is conceptualised as an autonomous actor that actively regulates religious affairs. 
The degree of state autonomy here is contingent on various factors (or “structural 
potentials”)90 which allow the state to exercise its demands over other actors. In the 
context of authoritarian Southeast Asian states, this research examines the extent of 
state autonomy and how it is resisted. ‘Policy feedback’ is then invoked to 
conceptualise the malleability of state decision to other demands and interests. This 
explains how state policies can lead to unintended consequences for the state, in this 
 
90 Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, 14. 
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case how the regulation of religious affairs increased the capacity of state fatwas to 
affect state decisions. The next part breaks down how state fatwas exercise policy 
feedback vis-à-vis the state. This is done by identifying the types of authority that 
manifest in state fatwas: legal-bureaucratic authority and traditional-societal authority. 
All these investigations culminate in a concept I call Statist Islam which refers to the 
outcome of both the intended and unintended negotiations within the legal and 
bureaucratic restrictions set by the autonomous state. 
2 Fatwas as a Mode of Contestation Against the State 
Fatwas represent a long-standing tradition in Muslim orthopraxy and orthodoxy that 
remains persistent throughout changes not only in time, but also in different political 
milieus.91 Many governments in Muslim-majority countries today have created or 
supported the establishment of fatwa institutions to provide state-sanctioned religious 
instruction for Muslims. The state-fatwa link is not a contemporary development as 
the seat of the mufti became public office circa the tenth century CE.92 For centuries, 
muftis have had prominent roles in the government as jurisconsults and mawlawis 
(men of learning), so much so that qadis or judges refer to compilations of fatwas as 
reference for their judgements.93 Masud and others noted: 
…the position of muftīs in Muslim political systems was defined by the role 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) enacted in that society. In Andalusia, jurists were 
indeed powerful, because they were part of the shūrā (council) of amīrs and 
caliphs, whereas in the Ottoman and Mughal political systems, the chief muftī 
was designated as Shaykh al-Islam. Muftīs were also appointed to various 
other positions, including market inspectors, guardians of public morals, and 
advisors to governments on religious affairs.94 
Muftis are often compared to qadis whose function, by passing judgements in the 
courtroom, defines and instructs a religious position.95 However the fatwa of a mufti 
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extends beyond the confines of a court. As a form of religious instruction, fatwas 
address a range of issues from the most basic of acts of worship to political behaviour, 
which makes them even more pervasive than court judgements. 
Therefore it is not surprising that many governments of Muslim-majority countries 
seek to regulate or manage fatwas. After all, the role of fatwas in regulating religious 
behaviour can also lend a legitimating quality to the state. The regulation of fatwas 
occurs through the bureaucratisation of religious institutions, which typically includes 
a fatwa-issuing body. The religious bureaucracy is then linked to the state, a typical 
form of co-optation in many Muslim-majority countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Malaysia, and many others.96 
While having a fatwa body on its side can legitimise a government, it does not 
necessarily protect it from religious criticism. This is because fatwas can be issued not 
only by state-appointed muftis, but almost any ulama or religious organisation. One 
relevant example could be observed during the first Gulf War when Middle-Eastern 
countries allied to the United States (US) had supported the military action in Iraq. 
The allies’ position gained the support of many state fatwa bodies of these countries, 
which provided (or at least attempted to provide) religious justification for the war. 
Meanwhile fatwa bodies of countries which were not allied to the US, as well as 
independent organisations, were shown to have issued fatwas against the US-led 
action.97 
The differences between these fatwas – those in support of or those against the war – 
demonstrated how Islamic politics play out in the dynamics of Muslim-majority 
countries. They reveal the fault lines among the dominant religious elites in the Middle 
East. Haddad identifies two key types of religious elites through these fatwas: Fatwas 
in support of the American invasion of Iraq were mainly issued by state-sanctioned 
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muftis, while fatwas that opposed it were generally issued by Islamists.98 I have 
previously discussed to some extent religious elites who were co-opted by the state, 
and I will also explain more about them later in this chapter. The Islamists, meanwhile, 
deserve some attention as I will elaborate below. 
2.1 The Islamists 
Islamists are proponents of Islamism. This is of course a key concept that relates to 
studies of Political Islam, which frame “Muslim politics” in a way that accounts for 
the “social relationships between actors, symbols, and structures.”99 As a concept, 
Islamism seeks to specifically explain political activism through Islamic religious 
movements. A vital feature of Islamism is the control of political positions to enable 
top-down implementation of Islamic values, ideals, and law. A key writer on the topic, 
Asef Bayat, defines Islamism as: 
“…Ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an “Islamic 
order” – a religious state, shari`a law, and moral codes in Muslim societies and 
communities. Association with the state is a key feature of Islamist politics.”100 
Bayat’s definition is representative of works by other authors.101 A key claim of 
Islamism is that religious change should come from state authority, which is why 
political power is an imperative objective. Bayat notes that Islamism should be seen 
“in terms of a systematic attempt from above to Islamicize society and the 
economy”.102 Another key scholar, Olivier Roy also sees Islamism as a project that 
promotes “Islamization from the top down”,103 and as such Islamisation projects will 
have to come through the state.104 Islamism therefore asserts a crucial aspect of how 
this particular set of religious elites engage with the state: it employs a state-centric 
perspective of how religious activism manifests. Islamists are expected to engage in 
political confrontations in order to capture state power as the ultimate objective is 
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Islamisation through the state. As such, discussions on Islamism almost exclusively 
focus on religious actors who engage the state via electoral politics and even 
militancy.105 Peculiarly, these discussions do not include religious bureaucrats as 
Islamists. 
There is another related theory to complement Islamism, and that is Post-Islamism. 
Post-Islamism can be summed up as an alternative to Islamism; instilling religiosity 
not through the conventional method of capturing political power to Islamise the 
society, but through means such as civil society, media, business, and various other 
channels.106 However this comes with an important distinction, and that is that Post-
Islamism argues the ultimate goal is not the Islamic state, rather it is the observation 
of religiosity at the individual level.107 In other words, while Islamism posits the 
relevance of religious political parties because the objective is the implementation of 
religion through the state, Post-Islamism places little emphasis on the political because 
the objective is the individual observance of religion. 
Both theories differ on several key issues, mainly the implementation of Islamic law, 
which is a major subject in Islamism as its proponents believe that it could only be 
implemented with political authority. Post-Islamism, while not necessarily demoting 
state-level implementation of Shariah to lesser importance, emphasises on the 
religious development of the individual. Post-Islamism therefore depicts the readiness 
of religious actors in Islamising the society by pushing for religiosity in domains which 
do not directly interfere with political powers. 
Even at the onset, these distinctions are fluid because these individual or structural 
goals can be interchangeable. However both forms of the theory underline the same 
limitation: that the overarching power of the state is somewhat insulated from the 
demands of religious elites. In literature concerning Islamism, state-linked clerics are 
simply referred to as the ‘ulama’,108 a term that literally means Islamic religious 
scholar. Although the state-linked ulama are religious activists in their own right and 
 
105 Bayat, Post-Islamism, 5; Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, Political Islam in the Age of 
Democratization, Middle East Today (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Tamara Cofman 
Wittes, ‘Islamist Parties: Three Kinds of Movements’, Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (July 2008): 
7–12; Roy, The failure of political Islam; Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam. 
106 Bayat, Post-Islamism. 
107 Uğur Kömeçoğlu, ‘Islamism, Post-Islamism, and Civil Islam’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 
16–32 (2014). 
108 Kepel, Jihad, 56–57. 
47 
 
by definition should be categorised as Islamists, observers of Islamism differentiate 
between the two. Roy locates the point of departure between them on two issues: the 
servility of state-linked ulama to the powers in place – which leads them to “accept a 
secular government” and “laws that do not conform to the sharia” – and their 
compromise with Western modernity.109 He describes the demands of state-linked 
ulama as a “complete and total implementation of the sharia, without regard to the 
nature of the political system”.110 This is in contrast to Islamists who desire “to end 
the division of power that has traditionally existed in the Muslim world between the 
de facto sovereign and a class of ulamas who oversee the law without involving 
themselves into matters of power”.111 Because of the emphasis on Islamists as an 
opposition to the state, those who do not share the Islamist goal of state control  – 
including the religious bureaucrats or ‘ulama’ – are relegated to a peripheral element 
of state-religious relationship, or even as an extension of the state and propagators of 
“official Islam”.112 In sum, although the Islamists and state-linked ulama have 
essentially similar objectives in that they desire a form of Islamic order, they are 
distinguished by how this order is defined. For the Islamists, the Islamic order requires 
the reformation of the political system, while for the ulama serving in state-appointed 
positions the Islamic order can function somewhat independently of the political 
system. 
As a result, religious elites who co-operate with the state are, at best, seen as 
functioning within state-approved parameters, and this makes them no different than 
other state actors. However in examining state-religious dynamics, I argue that these 
religious bureaucrats play a crucial role in shaping how religion manifests in the state. 
Even as these state-linked ulama are acknowledged to advance some form of Shariah 
law within parameters set by the state,113 it does not mean that these attempts 
necessarily remain within these set parameters, nor that they deserve less attention. 
This is not to say that Islamism could not accommodate the various types of religious 
actors who seek to contest, or at the very least negotiate their political roles with the 
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state. For example in examining the wide degree in which Islamist actors attempted to 
merge themselves with regime institutions, writers such as Zeghal argue that even 
conventional Islamists can take less confrontational approaches as they engage with 
the authoritarian state.114 The broader arguments contend that such Islamists avoided 
the ‘rejectionist paradigm’ commonly demonstrated that pits state-religious demands 
against one another,115 and instead opt for a more participatory ‘accommodationist 
posture’ that allows them to gradually gain a foothold within state structures.116 What 
this means is that Islamists can be co-opted by the state which then cements their 
political power in the state. If this was recorded in the case of conventional Islamist 
political parties in the Middle East, then shouldn’t the same be expected of a loosely-
tied group of religious scholars who have never clearly espoused affiliation to a 
religion-based political party? 
It is therefore not a surprise that the definition of Islamists has been broadened to cover 
not only political parties, but also individual ulama who have been absorbed in, or 
indeed co-opted by, the state.117 While this categorisation is convenient, it is prudent 
to exercise caution here; while associating these two types of actors as one might 
suggest their bureaucratic link to the state, there remains a clear difference between 
the goals and functions of Islamists, and the ulama who are working within state-
linked institutions (as Roy explained above).  
As such, a more cautious approach would be to identify each of them as a set of unique 
actors. I seek to avoid the conflation of the demands of the various religious actors – 
be it through political parties of co-opted religious institution – and avoid Islamism as 
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a conceptual tool to explain the agency of state-linked religious elites. While both 
desire some form of Islamic order, they are still very distinct because of the difference 
of what constitutes an Islamic order for them. As a result, their methods for achieving 
these objectives also differ; while one aims to capture state power, the other regards 
state power as an incidental element. Furthermore, my research moves beyond the 
bureaucratic relationship between religious actors and the state, and examine the 
degree of co-optation and its consequences on religious authority and localised 
religious praxis. 
Clearly the state-linked ulama have a political function, and even more so they must 
be accorded some form of agency. But how do we analyse this? While the agency of 
religious political parties can be explained through Islamism, the concept is too 
restrictive to assess the political role of state-linked religious elites. It is therefore 
important to acknowledge the distinctiveness of these ‘state’ ulama. I propose that this 
distinctiveness cannot be reduced to ambiguous notions such as ‘Islamic state’ or 
‘Islamic order’, especially when discussing their function within the modern nation-
state. Rather a more sensible way would be to analyse particular issues concerning 
religion, specifically those that necessitate direct engagements with the state. 
Therefore in examining the political role of religious bureaucrats, it is crucial to 
identify the nature of their relationship to the state. This is done by assessing the 
recognition given to them by the state; i.e. the legal-bureaucratic function of these 
state-linked ulama, and how this allows negotiation and resistance to occur. In order 
to do this, I have to shift my focus on literature examining the relationship between 
the state and religious bureaucrats. This brings me to Southeast Asia. 
2.2 Southeast Asian Co-optation 
State fatwas represent an important mode to assert religious demands. This is not only 
seen in the Middle East – as I have discussed above – but also Southeast Asia where 
state fatwas can publicly support or discredit a religious position. Here, one of the 
popular incidents involving state fatwas occurred in 1937 when the Raja of Kelantan 
in Malaysia wanted to keep his Dalmatian hound. However he was opposed by his 
sister who held the view that dogs are unclean and therefore keeping them as pets is 
not permissible. The sister’s view is also the mainstream Muslim position in Southeast 
Asia, which was why the issue garnered public interest. But the state fatwa in Kelantan 
decreed that the Raja was allowed to keep his dog. This fatwa was challenged and led 
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to a public debate involving local and overseas ulama. The outcome of the debate was 
however inconclusive, and eventually Al-Azhar – the Islamic authority in Egypt – was 
asked to issue a fatwa which ended in favour of the Raja and his Dalmatian.118 The 
event demonstrated the central role fatwas play in regulating day-to-day issues; even 
the royal family who ruled over Kelantan required a fatwa to justify the keeping of 
dogs as pets. There were also occasions when state fatwas were issued on more serious 
matters, such as against religious reformists known as Kaum Muda (Young Faction) 
who were inspired by their Middle-Eastern counterparts. These reformists condemned 
the religious practices and beliefs of the local Muslim community at the time, which 
they deemed unauthentic.119 They also criticised the rulers and the traditional religious 
institutions. As a response to defend the status quo, state fatwas were issued against 
the Kaum Muda and new laws were put in place to restrict reformist teachings and 
publications.120 
Despite the powerful role that the religious bureaucracy and state fatwas exhibited in 
regulating religious affairs, literature on Southeast Asia tends to overlook the nuances 
of religious co-optation, namely the agency of religious bureaucrats and the politics of 
their resistance against the state. In Political Science, many writers tend to take an 
instrumentalist view of the religious bureaucracy as a tool to prop up state 
legitimacy.121 This is, however, understandable; as the authoritarian state takes drastic 
measures to maintain power and control over the society, it also regulates avenues 
where political contestations can occur. This leads to the co-optation of societal actors 
and organisations within the fold of the state. In Muslim-majority Southeast Asian 
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countries, these co-optations are embodied in the creation of the religious 
bureaucracy,122 which includes state fatwa institutions. 
It is here that we should pause to clarify the term co-optation that I am using in this 
thesis. Co-optation here is defined as the act of including an entity into the decision-
making structure of a more powerful entity. In such a relationship, the co-optees are 
expected to acquiesce to the demands of the larger group.123 Selznick, credited for the 
coining the term, posited that co-optees do not gain any actual power or decision-
making capacity in the relationship.124 He identified two types of co-optation: formal 
and informal co-optation. Formal co-optation can be understood as co-opting a weaker 
element in making decisions, while informal co-optation occurs when co-opting a 
strong element that is then restricted in the decision-making process. In other words, 
Selznick sees co-optation as a one-way street in which the co-opted are ultimately 
ineffectual to make decisions. Although not without his critics,125 Selznick opened the 
way to analyse an important facet of bureaucratic relationship between groups with 
competing objectives. 
It is perhaps no surprise that due to the nature of relationship between the co-opter and 
co-opted, co-optation is observed to result in the reduction of the latter’s autonomy,126 
hinder protests that challenge the co-opter’s legitimacy,127 as well as impede the co-
optees’ authority as they focus on maintaining this bureaucratic relationship rather 
than obtaining new advantages.128 Yet it is just as important to note that co-optation 
 
122 Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia; Steiner, ‘Governing Islam: The 
State, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) and Islam in Singapore’; Abdullah, ‘Religious 
Representation in Secular Singapore’; Müller, ‘Sharia Law and the Politics of “Faith Control” in 
Brunei Darussalam: Dynamics of Socio-Legal Change in a Southeast Asian Sultanate’; Nasr, Islamic 
Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power. 
123 Alexa J Trumpy, ‘Subject to Negotiation: The Mechanisms behind Co-Optation and Corporate 
Reform’, Social Problems 55, no. 4 (2008): 480. 
124 Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization, vol. 3 
(Univ of California Press, 1949). 
125 Jeff Collmann, ‘Clients, Cooptation and Bureaucratic Discipline’, Social Analysis, no. 9 (1981): 
48–62; Trumpy, ‘Subject to Negotiation: The Mechanisms behind Co-Optation and Corporate 
Reform’; Michael David Dueñes, ‘Communication Cadres: Leaders, The Control of Communication, 
and Co-Optation.’, 2014. 
126 Hanspeter Kriesi, ‘The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context’, 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 1996, 152–84. 
127 Ora John Reuter and Graeme B. Robertson, ‘Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in 
Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes’, The Journal of Politics 77, no. 1 (January 2015): 235–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/678390; Trumpy, ‘Subject to Negotiation: The Mechanisms behind Co-
Optation and Corporate Reform’. 
128 William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd ed (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Pub, 
1990); Robert J Brulle and J Craig Jenkins, ‘Foundations and the Environmental Movement: 
52 
 
cannot be taken as a uniform manner of interaction, rather it occurs at varying 
degrees,129 and therefore has been examined through the lens of cooperation,130 or 
even revolution.131 In this sense, co-optation is far from inflexible and rigid, but 
represents a form of adaptable and fluid relationship between two entities that are 
linked through bureaucratic arrangement.  
My use of co-optation here can further be narrowed down to a specific form, in 
particular what Collman terms the “imposition of bureaucratic discipline” that defines 
clear lines and boundaries,132 in this case between the state and the fatwa-issuing body. 
Despite co-optation being used to signify a relationship with power imbalance, the 
consequences of negotiation and compromise should not be overlooked. To address 
this, my thesis investigates how much of the co-optees’ autonomy is retained in such 
a relationship, how they can preserve their capacity to change collective decisions, and 
the expansion or contraction of authority through this arrangement. With this in mind, 
the co-optation that I describe between the Singapore state and state fatwas here, while 
taking into consideration what is best termed an asymmetrical power imbalance,133 
makes the case that state-religious relationship results in the establishment and 
expansion of fatwas’ relevance in state structures. Therefore while co-optation does 
correctly describe how the state relates to fatwas especially through legal-bureaucratic 
recognition, this tells only of one aspect of the relationship and a small part of the full 
story. This is why my thesis title refers to the consequences of co-optation; how legal-
bureaucratic authority is reshaped through the co-optation of state-sanctioned fatwas. 
My thesis reveals that as state fatwas became the reference point for Islamic religious 
instruction, their expertise and positional authority can also affect state decisions; the 
co-optation of religious elites into the religious bureaucracy enabled the co-optees to 
expand their legal-bureaucratic authority in state structures. This is in addition to the 
inherent traditional-societal authority of state fatwas that is amplified through its 
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relationship with the state (as I will explain later in this chapter, as well as in Chapters 
3 and 4). As a result, co-optation does not only impact the decisions of the co-opted, 
but also the co-opter, i.e. the state.  
The co-optation of religion and religious institutions is not a phenomenon unique to 
Singapore, of course. Among its neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, religious 
co-optation takes various forms. In Buddhist Thailand, the co-optation of the sangha 
is a key project that gave legitimacy to political elites.134 Similar observations were 
recorded in Myanmar and Cambodia.135 Meanwhile in Muslim-majority Indonesia and 
Malaysia, the instrumentalisation of religion for political support is also a common 
observation.136 A considerable number of studies which sought to trace the 
Islamisation of the Malaysian polity since the 1980s – which includes the expansion 
of the religious bureaucracy and the development of national religious programmes – 
largely attributed the phenomenon to political actors competing for the Malay vote.137 
Mobilising Islam and Buddhism in Southeast Asia was even compared to how 
secularism was invoked in the West for political gains.138 
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Many observers rightly regard the state as the key actor behind state-driven religious 
projects.139 While there is some truth in this, such a narrative risks neglecting the role 
of religious bureaucrats in shaping state-linked religious agendas. Increasingly, there 
are studies that have begun to shed more light on the function of co-opted religious 
elites. Mohamad, for instance, credits state-sanctioned religious projects to religious 
bureaucrats who were co-opted by the state.140 As political actors expand the power of 
religious institutions to shore up state legitimacy, this elevates the role of religious 
elites in state bureaucracy and perpetuates more state-sanctioned religious 
programmes. This also mediates the position of the religious bureaucracy between the 
state and society, and “imbricated” the role of religious institutions in politics.141 
Peletz, who wrote on the Shariah court in Malaysia, argues that the state-linked 
religious institution proved helpful in negotiating and compromising between 
contradictory societal and cultural discourses. Shariah courts promote the foundations 
for a Malaysian-styled civil society while presenting themselves as a strategic loci of 
modernity projects.142 These observations indicate how the co-optation of religious 
institutions serves new purposes that go beyond the simple outcome of religious 
control by the state. The relevance of co-opted religious institutions is then preserved 
via legal measures. Kamali – in addressing Islamic law reforms in Malaysia – 
highlights how some Malaysian states enforced strict laws to ensure adherence to state 
fatwas, and in extreme cases those found propagating religious opinions contrary to 
them could face fine and jail sentences.143 This development, along with several 
examples of Islamic law amendments in Malaysia, accrued more authority to state 
fatwas, and preserved the relevance of religious institutions. More importantly, these 
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examples showed that the administration of religion is not only shaped by the state, 
but also by the very religious institutions and elites that were co-opted. 
As my thesis focuses on state fatwas and how they shape Islamic praxis within state 
restrictions, it is pertinent to survey relevant literatures on fatwas in Southeast Asia. 
Academic work on fatwas in Southeast Asia has largely ignored the political 
relationship of state fatwas, instead focusing on jurisprudential analysis and 
administrative limitations.144 Literature on Indonesian fatwas, however, provide rare 
insight into the political dynamic of official religious instructions in a Southeast Asian 
country. One reason for this is that the official Indonesian fatwa body is quite removed 
from state bureaucracy,145 unlike the configuration of its neighbouring countries. 
Literature on Indonesian state fatwas therefore highlights their societal function and 
political engagement with the state.146 Some argue that the official state fatwa 
institution in Indonesia, while refraining from taking an overly-partisan political role, 
framed its fatwas to serve strategic political interventions by putting pressure on 
Indonesian politicians and steering policy debates towards religious conservatism.147 
According to Mudzhar, while not denying their religious motivation, state fatwas in 
Indonesia are used to support state policies, or in some cases, exploit mistrust between 
religious groups.148 Menchik meanwhile examines the “co-evolution” between 
Shariah law and the secular government in Indonesia, and suggests that both these 
domains were affected by each other. By looking at decades of state fatwas on 
Indonesian family planning policy, he argues that the influences and interactions 
between the religious elites and the secular government are mutual; both sides were 
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taking cues from one another which effectively moderated each other’s position.149 
This closely represents what I examine in the thesis: a macro-level analysis of how 
statist intervention leads to the moderation of religious demands and vice versa, 
resulting in a version of Islamic orthopraxy that is unique to a particular country, i.e. 
Statist Islam. 
For Singapore – the focus of my thesis – academic observation on fatwas is very 
limited. The most notable analysis was written by the current Mufti of Singapore in 
which he discusses the theological underpinnings of state fatwas, with some attention 
given to the societal context and background.150 For a better understanding of the 
political relevance of state fatwas, a more relevant set of references is literature 
examining the Islamic religious bureaucracy in Singapore. These works, however, 
tend to over-emphasise the role of the state in religious affairs. Steiner, for example, 
argues that the state intervenes “in almost all aspects of Islamic law” and holds “a 
monopoly over the institutions responsible for the interpretation and scope of Islamic 
law.”151 Rahim broadly notes that despite legislative and policy mechanisms that 
reinforce the separation of politics and religion, the state continues to intrude into the 
religious sphere and influences the religious bureaucracy,152 which houses the fatwa 
body. As a result, some claim that the Islamic religious elites in Singapore “are either 
silent or are willing participants in many state projects that would sometimes 
compromise basic demands of ordinary Muslims.”153 In recent times, contestations 
coming from the Muslim professional and ulama classes against the religious 
bureaucracy were observed, which represent a form of protest against authoritarian 
regulation of Islamic affairs in the country.154 While not rejecting these observations, 
forms of protest originating within existing state-linked religious institutions should 
also be examined. Abdullah’s investigation of the religious bureaucracy and another 
non-state Islamic organisation in Singapore provides a refreshing take on the subject. 
He argues that state co-optation of religious elites is a complex matter that does not 
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necessarily depict a one-sided agreement, as the religious elites choose to engage the 
state with “larger end goals in mind” and “use their position vis-à-vis the state to their 
own advantage.”155 According to him, this is a necessary approach for religious elites 
in Singapore due to the overwhelming “power asymmetry” between them and the 
authoritarian state.156 Their silence on political affairs, Mostarom noted, is an accepted 
compromise of this.157 
One of the consequences of religious co-optation is examined in a distinct set of 
literature called the bureaucratisation of Islam. Bureaucratisation of Islam takes a 
largely anthropological perspective on how state co-optation of religion, through the 
bureaucratisation of Islamic religious institutions, is negotiated at the societal level.158 
Focusing on the Southeast Asian region in particular, it analyses how the co-optation 
of religious bodies and symbols by the state evokes a slew of responses from religious 
actors in the society, who accommodate or resist state penetration in various ways. In 
the case of Brunei, Müller explores how “state-enforced Islamic orthodoxy” led 
spiritual healers there to modify their practice so that it adheres to Islamic regulations 
set by the state. By co-opting religious regulations fit their own narratives, this 
modification even helped to bring such practices to the mainstream society, thus 
creating “hybrid pathways to orthodoxy”.159 It is not only religious practitioners that 
were affected by state regulation of religion. Muslim business owners also project 
forms of state-sanctioned religious agendas on their employees and companies. These 
religious projects in business organisations depict a form of corporate religiosity 
stemming from state policies.160 Essentially, these examples underline how state 
regulation of religion is resisted and negotiated at the societal level.  
My research complements this understanding of the Bureaucratisation of Islam by 
addressing how negotiation and resistance occur at the legal-bureaucratic level, i.e. by 
examining state regulations and policies which impact religious issues are negotiated 
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by religious bureaucrats. The bureaucratisation of religious institutions in Singapore 
provides a pertinent study in examining the consequences of such contestations. As 
the Singapore case which I examine spans at least five decades of state-religious 
negotiations and contestations, this allows me to study the long-term negotiation that 
balances between co-optation and autonomy. Due to the close hierarchical relationship 
between the state and state-linked religious bureaucrats, the sphere of negotiation is 
further narrowed down to specific sets of actors and institutions within state-linked 
structures. What this means is that the investigation of ‘top-down’ religious projects 
are contested and negotiated by an integral part of the state’s own bureaucracy. While 
literature on the Bureaucratisation of Islam that I mentioned looks at how top-down 
religious demands are negotiated by societal actors, my thesis shifts the focus of 
negotiation and contestation of religious policies ‘upwards’, i.e. by looking at the 
source of these policies and their negotiation at the state-bureaucratic level. 
This then shapes a unique form of context-specific religious praxis, shaped by state 
decisions as well as religious bureaucrats, which I term Statist Islam. This is not to say 
that the other, more societally-embedded actors lack the agency to negotiate and 
contest top-down religious policies. Rather my research complements existing studies 
through the examination of state fatwas that are positioned as state-linked religious 
instructions. These state fatwas therefore demand the examination of negotiations at 
the ‘higher’ plane of state bureaucracy and not at the grassroots level (which 
Bureaucratisation of Islam literatures explore). The positional advantage of state 
fatwas also allows them to shape Statist Islam beyond their legal-bureaucratic 
limitations, as their state-backed authority provides an additional dimension to contest 
state policies beyond the state’s drawing board, which then shapes a unique typology 
of religious praxis. 
3 The Politics of Fatwas in Singapore: A Framework of Analysis 
Especially in Political Science, the amalgamation of state and religious demands in 
shaping a unified religious discourse is a somewhat under-researched subject. I 
propose to fill this gap by synthesising aspects of the literature I mentioned above. In 
the previous section, I had discussed Islamism which emphasises on the state-Islamist 
divide in the quest to capture state power. While it aptly recognises the political agency 
of Islamist actors, the role of religious bureaucrats (placed between the Islamists and 
the state) was simply drowned out. I then analysed the co-optation of religious 
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institutions, an important theme that explains the state-religious dynamic in Southeast 
Asia. While the vast majority of studies neglected the function of religious bureaucrats 
in the relationship, there are a number of emerging literature that has begun to 
recognise how state-linked religious elites can shape state projects. This is supported 
by investigations showing how state-sanctioned religious orthodoxy – captured 
through the bureaucratisation of Islam – is negotiated by various societal actors. 
My research supports the research agenda that explores the role of religious 
bureaucrats in resisting and negotiating state projects on religion. This qualifies the 
usual narrative of state control of religion (evident in literature on Islamism and state 
co-optation of religion). It also provides an explanation on how these negotiations can 
take place through state-linked religious instruction or state fatwas. More importantly, 
I will also conceptualise how this negotiation leads not to a singular outcome that 
favours either state or religion, rather it is amalgamated and symbolised in a form of 
authoritative religious praxis I call Statist Islam. 
3.1 Synthesising the Concepts 
Religious institutions have to rely on various facets of authority in order to remain 
relevant in the contemporary world. In relation to the state, this is embodied in 
bureaucratic and legal recognitions. Proximity to the state, however, tends to breed 
suspicion and mistrust. In light of Southeast Asian state projects that prevalently co-
opt religious institutions, there is a tendency to downplay the role of religious elites in 
these projects especially if they are linked to the state. This is true for state-sanctioned 
fatwa bodies as they issue fatwas that not only become a dominant form of religious 
instruction for Muslims, but can also legitimise state decisions. To illustrate the 
nuances, negotiations, and forms of resistance that the religious bureaucracy pursues 
against the state, I will adopt a neo-Weberian political sociology standpoint to 
conceptualise the role and effect of state fatwas. 
The conceptualisation of religious bureaucrats is refined by employing an analytical 
framework which explores and explains the relationship of fatwas to the state and the 
Muslim community. The state is taken as an independent actor that is chiefly insulated 
from societal interests. To be more precise, this autonomy means that the state creates 
and attains goals that are not necessarily in the interest of other social groups, classes, 
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or society.161 This fits very well for states of authoritarian repute, and also 
acknowledges that over time, the state can evolve to accommodate the role of other 
actors in its decision-making process.162 Therefore my research takes into account the 
historical development of state fatwas in order to understand the factors that led to 
their gradual entrenchment in the state, which then enabled them to regulate religious 
praxis through state resources. A big part of this entrenchment relates to fatwas’ 
resistance and negotiation with the state, captured through policy feedback that 
explains how state autonomy is challenged. How the feedback occurs is 
conceptualised by examining the authority of state fatwas in relation to the state and 
society. Briefly put, state fatwas’ relevance to the state is embodied in their legal-
bureaucratic authority, while their connection to society is manifest in their traditional-
societal authority. The legal-bureaucratic authority stems from a key legislation that 
also establishes the state-sanctioned religious bureaucracy, which is made up of 
several religious institutions including a fatwa-issuing body. The traditional-societal 
authority meanwhile resides in the very existence and function of fatwas that serve to 
instruct Muslim religious life. (See Figure 1) 
The effects of state policy that regulates religious affairs thus allow fatwas to become 
relevant in state decision-making process. At the same time, this link to the state also 
amplified fatwas’ reverence beyond official state-recognised channels. In sum, as 
fatwas are given official state recognition, they also gained the capacity to inform and 
contest state decisions while expanding their religious authority within the Muslim 
community. While not dismissing that state decisions can be affected by various other 
demands coming from societal actors as well as exogenous influences, the parameters 
of my research examine how demands from state and religious bureaucrats intertwine 
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Figure 1 Conceptualising Statist Islam 
When linked to my case studies, these concepts demonstrate how state policy altered 
institutional configurations, which then enabled fatwas to affect policy feedback and 
shape Statist Islam. The first set of case studies will examine the impact of fatwas on 
state policies. These policies have wide-ranging effects not limited to common themes 
such as the economy, education, and health, but also religious practices. Certain health 
and social policies provide significant economic incentives and disincentives, which 
then directly challenge a given religious position on health and family issues. As state 
fatwas contested these policies, they not only challenged state decisions, but also 
found that their own position could be moderated by state demands. The combination 
of both state and religious interests is captured in Statist Islam. The second set of case 
studies concerns court judgements which have the authority to overrule state fatwas 
and limit their role to legally define religious praxis. Despite that, these fatwas were 
able to circumvent court decisions by asserting a more direct form of traditional-
societal authority, thus shaping Statist Islam beyond the formal legal-bureaucratic 
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channel. The third set of case studies will look at the evolution of state fatwas’ legal 
relevance as they became more entrenched in asserting religious order and social 
instruction. This is in reference to state fatwas being turned into a yardstick to regulate 
religious teachings through the creation of an accreditation system for religious 
teachers. This essentially made religious teachings that contradict fatwas illegal, and 
shows how persistent religious co-optation entrenches the role of fatwas in state 
structures and the legal framework. 
3.2 State Autonomy 
I shall begin with the conceptualisation of the state, keeping in mind its intrusive role 
in the management of religious affairs. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
authoritarian Singapore state closely regulates realms of contestation that potentially 
challenge its political rule.163 Societal demands are therefore channelled to pre-
approved domains and arenas that, while alluding to a façade of democratic 
participation, ultimately shield the state away from direct political contestations. This 
also restricts the scope of state-societal interactions within pre-approved avenues. 
State-societal relationship is the central theme in political sociology, with an emphasis 
on how this relationship affects the state.164 It is widely known that Max Weber 
favours the state as the determining point in analysing this relationship. Part of his 
stance was in response to Marx who situated class conflict as both productive of, and 
a driver of, economic transformation. In this sense Marx placed an unquestionable 
emphasis on the economy as the sole motivator behind social actions, and all other 
factors – including religion and political power – were relegated. In other words, 
Marxists view politics as a reflection of the class struggle in an overarching capitalist 
system. Therefore the state is seen as an agent under the direction of the capitalist class 
which can only be challenged by a proletarian revolution. Of course this traditional 
Marxist view was then challenged by some neo-Marxists who regard the state as 
somewhat autonomous because through its apparatus and law, the state becomes the 
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arbiter and arena of struggle between the classes.165 Nevertheless the state is, 
essentially, an instrument of exploitation. 
While both Marx and Weber see the state as a tool of domination, Weber does not see 
it as something that solely advances the interest of the bourgeoise capitalist class. In 
many ways, Weber regards the state as a rational bureaucratic actor in itself that was 
established to ensure the administration of law and order. In Politics as A Vocation, 
he famously defines the state as a “community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”,166 not necessarily at 
the behest of a certain class. In essence, the Weberian conception of the state argues 
that it is an organisation that pursues objectives which do not necessarily reflect the 
demands of powerful classes or groups. The state is an organisation that is inherently 
autonomous from dominant classes. However Weber still sees the state as the most 
powerful social institution that is insulated even from societal influences.167 
In recent decades, there has been a strong trend in favour of a ‘statist’ approach in 
academic studies. This can be contrasted with earlier attempts to replace the concept 
of the state with that of a broad and pluralistic political system.168 Yet the ‘state’ as a 
concept persisted as a phenomenon beyond subjective construct that Nettl remarks “no 
amount of conceptual restructuring can dissolve it.”169 The 1980s saw the rise of the 
statist approach as neo-Weberians expanded Weber’s understanding of state 
autonomy, albeit with a less pessimistic view of statist bureaucracy. They also revived 
an important caveat: that the state cannot be fully insulated from society. This was 
catalysed by the clarion call of “bringing the state back in” which also became the title 
of the book containing a collection of essays in favour of the statist slant.170 In its 
introduction, Skocpol argues that the state should be understood as more than a mere 
arena of contestation, but as an autonomous actor in itself. She sees the state as an 
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organisation “claiming control over territories and people which may formulate and 
pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, 
classes, or society.”171 Skocpol – in analysing state-societal relationship – assesses the 
centrality of the state in its decision-making process, and that that should be 
independent of other, non-state interests. Skocpol therefore not only dismisses the 
Marxist position that reduces the state to class struggle but argues that the autonomous 
state acts just like as an independent organization which functions through its own 
internal structure and interests. Essentially, there is a coherent form of organization 
for the state that autonomously drives its own independent decisions and actions.   
Yet state autonomy is not absolute.172 Its autonomy (and dependence to the society) 
can be affected by various factors, such as crises and emergencies which can lead to 
the enactment of highly autonomous state policies. Therefore the “structural 
potentials” that allow autonomous state actions are subject to change “both internally 
and in their relations to societal groups and to representative parts of government,”173 
which is why the concept is “realized only in truly historical studies that are sensitive 
to structural variations and conjunctural changes within given polities.”174 
Building on this, the relationship between the autonomous state and other actors is 
examined through a “fully relational approach.”175 Despite acknowledging its complex 
relations to other actors, the state is nonetheless taken as an autonomous actor, able to 
make its own decisions and largely uninhibited by the ties and network that define it. 
This decision-making is perhaps most evident in the policies that it creates, which 
places its own particular interest above other non-state actors. Again while the decision 
of the state is separate and distinct from the demands of society, it does not mean that 
it is immune to any sort of intervention. My research takes this concept of autonomous 
state and examines how state decision-making is negotiated despite this autonomy. 
The macroscopic examination of state-societal configurations is further investigated 
by analysing how various groups challenge state decisions. 
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One particular relationship that invites closer inspection is the interaction of religious 
communities with the state, and vice versa. This is especially pertinent in an 
authoritarian secular state like Singapore which vigorously curbs domestic 
contestations of its political authority, a key reason for managing religious affairs 
through the religious bureaucracy. There is also a wider regional concern behind this, 
since Singapore is susceptible to the religious trends of its Muslim neighbours. This is 
due to their shared history, location in a vastly Muslim archipelago, and fluid political 
developments, which I will explain in more detail in the next chapter. 
To sum up, the autonomous state is taken as the starting point in analysing state-
societal relationship. The neo-Weberian notion that emphasises state centrality means 
that state decision-making formulation is largely independent of other non-state 
interests. However beyond direct patterns stemming from political arrangements, 
unintended consequences through policy feedback should not be overlooked.176 
3.3 Policy Feedback 
Béland defines policy feedback as the “impact of previously enacted policies on future 
political behaviour and policy choices”.177 Policies here are not restricted to only laws, 
rules, and statements, but also “the broader sweep of politics.”178 Hacker and others 
posited that policies can even “resemble political institutions, structuring social 
experience, organizing group competition, and channelling political participation” as 
“politics unfolds on an existing landscape where policies may already have fostered 
coalition, set agendas, defined incentives, given rise to interests, shaped popular 
understandings, and so on.”179 
Building on the concept of the autonomous state, I have established that the state 
cannot be insulated from other influences. Here, two strategies in analysing the state 
becomes apparent. The first one views the state as “organizations through which 
official collectivities may pursue distinctive goals, realising them more or less 
effectively given the available state resources in relation to social settings.” The 
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second one looks “macroscopically” at the “configurations of organization and action 
that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and classes in 
society.”180 This brings us to the examination of other actors in state-centred analyses. 
Skocpol’s Protecting Soldiers and Mothers borrows from Tocqueville to depict how 
nineteenth century American state structures affected the objectives and capacities of 
social groups, leading to policy feedback that consequently reshaped political 
processes, thus modifying the capacities of the state.181 Peter Evans – a key 
collaborator of Skocpol – introduced the concept of “embedded autonomy” that 
explores the outcome of shared projects in economic development between the state 
and societal actors.182 Joel Migdal develops the “state in society” concept to 
demonstrate the mutual transformation of the state and society. He sees the state as an 
organisation that is not only separated, but also “elevated” from society.183 This does 
not mean that the state is a monolithic entity with clear boundaries, but just like any 
other organisation there are “ongoing battles” that push “different versions of how 
people should behave.”184 At the same time, the state is autonomous because it is a 
“field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image 
of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the 
people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts.”185 
I will focus on the concept of policy feedback to analyse how a constituent of the state 
can affect state decisions. In essence, policy feedback explores the “mechanisms 
through which policies reshape social and state actors’ interests and capacities” and 
how, over time, these new configurations influence politics and subsequent policy 
maintenance, reversal, or expansion.186 
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Literature on policy feedback can be divided into how policies relate to the mass public 
and political elites.187 With regard to the public, feedback research has explored how 
policies influence them and affect broad patterns of citizen participation.188 Campbell 
for example demonstrates how new policy recipients became more involved in 
political campaigns which then not only preserved the original policy, but also 
expanded it.189 Policies can also affect conceptions of citizenship as they inherently 
shape views on the recipient groups’ civic standing and how they are perceived in 
society.190 
For the elite actors in the state, policy feedback effects can transform or expand 
capacities of the state due to official efforts in policy implementation and its related 
administrative arrangements. This results in subsequent “administrative possibilities” 
for the state that affect future prospects of policy implementation.191 New policies may 
affect the identities, goals, and capabilities of groups that later turn them into political 
allies or otherwise.192 This creates structures of path dependencies that drive them to 
develop new policies along previous lines of interest.193 In other words as organised 
interests adapt to new policies, these actors grow dependent on them and become 
invested in their continuation.194 
It is at this point I should briefly raise the empirical context that my thesis addresses. 
The authoritarian norms that are prevalent in Singapore make it quite a distinct subject 
matter compared to the cases I cited above, which largely addressed the Western neo-
liberal state, i.e. the US which is typified by the democratic participation of a robust 
civil society. Singapore, however, is closer to the opposite end of the spectrum, and 
more synonymous with ‘authoritarianism’ where democratic norms are constricted by 
the state.195 
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My reference of authoritarianism here closely replicates Levitsky and Way’s usage, in 
particular when they describe regimes as “competitive authoritarian”; i.e. they may 
seem democratic but do not meet all the criteria that makes them a fully-democratic 
country.196 Such regimes might be lacking one of more of the following: free and fair 
elections, the right for adults to vote, political rights and civil liberties, freedom to 
criticise the political authority, elected officials having to real power to govern.197 
While such characteristics can be observed in democratic regimes, they are however 
not systematic enough to “seriously impede democratic challenges to incumbent 
governments.”198 In competitive authoritarian regimes, however, such violations 
become serious enough hinder proper challenges against the ruling regime. 
While Singapore certainly fits the template set by Levitsky and Way, the nature of 
Singapore’s authoritarianism can be further explained in literatures examining the role 
of law in legitimising state power, especially as my research concerns fatwas and their 
formal legal-bureaucratic role vis-à-vis the state. Here, the application of Singapore’s 
authoritarianism is explained in works by Rodan and Jayasuriya,199 Rajah,200 and also 
Chua,201 who outlined the duality (or even inconsistencies) of Singapore’s legal 
system. To elaborate, Singapore practices a somewhat transparent ‘rule of law’ in trade 
and economy which attracts foreign investments and contributes to Singapore’s 
economic success, consequently giving the ruling regime a legitimating quality where 
the GDP is concerned. Yet Singapore’s law on civil and political rights is far from 
admirable, fitting more aptly with the term ‘rule by law’ which impedes political 
opposition against the incumbent through the tight legal regulation of the media, civil 
societies, religious groups, and even legal practitioners.202 
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The endurance of the authoritarian system in Singapore – where one political party 
continuously dominates for more than half a century – cannot be attributed solely to 
repressive incapacitation of political opponents. Persistent authoritarianism requires a 
combination of effective (albeit ruthless) economic policies, as well as social 
objectives that appeal to voters, including forcibly dismantling labour unions to 
advance state capitalism, disrupting property rights for affordable housing projects, 
and actively managing racial and religious relations, demonstrating that even 
authoritarian models of governance have to be responsive to societal demands.203 Yet 
the avenues of participation and contestation are highly regulated such that societal 
demands are channelled through approved state-linked entities, thereby nipping 
potential political contestations in the bud.204 The Singapore state also exercises “pre-
emptive institutional initiatives” by co-opting potential political opponents into the 
fold of the state.205 
Measures like these underline that the monopoly of state control cannot be effectively 
contained within a single group of uniform actors; the state also has to accommodate 
various societal demands in order to effectively retain power. For the authoritarian 
state, this accommodation takes the form of co-optation that is designed to embrace 
competition as well as stifle potential dissent. Furthermore the way this 
accommodation takes place – by co-opting potential challengers – is not without 
consequences. Including new actors within state structures leads to new 
configurations, policies, and activities, which can subsequently “stimulate the 
development of influential bureaucratic constituencies”.206 Therefore both the state 
and society are not fixed in uniformity, but as Migdal observes they are continuously 
underdoing a “process of transformation”; constantly “becoming” by changing their 
respective “structure, goals, constituencies, rules, and social control”.207 This in turn 
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provides fertile ground for groups to form and make collective action to advance their 
respective interests. 
As the co-optation of new actors leads to the creation of new bureaucratic 
constituencies, this also gives them the capacity to inform state decisions. In the 
context of this research, the ‘new bureaucratic constituency’ in focus is the religious 
bureaucracy made possible by the policy to regulate religious affairs. This regulation 
is realised by the relevant legal statutes, as well as the bureaucratisation of religious 
elites which also aids societal acceptance. As state policies undergo the process of 
negotiation and implementation, the small yet important role of the state’s religious 
constituent becomes apparent. 
In examining the role of state-linked religious elites, and specifically state fatwas as a 
mode of religious demand, I intend to make several contributions to the concept of 
policy feedback. Firstly, notable empirical cases on policy feedback effects have been 
partial to examining “large-scale policy programmes in some specific policy areas but 
not others.”208 Prolific studies in the field mostly focus on welfare policies; Skocpol’s 
Protecting Mothers and Soldiers – credited for jumpstarting interest in policy 
feedback – traces the history of US social spending on its war veterans and its 
subsequent shift to mothers and their children.209 Mettler meanwhile examines the 
impact of educational provisions for US war veterans.210 Campbell explores the effects 
of proposed US healthcare reforms on senior citizens and their response to the 
policy.211 Similarly, work by Soss et al focuses on income and wealth inequalities by 
investigating welfare, tax, and labour policies.212 While useful, these case studies 
nonetheless are overwhelmingly concerned with broad policy programmes that appeal 
to large segments of the population. 
My research will shift the area of focus to analyse religious policies. This unique focus 
will apply policy feedback to analyse policies that are focused on the interest of small 
groups in the society. Although policy feedback concerns how politics can affect the 
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political capacity of various advocacy groups, the exploration of religious policies 
through the lens of policy feedback remains an under-researched topic. I have yet to 
find even one research paper on how policy feedback can be applied to examine 
policies that concern religious elites, which is quite a surprise.213 My thesis therefore 
will expand the potential of policy feedback analysis on religious and cultural issues. 
Secondly, there is a perceptible bias that policy feedback over-emphasises on the US 
experience, if not Western neo-liberal societies in general. This is due to the robust 
dynamics between lobby groups, political parties, as well as political actors in such 
milieus. By making Singapore the subject of my macro-analysis on state-religious 
relationship, I will not only shift the geographical focus on an entirely different 
continent, but more importantly apply policy feedback in an authoritarian context. 
This shift will also accommodate the various literature on Singapore (which I 
mentioned previously) revealing the consequences of highly-regulated domains of 
contestation. As authoritarian state structures are designed to resist societal elements 
from affecting state decisions, the role of co-opted social actors should then be 
scrutinised. Policy feedback will help to conceptualise the effects of legal-bureaucratic 
authority endowed on co-opted societal elites, as well as to examine how these effects 
are applied in a non-ideal pseudo/semi-democratic context. 
This thesis also analyses the conditions which facilitate policy feedback as well as 
factors leading to its change, something deemed to be lacking in the field.214 That is to 
say, I will examine the factors that could possibly disrupt and even end policy feedback 
effects. This entails looking at how institutional configurations evolve and change by 
analysing the foundations and factors that these configurations are built on.215 For 
state-linked religious institutions, this relates to the forms of authority they assert over 
the state and societal actors. In relation to the state, the formalised bureaucratisation 
of religious institutions takes the form of legal-bureaucratic authority. Meanwhile the 
informal traditional-societal authority remains central to how religious institutions 
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relate to the society. Because these forms of authority contract and expand, they would 
also provide explanations for the disruption and perpetuation of institutional 
configurations. Building on this relational authority – the different forms of authority 
that state fatwas invoke in relation to other actors – the outcome is then conceptualised 
in Statist Islam, which captures the factors that are essential to the functions of state-
linked religious institutions. 
To sum up, policy feedback concerns how policies affect politics. The state policy of 
regulating religious affairs leads to the entrenchment of new bureaucratic 
constituencies and their capacity to affect state decisions. But to understand how 
policy feedback occurs, I propose looking at how the authority of these bureaucratic 
constituencies is asserted. The next part will explain the role of authority in my 
conceptual framework. 
3.4 Authority 
To properly conceptualise fatwas as a form of state-linked religious instruction, we 
need to trace how religious bureaucrats relate to the modern state. This is pertinent 
because in many countries including Singapore, fatwas are legally recognised and tied 
to the modern state bureaucracy. By examining the basis of fatwas’ authority and how 
this translates in relation to the state and society, this section conceptualises the extent 
of state fatwas’ influence. 
Fatwas represent a crucial mode for religious elites to negotiate their sectoral interests. 
Because fatwas remain an indispensable tool for religious instruction, they can be 
invoked on a wide range of issues, from personal religious rituals to societal projects 
to political agendas. It is important to recognise that the legal and bureaucratic 
channels endowed to fatwas give them the authority to permeate the state’s decision-
making process. The outcome of this relationship and negotiation between state and 
religious interests shapes a standardised form of religious praxis, i.e. Statist Islam. 
Because state fatwas have to assert authority in order to affect Statist Islam, I will 
outline the types of authority they utilise when they contend against different actors in 
different situations. The legal-bureaucratic authority underpins the institutional 
configurations that state fatwas enjoy with the state. The authority of state fatwas over 
the society is meanwhile conceptualised through traditional-societal authority. 
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Authority could be examined in terms of power relations, yet according to Arendt, it 
should be further defined “in contradistinction to both coercion by force and 
persuasion through arguments.”216 A key point she makes is that political authority is 
complemented by religion and tradition. But the breakdown of “all traditional 
authorities” in modern times has led to a deepening political crisis, resulting in new 
forms of totalitarian government. While Arendt explicitly addressed the Western 
milieu and referred to a specific form of historical authority that rests on a recognised 
hierarchy, this argument could also be extended to many modern contexts. 
There are parallels of Arendt’s view on authority in the West to those in Asia, as the 
latter also derived power and authority “from a hierarchy taken as the earthly 
manifestation of a cosmic order”, which changed as “every country in Asia was 
restructured on a Western model of the nation-state”.217 This marked origin of power, 
authority, and their consequences today is not unique, and therefore does not diverge 
far from the Muslim experience where religious authority is linked to historical 
foundations, political origins, and claims of authentic Islamic sources and traditions.218 
Another parallel is the Platonian element of expertise, in which Arendt links to the 
authority of knowledge production. These elements are present in the roles of fatwa 
issuers, whose relevance began in the early days of Islam as the interpreter of scriptural 
injunctions. Being the ones to define religion made them the source of Islamic 
knowledge and accorded them the positions of qadis and muftis; essentially their word 
became law. 
The function of fatwas to interpret and define Islam is also related to Durkheim’s 
concern on the relationship between authority and morality, since fatwas instruct not 
only religious rituals but also moral norms in the society. Although Durkheim viewed 
morality to be extricable from religion, and vice versa,219 I argue that both are 
intertwined especially in the Muslim experience. At least two brief reasons could be 
given for this. Firstly, Durkheim sees religion as a “symbolic expression of society’s 
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deepest moral sentiments and ideals” which unites society in – what he believes to be 
– times of great individualism.220 My reference of religion, however, is less 
adventurous and more conventional, in that it refers to a set of beliefs in divine power 
that leads to a set of laws and praxes which regulates social order. Unlike Durkheim 
who sees the decline of religious institutions in ‘the West’ as the demise of religion’s 
role to dictate moral authority, I look at ‘the East’ to argue that the permutation of 
religious institutions into modern state structures is a sign of their persistence. Yet I 
must concede to Durkheim’s thesis that society is continuously looking for other non-
religious sources of morality, which then leads to some forms of individuation – if not 
societal norm – that challenges the religious definition of morality. However I propose 
that religious institutions are constantly in negotiation with these ‘new’ forms of 
morality in society. This is because even as religion regulates, it is also regulated by 
other forces; i.e. religious praxes are susceptible to change due to pressures stemming 
from the shifting morals of the society, and also the constantly evolving state 
interests.221 Today’s application of Islamic law as an “assemblage”222 of not only 
religious tradition but also various social, economic, and political demands bears 
testament to how religious institutions are transformed to remain relevant to the 
evolving moral preference of the society. The manifestation of secular and sacred 
interests through religious institutions is also supported by Hussin’s excellent insight 
on the development of Islamic law, which she calls the institutionalisation of the 
“politics of paradox” as the modern Muslim state struggles to maintain as well as 
suppress the application of Islamic law.223 Peletz’s and Mohamad’s earlier cited work 
on Islamic courts and religious bureaucracy also demonstrated how religious 
institutions became a platform of negotiation and bargaining between the state, 
society, and those in between.224 Secondly, Islamic religious authority is seen as both 
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a political and moral force that protects the interests of the citizen.225 Compared to the 
Western European experience, the ‘Muslim experience’ of religion is arguably 
inextricable from its role in regulating moral and social conduct. Numerous calls for 
an “Islamic reformation” – which assumed similar consequences for Muslims as the 
West with Christianity226 – were met with vociferous rejoinders.227 Also, political 
authority in Muslim-majority countries is almost always contingent on religious 
legitimacy.228 This is not only evident in the appeal of Islamist political parties in the 
Arab Spring, but also the widespread practice of co-opting religious institutions to 
bolster political legitimacy in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In essence, religious 
and moral authority could hardly be separable where the Islamic belief is concerned. 
Religious authority should, however, be separated from the understanding of state, 
legal, or military authorities that are largely based on physical coercion. While many 
authorities rely on some form of coercion, I propose that religious authority on its own 
possesses limited capacity to mete out physical coercion. This is especially true in 
secular countries where religious authority is removed from the state. In the case of 
Singapore where the Islamic religious bureaucracy is linked to the state, physical 
coercion is realised only by invoking relevant parts of the secular legal apparatus, 
through which the judiciary decides if its legal authority should be executed to process 
the demands of the religious bureaucracy. Even in countries where the legal system is 
based on religious law, the capacity to mete out physical coercion is not sanctioned 
solely by virtue of religious authority. Rather it is made possible by the 
interdependence of religious law on the court’s legal authority, which then carries out 
the required physical coercion. 
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Therefore, I take the position that the essential coercive elements of religious authority 
are introduced through “religious language and symbolism” that induce communal 
obligation and compel obedience,229 in addition to promises of metaphysical rewards 
and punishments. Religious authority is uniquely different than other forms of 
authority; after all as Pye argues, authority is subjective and dependent on specific 
interpretations and expectations of what constitutes legitimacy.230 The bearers of 
“sacred authority” – the term used by Eickelman and Piscatori to refer to religious 
authority – are linked to their followers through various means: ideology, as they 
“exemplify the moral order” and “represent symbolic reference points”; location, in 
which the presence of religious authority makes its bearers relevant; and function, 
because they serve a role in providing religious instructions.231 These domains of 
authority, as I call them, are but indicators of how religious institutions invoke 
authority when dealing with various actors. 
Here, Weber’s analysis of the foundation of authority could be used to demonstrate 
the type of religious authority invoked by state fatwas. The well-known tripartite 
distinction of authority – traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal – attempts to 
locate the sources of legitimation.232 Taking fatwas as an example to illustrate Weber’s 
ideal-type form of authority, the legitimacy of fatwas’ traditional authority fits 
Weber’s definition, namely as it is sanctified by validity for a long time. In this sense, 
the traditional authority of fatwas is firstly demonstrated in the essence of the fatwa 
itself; its sole existence demonstrates the persistent legitimacy of a long-held tradition 
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since fatwas represent the practice of religious instructions. The traditional authority 
is reinforced by the content of the fatwas, as the religious evidences that fatwas cite to 
justify their ruling are made up of established traditional Islamic scripture. 
The charismatic authority of fatwas can be seen in its association to the ulama, 
religious figures who not only claim knowledge of the religion but also symbolise 
religious scholarship. The role of these ulama are hardly confined within the fatwa 
institution, because prior to their appointment they were already established figures in 
the society, a testament to their charismatic authority. Indeed, to be appointed as a 
mufti not only requires religious knowledge, but societal acceptance as well. 
The rational-legal authority is demonstrated in the function of fatwas. They 
informally instruct religious orthopraxy and orthodoxy and set religious rulings in a 
Muslim community. In many countries, including Singapore, the authority of fatwas 
is also formalised through recognition in the secular legal system. On the surface, this 
allows the modern nation-state to manage its religious institutions and opens the door 
for the instrumentalisation of religion. Yet this also grants state fatwas access to the 
available bureaucratic resources, and more importantly formalises their legal 
relevance. 
Clearly the forms of authority here do not operate in isolation, rather they overlap 
depending on contexts and issues. For example, the personal charismatic authority of 
religious figures is shifted into a procedural one when they are appointed to public 
office. Mohamad posited that “the charismatic personality is…transmuted into the 
routinized charismatic official, who commands on the basis of statutes legitimized 
through a rational, bureaucratic, if not democratic, framework.”233 As the core of 
fatwas deal with religious issues, I propose to look at the various conceptions of 
authorities above within the ambit of religious authority. 
Here I define religious authority as: the capacity to exact Muslim societal obedience 
on religious issues, and influence other actors to the benefit of religious interests, with 
limited recourse to physical coercion. Religious authority in the modern state overlaps 
between legal, bureaucratic, and social spheres. The manifestation of state fatwas’ 
 




religious authority in these spheres is categorised into two broad classifications: legal-
bureaucratic authority and traditional-societal authority. 
3.4.1 Legal-Bureaucratic Authority 
Legal-bureaucratic authority refers to how state fatwas function in the secular context, 
i.e. by securing relevance through bureaucratic recognition and legal embeddedness. 
State-sanctioned religious institutions are endowed with formalised authority and 
recognised legally as a part of state bureaucracy. Fatwa institutions including those in 
Southeast Asia – among them Singapore – were accorded legal status as they 
transitioned into the post-colonial nation-state system. For the case of Singapore, this 
legal recognition is outlined in the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), a 
legislation that covers the regulation of Islamic law and its religious institutions. In 
addition to centralising the management of all mosques and madrasahs in the country, 
AMLA also embedded the fatwa-issuing body in the secular legal system, detailed the 
fatwa-making process and the appointment of Fatwa Committee members, and 
outlined the legal reach of state fatwas. As the administration of religious matters was 
centralised, fatwa-making also got embedded in the state and became part of the 
religious bureaucracy. 
At the same time, state fatwas also represent the rational-legal demands of religious 
elites. Religious demands are regarded by some as ‘sectoral’, “in the sense that they 
aim to influence state policies on issues that are seen as crucial from the point of view 
of a particular sectoral elite… [which] include the expansion of religious institutions, 
the preservation of orthodoxy against ‘deviant’ ideas, and public morality.”234 In this 
light, state fatwas cannot merely be seen as religious instructions that bridge the 
interests of state and society; they project a set of distinctive demands. Parenthetically 
this challenges the Weberian perception of religious demise in politics.235 Various 
sociological narratives, no doubt influenced by the Weberian approach, present 
religion as an increasingly obsolete cultural item.236 Berger’s initial secularisation 
thesis for example – built upon Weber’s theme and contrasted modernity and tradition 
as polar opposites – pushes the point further and argues that the weakening role of 
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religious institutions would consequently affect the piety of society and its 
consciousness.237 Probed further, the Durkheimian model posits that the dilution of 
religious authority leads to increased individualism, and eventually the society is 
driven by individual autonomy.238 In other words, religious authority shifts from 
institutionalised hierarchies to individual members of the society. This in turn makes 
individuals the driving force of religiosity, rendering structures of religious authorities 
redundant.239 This narrative suggests that while religious authority remains, it is 
mediated by individual members of the society as the “final assessor[s] of religiosity”, 
instead of the religious institutions.240 All these claims are questioned by investigating 
the function of state fatwas in the secular state. As state fatwas all over the world 
continue to issue religious instructions, their function demonstrates the persistence of 
institutionalised religious authority, especially as they are legally and bureaucratically 
entrenched in state structures. 
The fatwa institution I examine in this thesis is bureaucratically situated within the 
ambit of the state and possesses the necessary connections and resources to engage it 
in shaping relevant policies. This is built upon the formalisation of fatwas’ authority 
in two channels: legal and bureaucratic recognition. Legal recognition confers state 
fatwas with legal authority, which is also the most formalised form of authority due to 
its explicit expressions. This legal recognition can also grant fatwas jurisdiction over 
certain religious matters even if they happen to contradict secular norms. However 
there are limitations to this. In cases where state fatwas’ legal authority is not explicit, 
they are susceptible to challenges in court (as I shall elaborate in Chapter 5). 
Meanwhile the bureaucratic authority of state fatwas is largely defined by the state; 
the onus on making them relevant ultimately rests on lawmakers and policymakers. 
When state fatwas are formally consulted, they get included in the policymaking 
process. As I will explain in Chapter 4, this invokes their bureaucratic authority such 
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that policymakers were forced to carve out policy exemption for Muslims in order to 
comply to state fatwas. 
It is pertinent to note that co-optation can therefore be a mutually beneficial exercise. 
After all, Saward noted that the co-optation of various actors in the state endows the 
latter with additional “value” and “expertise”.241 This co-optation not only allows the 
state to control religious demands through regulated channels, but also oversee the 
management and administration of religious interests through the religious 
bureaucracy. The relationship between the representatives of the secular and the 
sacred, evident in the establishment of a religious bureaucracy, also lends legitimacy 
to the state as it implies a degree of trust between these two parties. 
At the same time, the co-optation of actors who can potentially challenge state 
authority can be advantageous for the co-optee. Especially in authoritarian states, an 
established legal-bureaucratic connection might be the most crucial factor that grants 
religious constituents the capacity to affect state decisions. Co-opted religious elites 
also stand to gain from the this newfound legal-bureaucratic “positional authority”.242 
In this context, positional authority allows them to be recognised within an office that 
connects them to the larger state bureaucracy, and ultimately endows them with the 
capacity to affect state decisions through policy feedback. Without this legal-
bureaucratic authority, it becomes seemingly impossible for interest groups to affect 
the decisions of the authoritarian state. The formalisation of the ‘expertise’ of religious 
elites, in this case by issuing fatwas, creates a designated function in the eyes of the 
state. As state fatwas represent the highest religious office, this also allows them to 
claim representation of the interest of the Muslim community. 
However legal-bureaucratic authority does not fully explain instances when state 
fatwas circumvent state demands. Indeed, to be effective on the society that they 
instruct, state fatwas rely not only on these legal and bureaucratic leverages, but also 
on an informal form of religious authority, which is explained below. 
3.4.2 Traditional-Societal Authority 
If legal and bureaucratic authorities require formal structural link with the state, 
traditional-societal authority refers to the informal embeddedness of fatwas: the 
 




unwritten linkages, connections, and relationships that endow them with authority 
over the Muslim community. This informal form of authority is epitomised in societal 
consent and adherence to fatwas. Just as fatwas can embed itself in certain state 
policies, they are also embedded in segments of the society due to a variety of reasons. 
It might be problematic to condense traditional-legal authority to a single factor, 
however it can be narrowed down to a combination of fatwas’ traditional and historical 
role, their connection to authentic religious sources, and the charismatic feature of 
fatwas. 
Fatwas exercise traditional-societal authority by transmitting religious instructions. In 
providing answers to religious questions, fatwas dictate how Muslims should engage 
everyday issues in modern life. Yet for state fatwas, this societal embeddedness is also 
aided by their bureaucratisation. In Singapore before the bureaucratisation of fatwas, 
the Muslim population relied on religious instructions from individual local ulama and 
overseas muftis.243 Bureaucratisation facilitated the centralising of local demand for 
religious decrees and strengthened state fatwas’ position in the society. This societal 
embeddedness is also bolstered by the ulama in charge of issuing fatwas. Since its 
establishment, the state fatwa body in Singapore has always practised a collective 
system in which a group of ulama convenes to issue fatwas. These ulama are 
themselves established individuals who command religious authority in the society. 
When they issue fatwas, their personal and charismatic authority are then lent to these 
religious decrees. 
In my thesis, I will demonstrate how state fatwas oscillate between legal-bureaucratic 
authority and informal traditional-societal authority, contingent on the context and 
actor they deal with. When dealing with the state and legal institutions, state fatwas 
exhibit proclivity to formalised authority as it adapts to legal and bureaucratic 
standards. However when dealing with non-state actors state fatwas tend to invoke 
societal embeddedness by asserting the informal religious authority they already 
command. In such cases, we can see how state fatwas utilise relational authority to 
appeal to different audiences and to negotiate religious objectives, which ultimately 
contribute to informing and defining Statist Islam. 
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This underlines the final point in this section, and that is the type of authority that state 
fatwas assert is relative to whom they are dealing with. Authoritativeness is necessary 
for the authority to function, i.e. “the directives of authorities can only be effective 
when, for whatever reason, people obey them.”244 I contend that it is relevant to 
examine authority beyond legal-bureaucratic structures, and instead investigate it as 
an understanding between the ruler and the ruled, “premised on the former’s provision 
of a social order of value sufficient to offset the latter’s loss of freedom.”245 In settings 
where the nature of legitimacy is contested, we have to look at how authority is 
asserted relative to the other actor. 
The obligation to comply to the commands of the ruler lies in the consent of the ruled. 
While a political ruler possesses the ability to exert forms of coercion on the society, 
e.g. by deploying the security apparatus, for the vast majority of religious institutions 
today the ability to coerce is severely limited. For many religious elites, ‘coercion’ 
takes the form of religious reprimands such as reminders of metaphysical rewards and 
punishments. But when dealing with secular state actors, the appeal of spiritual 
reprimands is clearly ineffective, so state fatwas invoke various other dimensions of 
authority to ensure their relevance. 
The fluidity of authority can also be used to explain how state fatwa issuers adhere to 
‘hard law’ (or a form of it) when dealing with policymakers and the judiciary, and 
shifting to ‘soft law’ when addressing the Muslim community. In socio-legal studies, 
soft law refers to instruments that abstain from forcing legal obligations on groups or 
individuals, at the same time implicitly promoting legal adherence to particular 
responsibilities and commitments.246 Unlike hard law, soft law is “not restricted to the 
text of any one convention” or law, and this gives soft law practitioners a “uniquely 
flexible and independent role,”247 analogous to how state fatwas operate especially 
when contested by the state. Hard law, explicit in its expressions, dictates the 
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formalised authority of state fatwas especially within the AMLA framework that 
provisions their bureaucratic and legal positions. 
However because soft law is depicted as being consistent with the demands of hard 
law, therein lies the glaring distinction in how this applies to state fatwas. The soft law 
side of state fatwas does not necessarily match with the written hard law in AMLA 
that endows them with legal-bureaucratic relevance. The reason for this is because 
there are two distinct forms of hard law that state fatwas abide by: the secular law 
(AMLA) that grants them modern relevance, and traditional religious law that is the 
Shariah. Each set of law is based on their respective legal history, distinct sources, and 
unique objectives. And when faced between either the secular or religious option, 
fatwas favour the latter at the expense of the former. As I shall demonstrate later in 
Chapters 4 and 5, this soft law characteristic allows state fatwas to extend beyond the 
reach of written law and contest state policies and court judgements. In certain policy 
negotiations, state fatwas exploited their bureaucratic position to advance religious 
interest. Similarly when state fatwas were challenged in court, their legal position was 
debated in light of how AMLA is interpreted. However when their formalised legal-
bureaucratic authority was compromised, state fatwas possess an alternative ‘soft’ 
channel to dictate and affect religious norms. This channel demonstrated how the ‘soft’ 
side of fatwas persists despite ‘hard’ legal and bureaucratic restrictions. 
Yet recent developments – and this will be discussed in Chapter 6 – turned state fatwas 
into the legal marker of what can and cannot be part of religious teachings in 
Singapore. This makes for an interesting turn of event that gives state fatwas more 
hard law attributes. Because the adherence to state fatwas in religious classes used to 
be voluntary, this transformed what used to be the ‘soft’ adherence of state fatwas into 
‘hard’ acceptance. Consequently, this also adds more religious relevance into state 
structures, an ironic outcome of state regulation of religion. As a result, state fatwas 
gained more relevance and authority to inform religious demands in the state. 
3.5 Statist Islam 
Building on the concept of state autonomy, it is natural to assume that state authority 
is not only inherent to conventional state programmes such as economic development 
and health policies, but also to religious projects. 
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The amalgamation of state and religious interests is embodied in Statist Islam which 
has been used to refer to Islamisation projects that seek to consciously manifest the 
Islamic faith in the state.248 Similarly the manifestation of Buddhism in the state is 
referred to as a form of “statist Buddhism”, with emphasis on Buddhist religious elites 
establishing linkages between the religion and the state,249 or even meshing religion in 
the state apparatus to form a particular national identity.250 My interpretation of Statist 
Islam however differs in the sense that it does not refer to the immediate efforts of 
introducing religion in the state, nor associating state structures to religious agendas. 
Rather Statist Islam is the consequence of efforts by the state, its apparatus, and 
religious and societal actors; the product of preservation and assertion of each actor’s 
interests, and the sum of its ramifications both intended and otherwise, exhibited 
through religious praxis. 
In challenging common assumptions about religious elites in authoritarian Southeast 
Asian states, state fatwas are situated at a prime intersection where state-religious 
interests collide. This is because the main function of state fatwas is to provide 
religious instruction for the Muslim community, which at times can be contradictory 
to state decisions. This problematises the assumption that religious bureaucracies have 
little or no room to assert their authority and sheds light on how exactly religious elites 
negotiate, resist, and inform state decisions. This also unravels the relationship of 
religious elites to the state and other key actors, and reveals complex negotiations and 
hidden reciprocities, not far from what Menchik argues in the case of Indonesia (which 
I mentioned earlier).251 Kloos aptly reminds us that the “power of the state should not 
be seen as all-pervasive,” and moving beyond how “Islam has been subjected to a 
process of domestication by the state”, it is also “crucial” to examine how Muslims 
“have set limits to this process, either by resisting it, or by becoming part of it.”252 
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Therefore, terming the interpretations of the state-friendly ulama as always “in line 
with the state” could also be disputed through this research.253 Although the religious 
bureaucracy in Singapore is an arm of the state, this does not mean that it simply 
administers state demands. Rather state instructions undergo an extra layer of filter 
that meshes state demands together with the interest of religious bureaucrats. What I 
argue here is that there is an overlooked process that leads to the amalgamation of 
statist and religious interests, and even scenarios where religious demands can come 
out on top. 
I already mentioned that my usage of Statist Islam differs from others who emphasise 
Islamisation projects which consciously espouse religious interests through the state. 
Statist Islam here is not an explicit state or social project to ‘stateise’ Islam or Islamise 
the state. It is not the sole product of domestic politics, but can also be shaped by 
extraneous factors that arise due to developments elsewhere. These developments 
particularly concern religious movements and trends, such as the dakwah (Islamic 
missionary) movements of the 1970s and 1980s that swept across Southeast Asia, 
disenfranchised Muslims who are inspired by the 9/11 terror attack and similar 
incidents, and more recently security concerns on individuals motivated by violent 
militant groups in war-torn Iraq and Syria. Because of the variability of these factors, 
Statist Islam does not refer to a static form of religious orthopraxy; it is constantly in 
a process of changing and becoming. 
The combination of these factors led the most powerful autonomous social institution 
– the state – placing new boundaries on how religious practices should be observed in 
Singapore. While the state has already set up boundaries designed to regulate religious 
demand and quell religious activism, these represent only a small scope of measures 
that affects religious praxis. Which is why it is important to consider both domestic 
and foreign factors, as well as historical and current developments whose outcome 
directly and indirectly shapes religious praxis in a country. This relates to a point raised 
earlier in which I suggested that Islamic institutions represent the amalgamation or 
“assemblage” of various religious, social, economic, and political interests. 254 At the 
same time the unique, localised factors of each environment where Islamic law is 
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observed also indicate how Islamic religious sources are accepted in a particular place. 
This is what Messick argues as he identified the variegated layers of sources of Islamic 
law, which, at the local level, a unique adherence to certain types of Shariah sources 
applies.255 A prime example is when classical traditional Islamic sources, such as fiqh 
manuals, are transmitted and interpreted in more contemporary settings in the form of 
fatwas.  
I take the position that the modern state fatwa represents the dominant form of 
contemporary religious interpretation and instruction, where a combination of factors 
both theological and exogenous to religious debates manifests, in addition to highly 
localised factors that affect its outcome. Among these factors, I posit that the 
regulations put in place by the modern state has the most significant effect on state 
fatwas, which consequently affects the religious praxis of a specific country. Statist 
Islam therefore underlines how state decisions affect fatwas, just as it demonstrates 
how fatwas affect the state. Relating this point to the earlier conception of policy 
feedback, I have discussed how state policies do not only affect the policy targets, but 
also the policymakers. This is an often-overlooked aspect especially when discussing 
state-religious dynamics. As the state enacts new laws to oversee more religious 
issues, new bureaucratic connections are established which then reconfigure state 
structures. Through the expansion of religious regulation, these state structures 
become gradually cognizant of, if not more involved in, addressing religious demands. 
These are important developments that shape future state decisions concerning 
religion, which ultimately underlines an important outcome: that as the state regulates 
more religious affairs, religion becomes more embedded in the state, which ironically 
increases the role and relevance of state fatwas in state structures. 
Taking into account the constantly changing state mechanisms that advertently and 
inadvertently affect religious praxis, Statist Islam allows for a fuller understanding of 
the factors that shape how the Islamic belief is practised, which then results in a 
particular ‘brand’ of Islam in a country. 
 





This chapter has outlined the analytical framework for researching state fatwas, a 
crucial form of religious instruction in the modern state. Beginning with the empirical 
conceptions presented in Islamism and state co-optation of religious institutions, I 
synthesised these theories to explain the agency and function of state fatwas in the 
modern state. This is then incorporated into the analytical framework.  
To analyse state fatwas, I started with the autonomous state that manages religion 
through its rigorous policies, resulting in the co-optation and bureaucratisation of 
religious institutions. This enabled religious elites to affect state decisions through 
policy feedback. Feedback effect occurs as state fatwas invoke their legal-bureaucratic 
authority, which then enables a form of state-religious negotiation. The amalgamation 
of these set of interests and demands manifests in Statist Islam which represents how 
the Islamic praxis is observed. Statist Islam is rooted first and foremost in the 
bureaucratic limitation and legal restriction set by the state, and takes into account the 
relational authority of state-linked fatwas to the state and society, and what this means 
for religious praxis in a country. 
In the context of authoritarian governments, tracing the development of fatwa-making 
and its embeddedness in the state and society will reveal the nuances and negotiations 
that take place. Despite the religious objectives of fatwas, it is a grave mistake to 
dismiss them as irrelevant in a modern secular state. The fact that official state-
sanctioned fatwas persist today exhibits the ongoing evolution of religious 
engagement with the modern state. This contributes to the growing literature on how 
religion is negotiated and informed in Southeast Asian contexts. Although post-
colonial state projects accommodated many religious institutions in the region, there 
is a gap in addressing the role of religious elites in these projects. This is especially 
true for state fatwas which represent a key form of religious instruction that possesses 
the authority to legitimise and challenge the state. There is a dearth of research on how 
state fatwas function in Southeast Asia, and even more so in comparing how different 
state-sanctioned fatwa bodies operate in the world today. As such, I draw upon Statist 
Islam to conceptualise the consequences of shared religious projects involving the 
state and religious elites. Although state fatwas are constricted by various regulations 




The empirical component of this thesis begins in the next chapter as I outline the 
political and social history that led to the creation of a state-linked fatwa institution in 
Singapore. This will provide proper context for the function and role of state fatwas 
as they become the vehicle that religious elites utilise to inform, negotiate, and contest 





Chapter 3: The Governance of Muslims in Singapore 
1 Introduction 
Fatwas represent a long-standing Muslim tradition that remains observed throughout 
changes not only in time, but also in different political milieus. The persistence of 
fatwas signifies their informal traditional-societal authority as they remain present and 
relevant beyond the state and modern legal recognition. Yet fatwas’ formalised 
functions should not be overlooked because it is the legal and bureaucratic relevance 
that cements the authority of fatwas in the modern nation-state. 
This chapter provides the social and political background for the development of 
fatwas’ formalised authority in Singapore. It seeks to answer an important part of the 
thesis: how was the modern authority of state fatwas formed? I answer this by looking 
at the historical development of Singapore’s religious bureaucracy which culminated 
in the formation of a fatwa-issuing institution. By focusing on colonial practices and 
post-colonial developments, I argue that the bureaucratisation of religion and 
enactment of Muslim law within the secular legal framework of Singapore not only 
regulated religious demands, but also transformed fatwas into a form of legally-
relevant religious instruction. This also validates the authority of religious elites to 
affect state decisions through policy feedback. In other words, by tracing the history 
of the modern religious bureaucracy, this chapter will demonstrate how the ‘statist’ in 
Statist Islam came to be. 
Islam in Southeast Asia spread by way of tradesmen, holy men, and the expansion of 
kingdoms.256 A clear majority of Southeast Asian Muslims are Sunnis and follow the 
Shafi’ī madhhab or school of thought that guides how religious praxis is observed. 
Historians have debated whether the arrival of Islam could have originated from the 
Middle East, India, or even China.257 No matter through which region Islam came to 
Southeast Asia, religious matters ultimately lie within the domain of local Malay 
rulers. Therefore religious authority in pre-colonial and colonial Malaya (and even 
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Malaysia today) rests on Malay rulers who claim institutional, legal, and traditional 
legacy. In the past, these rulers appointed various religious officials and qadis (alt. 
kadi or kathi) to oversee religious affairs, who became religious judges as well as 
marriage solemnisers.258 In an era when the law of the land was strongly influenced 
by Islamic tradition,259 these religious figures conducted marriage ceremonies, and 
adjudicated and arbitrated in various disputes. They were as relevant back then as 
today’s judges, lawyers, and legal professionals, thus situating them in politically- and 
socially-elevated positions. 
By the turn of the 20th century, however, their religious dominance was challenged. 
The changing political landscape brought upon by British colonisation changed the 
legal system and pushed religious law to the periphery. To be precise, the domain of 
religious law was limited only to marriages, divorces, and inheritance under colonial 
rule. As Lindsey and Steiner acknowledge, this is also reflected in the use of the word 
qadi which originally means a religious judge who represents an “authoritative judicial 
figure of wide jurisdiction.”260 However in the Southeast Asian context today, the 
curtailed power of qadis effectively reduced the term to refer to “a bureaucratic 
functionary with responsibility only for officiating at marriages and divorces.”261 
Yet the restriction of religious law to particular domains did not hinder the observation 
of religious rituals and practices such as prayers, fasting, and other acts of worship. As 
long as religious observance persists, there will be a need for instruction, which means 
that fatwas remained relevant. 
The colonial period marked a time when new political and religious identities were 
forming, necessitating religious elites to bolster claims of authority. The two 
prominent religious camps at the time were the Kaum Tua (Old Faction) and Kaum 
Muda (Young Faction), who represented the traditionalist and reformist factions 
respectively. The Kaum Tua was made up of ulama who were allied to the Malay 
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ruling class.262 They typified the religious bureaucrats of their time and were 
positioned to inform the state about Islam. The Kaum Muda were the religio-political 
reformists who emerged at the turn of the 20th century. They were widely influenced 
by the ideas of Islamic clerics trained in Egypt and Europe, namely Jamaluddin al-
Afghani and Muhammad Abduh who marked their presence by seeking political 
reform to what they deemed as the corrupt Ottoman Empire.263 As these ideas spread 
in the Middle East, and given the region’s reputation as a seat of Islamic education, 
Malayan students who went there to read religion were also exposed to reformist 
ideas.264 It was no surprise that upon their return, some of them began to blame Malay 
rulers for colonial dominance and religious decline, and called for reform.265 
The Kaum Muda embarked on their reformist projects by establishing schools and 
magazines to disseminate their ideas.266 Among the key vehicles to lend legitimacy to 
their cause were fatwas. These reformists pegged their religious authority to 
established religious figures by importing fatwas from the Middle East to support their 
movement. These fatwas were disseminated through their preferred media platforms 
of magazines and journals to chip away at the authority of the Kaum Tua religious 
bureaucrats who were seen as part of the problem.267 They criticised the religious 
orthodoxy of the ‘old school’ and condemned certain ritual practices as deviations.268 
This threatened the authority and dominance of state-linked Islam. In response, state-
linked Kaum Tua ulama used various means to preserve their authority against the 
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newcomers.269 They had access to various legal and administrative measures that gave 
them powers to oversee other religious institutions such as mosques and madrasahs, 
which essentially enabled them to determine what was “properly Islamic” in the 
Muslim community.270 In addition to that, fatwas were also utilised to preserve their 
religious authority. Fatwas were therefore issued to defend their traditionalist 
position,271 and to attack the reformists by labelling them as deviants.272 
The brief example above illustrates the significance of fatwas as an instrument of 
authority and legitimacy. It shows how the authority of fatwas manifested itself in 
state-linked religious bureaucracy. More than a century later, the reformists evolved 
into new entities, breaking into groups and offshoots and even influential political 
parties, namely the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia or PAS). 
The traditionalist religious bureaucrats evolved over time by weaving religious 
influences within existing bureaucratic designs. In the midst of these changes, fatwas 
remain a central instrument to assert religious authority not only against other religious 
elites but also the modern state. 
The relevance of fatwas in the state is linked to their legal-bureaucratic authority. The 
positional advantage that came with the bureaucratisation and co-optation of religion 
gave the co-optees (in this case the religious bureaucrats) the authority to assert their 
demands in the modern state. In this context, their authority is asserted through a series 
of vehicles, the most crucial of which are fatwas. Compared to, for example legal 
enactments that ban certain religious classes, the fluidity of fatwas can transcend 
almost any state restriction and legal limitations, allowing them greater flexibility in 
shaping and influencing both religious observance and state decision. This is because 
there are two very extensive forms of authority that fatwas rely on. At the very basic 
level, fatwas assert traditional-societal authority which enables it to influence the 
religious praxis of a Muslim community. State fatwas are also endowed with some 
form of legal and bureaucratic backing, the sum of which is embodied in their legal-
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bureaucratic authority. This legal-bureaucratic authority is the product of linking 
fatwas to modern state bureaucracy, thus increasing their capacity to affect state 
decisions through policy feedback. As a result, state fatwas can affect both state 
decisions as well as shape the religious praxis of the Muslim community who seeks 
religious instructions, even if the two set of demands are somewhat contradictory, 
which I will elaborate in the next chapter. 
For this chapter, I will focus on how fatwas became relevant to the modern state in the 
first place. In Singapore today where religion is highly regulated, co-opted religious 
bureaucrats consciously tolerate, if not embrace the authoritarian secular government. 
These efforts result in distinct political outcomes. Careful scrutiny of state fatwas 
therefore allows us to examine how religious demands are asserted in the modern state. 
As an important form of religious instruction embedded in state bureaucracy, state 
fatwas exemplify the negotiation of religious demands with the state from a 
subordinate position, given the bureaucratic hierarchy of the administration of Muslim 
affairs. Examining state fatwas provides a grounded analysis of the impact of religious 
ideas on state decisions and vice versa. In the process, my research reveals how the 
authority of state fatwas is exercised beyond the intended purpose outlined in the 
legislation, and indeed can serve as a platform for the state to reach out to society. 
The following discussion is structured into three main parts. The first part will examine 
the brief history of religious bureaucracy in colonial Singapore through the 1880 
Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance. This is the first legal enactment in colonial 
Singapore that recognised the function of Islamic religious elites. The next part will 
analyse the post-colonial development of religious law and bureaucracy by looking at 
the 1965 Constitution of Singapore that specifically mentioned the protection of native 
religious rights. I will also discuss the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) 
which allowed for the establishment of the Fatwa Committee (formally known as the 
Legal Committee), as well as the sections in AMLA pertaining to fatwa issuance. The 
final part will conclude and underline how a combination of political and societal 
developments led to the creation of a centralised religious bureaucracy and cemented 
the authority of fatwas in the modern state. 
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2 The Colonial Administration 
2.1 The Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance (1880) 
The Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance of 1880 is a remarkable symbol of religious 
bureaucracy in the colonial period. The ordinance essentially rebooted the 
administration of Islamic law into centralised religious order and paved the way for 
later amendments that cemented religious bureaucracy in the secular state. 
Up until the colonial time, Singapore was ruled by the Johor Sultanate. Various 
sultanates in the Malay Peninsula were known to have appointed Islamic religious 
bureaucrats as officials, advisors, muftis, and qadis.273 One of the earliest recorded 
involvement of the state mufti in the Johor Sultanate was in 1895, when he witnessed 
the proclamation of the Johor State Constitution (Undang-Undang Tubuh Kerajaan 
Johor).274 It was highly likely, however, that the position of the Mufti of Johor existed 
much earlier than that given the recorded presence of muftis in other Malayan 
Sultanates including Malacca, from which the Johor Sultanate originated.275 
Although Singapore initially remained under the Johor Sultanate when the British 
arrived in 1819, it was only five years later in 1824 that the sultanate was made to 
“cede, in full sovereignty and property, to the Honourable the English East Indian 
Company, their heirs and successors for ever, the island of Singapore.”276 Under 
colonial rule, secular law superseded Islamic law, although segments of Islamic family 
law pertaining to marriage, divorce, and inheritance were specifically exempted.277 As 
Stamford Raffles, credited for the British takeover of Singapore, noted: “In all cases 
regarding the ceremonies of religion and marriages and the rules of inheritance, the 
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laws and custom of the Malays will be respected, where they shall not be in contrary 
to reason, justice or humanity.”278 
After the British took control of Singapore in perpetuity, things began to change for 
the Muslims in the country. The ratio of the Malay-Muslim population quickly 
decreased; in 1824, the Malays still formed the largest community in Singapore,279 but 
by 1827, the ethnic Chinese community overtook them to form some 65 per cent of 
the population.280 In the process of becoming a Straits Settlement, Singapore was then 
declared ‘uninhabited’, which meant that Islamic law could not be part of the law 
except through ordinance, and that the customary Malay laws were “neither respected 
nor enforced at any point in the history of the Straits Settlements.”281 In essence, 
English law overwrote local customary laws. 
There were therefore no state-linked religious institutions that could administer 
Islamic law in colonial Singapore. The authority linked to such institutions, which 
would have been under the jurisdiction of a sultan, was shifted to individual religious 
elites. This was because unlike in the Malay states where the traditional Malay rulers 
remained the highest authority of religious affairs, the British had ousted the rulers 
from Singapore. The dissociation of the state from the administration of Islamic law 
therefore pushed the responsibility wholly towards individual religious elites such as 
communal qadis and imams.282 Thus Singapore’s highest religious authority were the 
ulama class, meaning that the qadis and other religious officials rose to become 
influential social actors.283 In such a scenario, the legal status of Islamic religious 
observances also became increasingly problematic as both British and Islamic laws 
were observed, leading to a “complex combination of judicial precedent and statutory 
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intervention”284 which Hooker labelled the “Anglo-Malay madhhab”285 (school of 
law). 
While these religious elites were left to administer Islamic law with minimal state 
intervention, this also meant that religious authority was dispersed. The voluntary 
recognition of qadis led to disputes between various parties; after all each community 
selected its own qadi to administer Islamic law.286 The problem was illustrated in an 
1878 case when a qadi solemnised the wedding between a non-Arab man and an Arab 
woman without her guardian’s consent. Her uncle asked the colonial court to have the 
marriage annulled because, according to the predominantly observed Shafi`ī 
madhhab, the marriage is contingent on guardian consent. The Shāfi`ī madhhab or 
school is the predominant school of Islamic law observed in Southeast Asia. The judge 
however consulted the manual of another established madhhab that allows a woman 
to select her suitor without guardian consent, and had the case dismissed.287 
Arab merchants had long petitioned for the appointment of official qadis in Singapore 
to make the registration of marriages and divorces compulsory and properly 
recorded.288 An official qadi and centralised registration of marriage would guarantee 
confidence and standardise record-keeping, which would then benefit frequent 
travellers such as the Arab merchants. Due to the arbitrary nature of qadi rulings, there 
were cases in which upon the return from one of these travels, Arab merchants found 
their wives to have been unceremoniously separated from them.289 This petition for a 
centralised qadi was eventually accepted by the British. In 1880, the British 
acknowledged the status of Islamic personal law with the enactment of the 
Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance. (See Figure 2)  
Each of the Muslim community of Singapore – the Malay, Indian, and Arab ethnic 
groups – already had their self-appointed qadis who were recognised by the state 
(although they had no official positions).290 The ordinance changed this by making the 
appointment of qadis a government undertaking, i.e. by allowing the Governor of 
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Singapore to appoint official qadis and religious officials,291 and established qadi 
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over Muslims.292 Furthermore a “Mahomedan 
Registrar” was appointed to oversee the duties of these qadis.293 This marked the 
rebooting of religious bureaucracy in Singapore, and effectively placed these religious 
bureaucrats on the same level as civil servants.294 
 
Figure 2 The Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance of 1880 and 1908 
Whatever was the catalyst for its establishment, the 1880 Mohammedan Marriage 
Ordinance underlined how linking religious administration to state authority involves 
a more complex dynamic rather than a one-way statist usurpation of religious 
institutions. This episode also demonstrated that the state is an important component 
in the administration of Islamic law. This is because the state has the power to 
bureaucratise and centralise the various autonomous religious elites under one single 
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enactment. In doing so, the bureaucratisation also fosters better record-keeping 
practices, one of the motivations behind the new law. More importantly, the 
development of religious bureaucracy in Singapore showed how the interests and 
demands of religious elites came to be intertwined in state and legal structures. This 
shall have an enduring effect even for religious rulings and fatwas, as we shall see 
later. 
3 Post-colonial Religious Affairs 
3.1 The Constitution of Singapore 
The 1880 Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance was just the beginning of the 
bureaucratisation of Islamic institutions in Singapore. Since then and up to 
Singapore’s independence in 1965, there were gradual increments to facilitate the 
administration of Islamic law in the country. Amendment to the initial Ordinance in 
1908 made marriage and divorce registration compulsory, and imposed fine and 
imprisonment for offenders.295 Another 1923 amendment saw the legal recognition of 
Muslim intestate law or farāiḍ.296 There were several other amendments that allowed 
qadis to adjudicate claims of dowries and maintenance, and empowered the Registrar 
to arbitrate conflicts between qadis and manage appeals against their decisions.297 
A centralised body, the Muslim Endowment Board, was also established in 1906 “to 
promote social welfare and establish colonial oversight of Muslim philanthropy.”298 
This was followed by the creation of the Mohammedan Advisory Board in 1915 to 
advise the colonial power on matters pertaining to Islamic affairs.299 It is worthy to 
note that the creation of the Mohammedan Advisory Board was described as an 
“emergency” measure,300 in part to advise the colonial government on Muslim affairs 
and supervise religious groups.301 This ‘emergency’ measure stemmed from the 
mutiny of a group of Indian-Muslim British soldiers in February of 1915 when they 
pledged allegiance to the Ottomans in World War I. These soldiers from the 5th Light 
Infantry of the Indian Army took up arms, seized ammunitions from barracks, and 
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freed German prisoners of war who were being held in Singapore. The mutiny lasted 
a week and resulted in 26 deaths. It was eventually quelled with the help of British 
allied forces. After the rebellion, the mutineers were court martialled and sentenced to 
transportation for life or public execution by firing squad. To prevent similar 
occurrences, the British not only mandated compulsory military service on all adult 
males and created a reserve voluntary force, but also established the Mohammedan 
Advisory Board to regulate religious movements. This cemented the role of a 
centralised religious administrative body within the British colonial government. Over 
time, more Islamic religious institutions were recognised by the government. In 1957, 
the Muslim Ordinance was introduced, and led to the formation of the Syariah Court, 
formally institutionalising the management of Muslim marriages and divorces in 
Singapore.302 
Despite these developments, the official fatwa body was a relatively late addition to 
the religious bureaucracy. The appointment of a state mufti was already mooted during 
the colonial period,303 however the seat was instituted only after independence. One 
reason for this was that the void left by the lack of state fatwas could be filled rather 
easily by other fatwa issuers both locally and abroad. There was no official mufti in 
colonial Singapore up until independence, a period that lasted for about one and a half 
century. As there was no single individual or institution formally appointed to issue 
fatwas, petitioners would ask their respective religious teachers for fatwas, as well as 
the state-appointed qadis and registrar. Other informal avenues to source for fatwas 
were religious programmes through the radio, books, and even pamphlets.304 Members 
of the Singapore Muslim community were essentially free to choose fatwas which 
suited their interests, which risked stripping fatwas of their sophisticated, 
contextualised development. In these early variations of ‘fatwa-shopping’, religious 
questions were also directed to overseas muftis in nearby Johor, and even as far as 
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Egypt.305 This, of course, changed with the establishment of a central and official fatwa 
body later, which was given legal relevance and bureaucratic power.  
When the Crown Colony was dissolved in 1963, Singapore became part of Malaysia. 
However this short-lived merger ended just two years later when they separated. Upon 
independence from Malaysia, Singapore had inherited a “particular mode of 
integrating Islamic law into the law of the state.”306 It can also be said that Singapore’s 
accommodation of Islamic law in the legal system was inspired by its merger to 
Malaysia; despite earlier plans for a central Islamic body in Singapore,307 the eventual 
establishment of a centralised administrative religious body followed Malaysia’s own 
National Council for Islamic Affairs.308 During the Malaysia-Singapore merger from 
1963 to 1965, the Malaysian king became the highest Islamic authority for the 
Malaysian states which then included Singapore. Plans were then in place to create a 
religious advisory body to the Malaysian king, and Singapore – being part of Malaysia 
– was obliged to have established a Council of Muslim Religion to advise the king on 
religious matters.309 
While the merger was short-lived, the proposed Islamic council remained, a 
development which can be attributed to several reasons. For one, the separation from 
Malaysia forced the Singapore state to take measures to placate the Malay-Muslim 
constituency in Singapore.310 Domestically, memories of the 1964 racial riots in 
Singapore were still fresh. The riots saw two big clashes between the Malay-Muslim 
and non-Muslim ethnic Chinese groups. The first clash transpired after a religious 
celebration in July 1964 which led to the death of 23 people. In September the same 
year another riot led to the death of 13 people. In total, more than 500 people were 
injured and close to 5,000 were arrested.311 Externally, there were also threats from the 
large southern neighbour Indonesia which had opposed Singapore’s merger with 
Malaysia, and even bombed various targets in Singapore. Regionally, Singapore forms 
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part of a larger Malay-Muslim region. Where Malay-Muslim sultanates once ruled, 
they were replaced by countries that link political authority to religious legitimacy. 
The Malay-Muslims in Singapore briefly became the majority group when Singapore 
joined Malaysia. Separation from Malaysia returned them to minority status. These 
domestic and regional tensions required reassurances that native Malay ethnic and 
religious interests were protected upon Singapore’s independence. More importantly, 
they created the necessary structural potentials that pressured the Singapore state to 
allow religious elites to play a participatory role in the new nation.  
As a result, Singapore’s new constitution, enacted in December 1965, accorded 
constitutional provisions to the native Malay ethnic population, as well as their 
associated religion Islam. In the Constitution of Singapore, part XIII on General 
Provisions begins with Article 152 on Minorities and Special Position of Malays. 
Article 152(2) of the constitution ensures the state’s role in regulating not only social, 
but also religious interests: (emphasis mine) 
The Government shall exercise its functions in such manner as to recognise the 
special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore, 
and accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the Government to protect, 
safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educational, religious, 
economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language. 
Furthermore the constitution also recognises the need for an Islamic religious 
bureaucracy in the state. This can be attributed to the local and regional factors that I 
mentioned above, which underlined the critical support of statehood by political as 
well as religious elites. This also means that the interests of state and religious elites 
became intertwined through legal and bureaucratic links, which then created new 
avenues for the control (and expansion) of religious demands. The initial plan for the 
Malaysian-inspired Council of Muslim Religion was therefore incorporated in the 
constitution,312 as Article 153 specifically provisioned: 
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The Legislature shall by law make provision for regulating Muslim religious 
affairs and for constituting a Council to advise the President in matters relating 
to the Muslim religion. 
The recognition of native Malay-Muslim religious rights in the Constitution of 
Singapore depicts the evolution of Islamic law in the secular legal framework. Such 
provisions were codified in earlier ordinances, beginning with the Mohammedan 
Marriage Ordinance in 1880 and its subsequent amendments. The religious 
bureaucracy was further institutionalised through various bodies such the 
Mohammedan Advisory Board, set up following the 1915 mutiny to regulate and 
manage religious affairs in a perilous period. Upon independence, a different set of 
conditions called for a somewhat similar approach: the creation of a state-recognised 
religious administrative body in Singapore. The demands of various Muslim groups 
to participate in “the governing of the state”313 and “implement the shari’a”314 were 
eventually successful as the circumstances facilitated this upon Singapore’s separation 
from Malaysia. The 1965 Constitution of Singapore affirms the role of the state in the 
regulation of Muslim religious affairs. It not only guarantees a centralised 
administration of Islamic religious affairs but also embeds the role of religious 
institutions in the modern bureaucracy. 
It was therefore clear that the precarious emergence of a small, independent state 
required explicit support not only from political elites, but also religious elites. For the 
state, this meant giving up its resources and opening up access for religious demands. 
For the religious elites, having a centralised religious administration linked to the state 
which manages everything from mosques to madrasahs threatens their autonomy, yet 
ensures their relevance through formal institutions and legislations. Ultimately, the 
premise that such a move would preserve each group’s respective authority motivated 
the formalisation of this relationship and gave birth to the modern Islamic religious 
bureaucracy in Singapore. 
3.2 The Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) 
Building on these constitutional guarantees, the AMLA was enacted in 1966 and 
superseded all previous Islamic law ordinances. The jurisdiction of the Syariah Court 
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– established in 1957 – was outlined in AMLA. Two new institutions were also 
formed: The Registry of Muslim Marriages and Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 
(Islamic Council of Singapore or MUIS). MUIS is the administrative body with wide-
ranging jurisdiction over Islamic affairs. It holds the key to vital financial resources 
by managing zakat (compulsory alms) and properties endowed for Islamic religious 
cause or waqf. The institution also oversees madrasahs, mosques, and hajj matters. 
More pertinently to this research, a fatwa body was also formed under MUIS. The 
establishment of a central fatwa issuer relegated the position of other fatwa-givers and 
marked the assimilation of fatwas into state machinery, thus endowing it with new 
legal-bureaucratic authority. 
The establishment of AMLA was made with substantial contributions from various 
religious elites.315 The invested efforts of religious elites in drawing up AMLA was 
evident as a good number of those consulted was among the ulama who represented 
various political and religious organisations, including a mosque.316 Furthermore, the 
President of the Syariah Court at the time, who was later appointed the first Mufti of 
Singapore, was also included in these meetings.317 Substantial consultations with 
religious elites mitigated the worries of forming a new country; as mentioned earlier 
Singapore’s internal social divide and external threat meant that new policies cannot 
be another source of disruption, especially at such an early juncture of statehood. The 
co-optation of religious elites effectively made AMLA a collective effort and situated 
them in a position to align their interests with the state as both groups attempted to 
exercise their demands within a common framework. 
Prior to AMLA, the administration of Islamic law was limited to marriage, divorce, 
and inheritance laws through the Syariah Court. As AMLA stipulated the appointment 
of a state mufti and a fatwa-issuing committee, this enactment single-handedly unified 
all petitioners to one source. Although the committee is formally referred to in AMLA 
as the Legal Committee (Jawatankuasa Fatwa), it is commonly known as the Fatwa 
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Committee (which is also the term I will use henceforth).318 The Fatwa Committee is 
made up of both salaried religious bureaucrats as well as volunteer ulama, who issue 
fatwas collectively. The Fatwa Committee is linked to MUIS through its secretariat 
known as the Office of the Mufti, which operates as a department in MUIS. (See 
Figure 3) In this sense, the Fatwa Committee is somewhat removed from the direct 
hierarchy linking it to the main administrative body MUIS that oversees a significant 
part of Islamic religious affairs in Singapore. Yet the role of religious bureaucrats in 
the Fatwa Committee should also not be understated. 
 
 
Figure 3 A simplified organisational hierarchy of the Fatwa Committee 
While AMLA provides state fatwas with legal authority, MUIS is the key connection 
through which bureaucratisation occurs. Despite that, MUIS, by definition, does not 
quite embody ‘the State’. This is because the original purpose and intent of its creation 
was as a statutory board. As a statutory board, MUIS claims organisational autonomy 
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while remaining answerable to the Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs, who is taken 
as the key representative of ‘the State’.  
I should briefly note here that my thesis does not address specific politicians, parties, 
or government department due to the fact that Singapore’s political system has, since 
independence, been continuously ruled a single party: the People’s Action Party 
(PAP). For a period of more than five decades, a particular style of governance has 
cemented itself in state bureaucracy. As a result, an authoritarian political culture has 
developed and established itself in state and state-linked structures, so much so that 
the military, civil service, and even academia are turned into bases of support for the 
ruling party.319 This should be seen in relation to the theory of state autonomy which 
I have presented, as the creation of new bases of support marks the expanding 
boundary of where the autonomous state lies. The state is therefore considered a 
collective actor against the fatwa institution. Therefore while my research explores the 
legal-bureaucratic boundary between the fatwa institution and the state, it does not 
seek to further distinguish where the boundary lies between the state’s various 
components which the fatwa institution deals with, The relevant components of the 
state, ranging from the prime minister, to the president, to the party, are therefore not 
singled out in the thesis. However what is pertinent enough to be mentioned is the 
point of contact between the fatwa issuers and the state, which in this case are the 
Minister-in-Charge of Muslims Affairs, whom the religious bureaucracy answers to, 
as well as various Muslim parliamentarians who were recorded to have directly 
petitioned or at least interjected in the fatwa-making process. 
As mentioned above, the fatwa body is housed in MUIS, which in itself is a statutory 
board. Statutory boards in Singapore were created in order to exercise flexibility in 
pursuing objectives set by the state, compared to the supposed rigidity they face if they 
were a proper department in a government ministry.320 Statutory boards like MUIS 
therefore, on paper, enjoy a degree of autonomy and are expected to demonstrate better 
efficiency of resources.321 Yet I have also pointed out how the Singapore state 
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constantly regulates domains of contestation, and therefore it should not be surprising 
that statutory boards in Singapore peculiarly answer to government ministers. One 
might question how this bureaucratic hierarchy within an authoritarian government 
affects the autonomy of religious bureaucrats to affect state decisions. By being closely 
linked to the state, MUIS is clearly susceptible to forms of state instrumentalisation.  
Here, I will briefly pause to provide an overview of the functions of statutory boards 
in Singapore. Studies have shown how statutory boards became the platform in which 
state mechanisms were deployed to pursue repressive policies.322 Several observers 
posit that the supposed autonomy of statutory boards benefits specific objectives set 
by the state because it gives flexibility and speed to pursue projects which would 
otherwise be hindered by a slow-moving government department.323 For example, the 
Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) – the history of which can be traced back to 1877 
– was a Singapore government department designed to facilitate savings for the lower-
income group. As a government department, it faced several restrictions such as 
operating only three days a week, resulting in dwindling deposits.324 To compete 
against conventional banks, it was transformed into a statutory board in 1971, first 
under the Ministry of Communications and later the Ministry of Finance. Free to enter 
into new business relations, the POSB managed to turn its fortunes around and was 
eventually acquired by another bank. The Housing and Development Board (HDB) is 
also another well-known statutory board in Singapore that began in 1960. In order to 
quickly build public housing for the low income, the HDB was given legal power to 
acquire land and evict previous owners.325 While statutory boards are efficient as they 
are not restricted by procedural delays typical of government departments,326 their 
proximity to the state means that they remain to be instruments of the government’s 
political and ideological legitimacy. As such, HDB properties are subject to certain 
policies set by the state, such as the enforcement of racial quotas for public housing 
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and enacting policies that benefit only conventional family structures. Without going 
into the debates behind such policies, statutory boards – which benefit from state 
resources – are ultimately used as mechanisms for social control with repressive 
tendencies.327 Furthermore, even as statutory boards are formally removed from the 
political arena, Singaporeans constantly equate them with the state.328 Clearly the state 
benefits from this relationship especially if the statutory boards perform well, but it 
simultaneously retains political benefit by being able to “distance itself from public 
criticism and dissatisfactions” of its subsidiaries when the need arises.329 
As a statutory board, MUIS possesses the flexibility to administer a wide range of 
religious affairs, at the same time operating as an “intermediary function between the 
state and the Muslim community.”330 The Fatwa Committee is situated within this 
religious statutory body and has a unique role to issue fatwas that affect not only the 
Muslim community, but also the Singapore government. 
However being linked to the statutory board that administers Islamic affairs does not 
necessarily mean that fatwas are tied to the demands of the authoritarian state. This 
relationship is tempered through several measures, which I will explain in detail in the 
next section. For now, it suffices to say that although state fatwas’ relationship to the 
state can be defined through bureaucratic hierarchy, I take the position that a better 
indicator of this relationship is by examining the function of state fatwas, which is 
what this thesis sets out to do. Therefore despite the bureaucratic link of the Fatwa 
Committee to MUIS, and MUIS to the state, my research will show that state fatwas 
are rather distinct from either of them; they cannot be simply reduced as the religious 
instruction of the parent body MUIS, and certainly not a state-approved interpretation 
of Islam. This also means that my thesis opens the door to question the common 
assumption on statutory boards in Singapore. If the Fatwa Committee, a constituent of 
a statutory board, can exhibit resistance against state demands, surely statutory bodies 
themselves also contest state decisions? If so, how is this achieved? These are 
important questions that challenge the normative views of key institutions in 
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Singapore and deserves scrutiny, however they lie outside the scope of the current 
research. 
Although the legal-bureaucratic relationship of fatwas to the state can restrict their 
authority, it can also boost fatwas’ reverence in the Muslim community (i.e. their 
traditional-societal authority). This is because the ‘official’ status of fatwas made them 
a focal point for religious instruction, and increases the confidence of petitioners,331 
that other fatwa bodies were pushed to the periphery. To illustrate, in 1949 a petitioner 
wrote in to a newspaper asking Jamiyah, a local religious body, for a fatwa on imported 
meat available in local supermarkets, whether it was slaughtered in a manner which 
was halal or permissible for Muslim consumption.332 But with the establishment of a 
central fatwa body, local religious petitioners were directed to a single official source 
to refer to, so much so that its authority eclipses that of other bodies. One of the early 
fatwas issued by the Fatwa Committee decreed that a new Islamic lunar month is 
determined not by physical sighting of the new moon, rather through astronomical 
calculations. Compared to physical moon-sighting which has to take place on the 
evening of an expected new month, astronomical calculations can be determined long 
before the actual start of a new month. This would be useful for scheduling and 
planning purposes, such as for work and school holidays for the Islamic festival of 
Eid.333 In 1980, a Jamiyah seminar discussed alternative methods of moon-sighting to 
determine the Islamic lunar calendar. However it was criticised by the public for 
challenging the state fatwa on the matter.334 This demonstrated the rise of the state 
fatwa institution to supersede the authority of earlier, much older, religious institutions 
in the country. 
As new technological, medical, and financial issues also led to more fatwa requests, 
the relevance of state fatwas also grew. The state fatwa body became an accessible 
point for religious queries and narrowed down religious authority to a single body of 
religious experts. Every time this body issues more of its fatwas and opinions, its 
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authority expands, and pushes the other institutions to the periphery. Over time, the 
state fatwa institution entrenched its position in society that it became the default 
reference point for religious issues. 
Clearly the creation of an official fatwa body made significant changes to how fatwas 
function in state and society. Firstly, it officially diminished the role of other fatwa-
givers and relegated the status of fatwas issued by other religious elites such as qadis, 
the ulama, and even authors. It must be noted that the existence of a state fatwa body 
never prevented these actors from issuing fatwas, though now they have to contend 
with an official state-appointed mufti, in addition to other fatwa-issuers. 
Secondly, the establishment of an official state fatwa institution opened up new 
linkages with the state and granted direct access to the its bureaucratic workings. This 
made state fatwa issuers more cognizant of bureaucratic considerations, which 
moderate state fatwas even further. Although officially under state hierarchy, the legal 
intent of the state fatwa body originated from the constitutional guarantee of 
preserving the religious interest of the native Malay population. These new channels 
of authority are reciprocal and would thus test the capacity of state fatwas in operating 
between competing interests. 
Thirdly, the enactment of AMLA marked the assimilation of soft law into hard law. 
Soft law – as mentioned in the previous chapter – implicitly promotes legal adherence 
to particular responsibilities and commitments. Hard law meanwhile refers to explicit 
legal expressions, which in this case dictates the recognition of fatwas in AMLA as 
well as their bureaucratic position. Fatwas as we know have no legal recognition in 
the colonial era. Adhering to fatwas was purely voluntary, which is why instances of 
‘fatwa-shopping’ occurred as fatwa-seekers searched for religious advice that fit their 
demands. When AMLA was enacted, it opened the door for state fatwas to shape 
religious praxis as this recognition placed them above other religious institutions. This 
legal relevance also resulted in state fatwas being recognised by the court, and 
effectively cemented the hard law transformation of fatwas. But as Chapter 5 will 
show, this hard law recognition can also curb the authority of state fatwas, which then 




AMLA is instrumental for Muslims in Singapore as it effectively centralised key 
Islamic institutions in the state. Although the enactment chained these institutions to 
act in accordance to state logic, the inclusion of religious elites in its inception also 
formalised religious interests, demands, and authority within AMLA. AMLA 
underwent several amendments over the years. Among them in 1998, when provisions 
were made for MUIS to create an investment subsidiary, as well as new regulations 
concerning halal food, the enforcement of waqf registration, and the administration of 
madrasahs. In addition, there were proposed changes to the Syariah Court, such as 
allowing civil courts to decide on child custody and matrimonial property, which the 
ulama feared would dilute the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court.335 Compared to the 
1966 AMLA, the 1998 amendment was argued to have excluded independent ulama 
in its process, leading to popular discontent among them.336 It was thus no surprise 
that the proposed 1998 amendments were met with heated objections from various 
religious elites.337 Even the current Mufti of Singapore, who was then the assistant 
secretary of an Islamic civil society group, challenged these amendments.338 Yet these 
changes proceeded and established the hard-line statist trend against religious 
demands for the years to come.339 This is also evident in how state fatwas relate to the 
state. As I will demonstrate in my case studies later, state fatwas issued in the 1970s 
were amended over three decades later in order to accommodate state policies and 
legal judgements. While state fatwas can still manoeuvre through statist interests to 
assert their own authority, the trend demonstrates the authoritarian state’s continuous 
policy to regulate religious praxis in Singapore and state fatwas’ attempts to resist it. 
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The development of AMLA illustrates the fluctuations of the relationship between the 
state and religious elites. Formalised legal-bureaucratic authority does not necessarily 
mean that the demands of religious elites are met, rather they are tempered by state 
interests. Similarly for the state, placing fatwas within the boundaries of the state 
bureaucracy does not simply imply the co-optation of religious interests, but it 
underlines the continuous negotiations that persist between these actors. 
As such, AMLA was described not as an alternative legal recourse for Muslims, but a 
facilitator to manage and streamline the application of Islamic law in the country.340 
In addition, the creation of the state fatwa body, the Fatwa Committee, was described 
as a “stabilising and unifying force”341 as it takes away the need to source for overseas 
fatwas, and more importantly minimises the differences between religious opinions 
locally. These observations may be true but should be properly qualified. Because as 
we shall see in later chapters, these new forms of authority that defined the 
bureaucratic and legal position of state fatwas also complicate the negotiations 
between religious elites and the state. These complications arise not only between 
institutional actors, but also those among the local Muslim community who challenged 
the authority of state fatwas by publicly contesting their validity. 
3.3 Formalising the Issuance of Fatwas 
AMLA does not only mention the formation of a Fatwa Committee, but also detailed 
its members, protocol, and procedures. This illustrated the overwhelming bureaucratic 
logic that is tied to the issuance of state fatwas, reflective of the formalised authority 
accorded to them. 
According to AMLA, the Mufti of Singapore is appointed by the President of 
Singapore “after consultation with the Majlis.”342 Majlis here refers to the MUIS 
council. The council is made up of the MUIS president, the chief executive, the mufti, 
and at least fourteen other members. Among these fourteen Majlis members, a 
maximum of seven are appointed based on recommendation by the government 
minister responsible for Muslim affairs, while the rest are appointed based on 
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recommendations by various Muslim societies.343 The Majlis then recommends the 
mufti, “a fit and proper person”, to be appointed by the President of Singapore.344 
Since the position was first created, there have been only three muftis in Singapore. 
The first was Mohamed Sanusi Mahmood who held the position from 1968 to 1972. 
He was succeeded by Syed Isa Mohamed Semait who was mufti from 1972 to 2010, 
after which Mohamed Fatris Bakaram took over. 
AMLA also detailed the composition of the Fatwa Committee. According to Article 
31 of AMLA, the Fatwa Committee consists of at least five individuals: the mufti and 
four other “fit and proper members”, two of whom are members of the Majlis, and two 
others who are not.345 Aside from the mufti, the members of the Fatwa Committee are 
appointed by the President of Singapore, again, on the advice of the Majlis.346 A 
quorum is formed only with the mufti and two other members of the Fatwa Committee, 
“one of whom shall not be a member of the Majlis”,347 which would balance between 
members and non-members of the Majlis. 
The distinction between Majlis and non-Majlis members in the Fatwa Committee is 
designed to avoid a strong representation of the parent body MUIS in issuing fatwas. 
Furthermore, the ulama in the Fatwa Committee – whether linked to the Majlis or not 
– typically underwent very similar training locally, such as religious education in one 
of the only six madrasahs in Singapore, employed within circles consisting of other 
ulama, and upheld to similar societal expectations. Perhaps the clearest example of 
this is that all three muftis of Singapore were graduates of Al-Azhar University in 
Egypt. These shared interests and experiences provide yet another layer of distinction 
from the parent body MUIS and its bureaucratic logic, thus strengthening the informal 
traditional-societal authority of state fatwas. 
In recent practice, the number of Fatwa Committee members was increased to thirteen 
in 1990,348 and then fifteen.349 According to the previous mufti, Syed Isa Semait, the 
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additional members allowed more inputs from a wider pool of experts not limited to 
religious sciences, but also finance, law, medicine, and other fields required to issue 
modern state fatwa.350 
Traditionally the mufti fulfils the meaning of his title by issuing fatwas. Yet this is 
where the modern bureaucratic mufti departs from his historical predecessors as he 
cannot issue a fatwa on his own accord. Rather as dictated in AMLA, fatwa-making 
must be done collectively in the Fatwa Committee that the mufti chairs. In other words, 
a religious opinion issued by the committee is deemed a state fatwa only if it is agreed 
upon unanimously. If a consensus cannot be reached, the fatwa will be referred to the 
Majlis, “which shall in like manner issue its ruling in accordance with the opinion of 
the majority of its members”.351 This decision, however, is not considered a fatwa.352 
In addition to state fatwas that can only be issued if they fulfil the conditions outlined 
in AMLA, other fatwa-like statements can be issued though they do not reach the level 
of fatwas. Among them are personal religious statements made by the mufti, and 
religious guidance called irshād issued by the Office of the Mufti (the secretariat of 
the Fatwa Committee). These religious instructions highlight how tightly the legal-
bureaucratic regulations dictate fatwa-issuing in the modern Singapore state. At the 
same time, these fatwa alternatives also demonstrate how, even when fatwas cannot 
be issued, small pockets of autonomy allow fatwa issuers to command religious 
instruction on the society. 
A state fatwa may be requested by anyone through various means, such as a letter 
addressed to the Secretary of the Majlis.353 The Secretary will then refer the query to 
the mufti as the chairman of the Fatwa Committee.354 The Fatwa Committee then 
considers whether to issue a fatwa, “unless in its opinion the question referred is 
frivolous or for other good reason ought not to be answered.”355  
The Fatwa Committee meets monthly, although there were many instances that 
meetings had to be adjourned and resumed at the next soonest availability due to long 
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deliberations.356 The Fatwa Committee also holds special meetings on short notice 
when there are urgent issues to be addressed. Court institutions, including the Syariah 
Court, may petition the Fatwa Committee for its expert opinion. Syariah Court would 
“reasonably” be expected to follow the given opinion.357 Civil courts meanwhile are 
not obliged to follow fatwas, and while they might “generally” adhere to them,358 my 
discussion in Chapter 6 will reveal the limited authority of state fatwas in court. 
State fatwas are also expected to adhere to a particular school of thought.359 Article 33 
of AMLA outlined that the Fatwa Committee should “ordinarily follow the tenets of 
the Shafi`ī school of law” or madhhab,360 which is common amongst Southeast Asian 
Muslims. However in case the Shafi`ī opinion is found to be “opposed to the public 
interest”, any of the other “accepted schools of Muslim law may be considered 
appropriate”.361 This stipulation in itself is an interesting inclusion in AMLA. Not only 
does this formalise religious practices according to localised norms, but to some extent 
it gives state fatwas an additional layer of conformity to tradition by ensuring that they 
do not sway much from established traditional interpretation, since adhering to 
madhhabs also means following particular methodologies of deriving a religious 
ruling. This not only preserves traditional Islamic law-making from misinterpretation, 
but can also prevent state coercion and influence.362 
The detailed manner in which AMLA stipulates the issuing of state fatwas illustrates 
the bureaucratic logic that the Fatwa Committee is expected to adhere to, which is 
reflective of the bureaucratic and legal authority accorded to it. At the same time, this 
highly-bureaucratic culture also grants state actors access to them and challenges the 
traditional informal authority of state fatwas. These contestations will be examined in 
detail in the following chapters. 
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This chapter was guided by the question: how was the modern authority of state fatwas 
formed? To answer this, I have traced the development of Singapore’s religious 
bureaucracy, which over time culminated with the establishment of the fatwa 
institution. From societal petitions that demanded a centralised religious authority to 
improve the management of religious affairs, to the consequent revisions of laws and 
ordinances that regulate religion, today’s Islamic religious bureaucracy is the result of 
more than a century of political expediency, accommodations, and negotiations. I have 
shown how religious elites managed to find a common platform with the state. This 
platform marries religious interest with the politically pragmatic, secular, and 
authoritarian state. The legal-bureaucratic connection made possible through the legal 
statute AMLA and bureaucratised state-linked religious institutions combined both 
state and religious demands. This state-religious connection opened the door for state 
policies to be influenced by religious bureaucrats, and the decisions of religious 
bureaucrats to be affected by state interests. The amalgamation of this then affects how 
religious praxis is shaped in Singapore, i.e. Statist Islam. 
Prior to the establishment of the modern state bureaucracy, fatwas in Singapore were 
issued by independent religious elites and institutions. There were however minimal 
links that chained them to state regulations. However upon independence, fatwas were 
recognised by the state and given the ‘official’ title. With this positional advantage, 
not only have state fatwas gained prominence over other non-official fatwas, but they 
are also tied to modern legal-bureaucratic restrictions. As a form of religious 
instruction sanctioned by the state, state fatwas cannot simply direct ‘Islam’ with full 
autonomy. Rather they are tied to state interests that embodies the ‘Statist’ prefix in 
Statist Islam. 
Until today, these co-opted religious institutions have maintained a formal relationship 
with the state for more than half a century, a difficult feat especially given the 
contrasting set of interests each of them represents. The practice of religious elites 
maintaining close proximity with the state is far from new; similarities between 
today’s religious bureaucrats and those before them remains. Across generations, 
religious elites and institutions had limited options in ensuring relevance in the state 
save through bureaucratisation. The mix of cooperation and co-optation, while not 
without problems, cemented the relevance of religious institutions and accorded them 
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new channels of influence. Amidst these developments, fatwas found new forms of 
legal and bureaucratic authority. 
Religious entities affiliated to the state should therefore be observed beyond merely 
assumed subjugation. They are, first and foremost, activists in their own right, who 
decidedly operate in constrained avenues. Purposely passive in politics, they promote 
their religious ideals through the established intricacies of the secular state. As their 
time-tested methods indicate: proximity breeds trust, and trust diminishes reprisals. 
However their approaches are characteristically prolonged – even mundane – and 
because of that, often disregarded. 
The next part will address one of the prolonged approaches in which fatwas affect state 
decisions. I shall examine how effective state fatwas are at negotiating religious 
demands and scrutinise claims of unilateral subjugation or tempered co-optation by 




Chapter 4: Contesting Bureaucratic Authority: State Fatwas vs. 
State Policies 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined how the colonial development of religious bureaucracy 
in Singapore culminated in the enactment of the Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA) in 1966. This gave legal provision for the establishment of a centralised body 
for the administration of the Islamic faith namely through the Islamic Council of 
Singapore, commonly known by its acronym MUIS. Within MUIS, a fatwa-making 
body called the Fatwa Committee was also formed. 
Tracing the establishment of the official fatwa body and the legal-bureaucratic powers 
vested in state fatwas enables us to understand their link to the modern state. In this 
and the following chapters, I will examine specific examples of how these legal-
bureaucratic developments allowed state fatwas to affect state decisions in Singapore. 
This demonstrates how formalised legal-bureaucratic authority is actualised, and to 
what extent it remains relevant to advance religious demands against state wishes. At 
the same time, the case studies will also scrutinise informal forms of authority (i.e. 
traditional-societal authority) that state fatwas invoke when their legal-bureaucratic 
authority is challenged. 
As I previously mentioned, this thesis contains three different sets of case studies on 
how state fatwas assert religious demands against: (1) state policies, (2) court 
judgements, and (3) recent developments in civil law. This chapter, being the first of 
the three, is driven by the question: how do state fatwas assert their authority vis-à-vis 
state policies? I answer this question by examining two examples. The first example 
looks at state policies that ignored fatwas, and the second one concerns policies that 
consulted fatwas. I argue that when formalised legal-bureaucratic authority is invoked, 
state fatwas can considerably affect state policies. However state fatwas also exhibit 
proclivity to rely on informal traditional-societal authority because it can shape Statist 
Islam beyond state restrictions. 
These cases will show how state fatwas invoked both formalised legal-bureaucratic 
and informal traditional-societal forms of authority in preserving religious objectives. 
This supports the hypothesis that the legal-bureaucratic recognition of state fatwas 
allowed them to affect state decisions through policy feedback. Yet the autonomous 
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state largely dictates this aspect of the relationship, because for fatwas to impact state 
decisions they have to first be engaged by the state. Thus while fatwas represent 
religious demands and interests, their functions are still restricted within the 
parameters set by the state. In order to ensure the regulation of Muslim religious 
behaviour (and claim greater reverence among followers), state fatwas can also 
circumvent state decisions and policies by directly addressing the Muslim population. 
This argument is structured in the following five parts. After this introduction, the next 
part (Section 2) provides a brief background on the rise of a centralised fatwa body 
immediately following Singapore’s independence. This section will also discuss the 
human body as a site of state-religious contestation. Section 3 consists of two case 
studies which will look at how state fatwas’ formalised legal-bureaucratic authority 
and informal traditional-societal authority were asserted. The first case study concerns 
Singapore’s population control policies which were implemented from the 1960s 
onwards. I will briefly outline the various population policies put in place, and 
examine how state fatwas engaged with these policies. The second case study will 
demonstrate how formalised legal-bureaucratic authority allowed state fatwas to 
negotiate for Muslim exemption in a nationwide organ donation system. Section 4 
then analyses how these distinct types of authority affect state fatwas and also state 
decisions, with the assessment that despite the relevance of formalised legal-
bureaucratic authority, informal traditional-societal authority remains crucial in 
asserting the reverence of state fatwas on the Singapore Muslim community. The final 
part (Section 5) concludes by suggesting that while the bureaucratised role of state 
fatwas allowed it to contest state depiction of religious praxis, the traditional religious 
influence in society still remains vital for them to function in the modern state. 
2 Background 
2.1 The Influence of State Fatwas 
Prior to the enactment of AMLA in 1966, there has never been a record of a mufti in 
Singapore despite petitions to have one appointed.363 In fact there were no mufti during 
the whole one and half century of colonial rule. During this time, religious questions 
were referred to ‘unofficial muftis’ in the form of state-appointed chief qadis, religious 
teachers, as well as a number of Islamic organisations. Among the notable Islamic 
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organisations then were the Muslim Missionary Society Singapore (Jamiyah), and the 
Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (Pergas). Jamiyah 
was established in 1932 by Abdul Aleem Siddiqui, an Islamic scholar of Indian 
origin.364 Pergas meanwhile was founded in 1957 by a group of Islamic teachers and 
scholars, among them Ahmad Zohri Mutamim and Daud Ali. These organisations still 
stand today and remain active in addressing religious issues in Singapore.365 
When the Fatwa Committee was formed, it roped in individual ulama as well as those 
linked to various organisations such as Pergas. The appointment of these ulama in the 
Fatwa Committee was based on their religious knowledge, which is also an indicator 
of their reputation and standing among the Muslim community. When absorbed into 
the Fatwa Committee, the individual religious authority of these ulama facilitated the 
acceptance of a new fatwa-issuing body among Muslims. More importantly, it also 
lent religious credence and authority to official fatwas issued. 
Having prominent ulama serving in the Fatwa Committee is central to ensure that 
religious authority is “transmuted” to the fatwa-issuing office.366 This is because the 
state fatwa body is not only a new institution, but also served as the highest religious 
instructor in the country. At its inception, there were five members in the Fatwa 
Committee who were responsible in issuing fatwas. All of these members were already 
established religious scholars, among them the founders of Pergas. Before the creation 
of the Fatwa Committee, fatwas were commonly obtained from the religious bodies 
mentioned, as well as from other individuals and institutions both locally and abroad. 
Fatwas were also requested in national newspapers. I previously mentioned an 
example in which a Muslim wrote in to a newspaper asking Jamiyah for a fatwa on 
imported meat available in local supermarkets, whether it was slaughtered in a manner 
which was halal or permissible for Muslim consumption.367 The role these ‘unofficial 
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muftis’ played – whether they were individual religious teachers or institutions who 
issued fatwas – in providing religious instructions and setting religious norms were 
central to Muslim religious life. That is, until the establishment of the Fatwa 
Committee which shifted the authority of issuing religious instructions to a single 
body. 
At their core, state fatwas are simply answers to religious questions. They therefore 
cover a wide spectrum of issues. In my fieldwork looking through the minutes of 
meetings of the Fatwa Committee, the questions asked by the Muslim community was 
truly diverse, and also reflect the social realities of everyday life at the time. This is 
especially true in the first few decades of the formation of the Fatwa Committee (i.e. 
beginning in 1968). The establishment of a local official fatwa body centralises fatwa-
issuing for the Muslim community. Perhaps more importantly it makes getting 
authoritative religious answers more convenient, since the alternative to a local state 
fatwa is a foreign state fatwa; after all international correspondence before the internet 
age is a tedious task for many. Aside from typical questions concerning Islamic 
worship and rituals, these early state fatwas also addressed issues that reflected the 
social realities of the Muslim community at the time, such as mosque demolition and 
relocation because of land redevelopment, or the status of Islamic inheritance made 
prior to AMLA, or as this chapter will show, medical issues revolving around state 
policies. There were also questions by the police that asked for a certain type of 
mystical practice, called susuk,368 to be discouraged through state fatwa because its 
practitioners believed it made them invincible, and therefore encourages acts of 
violence. In addition to revealing the social realities of the era, these examples also 
demonstrated the extent of state fatwas’ informal traditional-societal authority, since 
these fatwas have no legal bearing but instead rely on the voluntary adherence of 
petitioners. 
Over time as state fatwas addressed more issues, reliance on them also increased. 
Being accessible and localised, the state fatwa body became a convenient avenue for 
religious queries, at the same time narrowing religious authority to a single body of 
religious experts. Since the presence of the Fatwa Committee does not restrict others 
from answering religious questions, state fatwas also serve to clarify competing 
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religious opinions. However being the official state-sanctioned fatwa-issuing body, 
state fatwas can supersede these other non-official fatwas. Every time this Fatwa 
Committee issues fatwas, it becomes more recognised and relevant. Over time the state 
fatwa body became the main reference point for religious queries.  
The relationship between the state fatwa body and the state is meanwhile more 
complicated. The Singapore state, with its autonomous bureaucratic culture and 
expansive resources, is not necessarily in want of the state fatwa institution’s 
blessings. As I have argued in the previous chapter, the creation of a fatwa institution 
that is linked to the religious bureaucracy, and by extension the state, serves to contain 
religious demands by channelling them to pre-approved institutions. This marks 
Singapore’s brand of authoritarianism – which is hardly unique amongst Southeast 
Asian countries. But this authoritarianism is more concentrated and manageable for 
the state due to Singapore’s tiny geographical footprint and small population. This 
constricts the boundaries of political contestation to very limited areas. Khong 
compellingly argues how political elites in Singapore turned even the civil service into 
a base of support by co-opting and politicising the body to serve the ruling elite, so 
much so that the line between party politics and civil service dissolved.369 This base 
of support extended to even include military elites, local trade unions, and the 
intelligentsia.370 
While the political activism of local businesses, academics and religious leaders is a 
part of normal functioning democracies, in Singapore and similar milieus such 
contestations against the state are quickly quelled due to the prevalence of 
authoritarian practices. Even when religious elites challenge the state, the processes 
and outcomes are managed by the latter through specific laws that are invoked 
arbitrarily,371 which suggests that state administration evolved to be above the 
judiciary in terms of its position in the pecking order. Even expressions of political 
contest become highly regulated through new laws for parliamentary elections, and in 
more recent times, pre-approved venues to hold demonstrations. The election of the 
President of Singapore for example, a largely ceremonial position, is a highly 
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politicised platform that severely hinders the inclusion of candidates who might 
challenge state dominance.372 
Yet this does not mean that contestations against political authority do not emerge. As 
the government attempted to fend off challenges by sealing off possible pressure 
points, contestations became concentrated at various intersections where opposing 
interests converged. These convergences were ironically facilitated by the state 
through acts of co-optation that were meant to placate potential challengers. One such 
juncture is the religious bureaucracy that represents an “important source of social 
resistance to expansion of state power and capacity, and as the focal point…that 
resist[s] state domination.”373  
State fatwas are placed at this unique point: they are issued by the Fatwa Committee 
that is recognised as the official religious instructor in the country, and hierarchically 
situated within a statutory board that administers Islamic affairs. This legal-
bureaucratic recognition enables fatwas to assert a degree of influence over state 
decisions, as these religious instructions demonstrate how a form of policy feedback 
is exercised against state demands.  
The state, in ensuring that its policies are well-received by the masses, realises that 
having the support of fatwas is in many ways a strong indicator of mainstream Muslim 
acceptance, especially since they assert considerable religious authority. I must note 
that the state is not compelled to base its decisions on fatwas, however it would 
nonetheless be an advantage if it gains fatwas’ blessings. After all, fatwas address not 
only religious issues but can also define Muslim relationship to the state, making them 
a widely relevant instrument with the potential to address political concerns. This 
illustrates the complicated relationship between the two entities, especially when state 
fatwas can challenge conformity to state decisions. 
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2.2 Regulating the Body 
This chapter focuses on how the state and fatwas contradict each other in health 
policies. Health policies, in this case, concern the regulation of the human body 
through various measures. As a number of scholars note, the rise of the modern state 
is marked by regulatory interventions targeting the human body.374 All decisions that 
the state makes, whether in peace or war, concerns the adherence of its citizens, which 
is then realised only through physical action. Yet beyond the act of merely following 
through an instruction by way of the human body, the human body itself can be a site 
on which state regulation is applied. 
Foucault refers to state power over other bodies as “biopower”, defined as “diverse 
techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations”.375 
Here, the human body is taken as a site in which power relations is exhibited.376 
Among the ways state regulations can directly affect the human body is through health 
policies.377 For Turner, this constitutes the state’s disciplinary power and control over 
the body, as the “discourses and practices of public health and health promotion 
attempt to serve… functions” that affect the reproduction of populations and the 
regulation of bodies, which underline the interest of the state in regulating and 
restraining the human body.378 
But what about religion’s control over the body? This aspect is perhaps less of a 
surprise compared to the state. After all, common Islamic rituals such as fasting and 
praying are first and foremost a physical act of worship. The more ostensible physical 
representation, such as the hijab for women and the beard for men are all 
manifestations of bodily regulation. At the very least parallels can be made between 
religious commands on self-control and state regulations, as both “representations of 
‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’” in the modern state help shape people's identities, 
sensibilities, and experiences.379 Probed further, the body is not “a mere receptacle or 
 
374 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Bryan S. 
Turner, ‘The Government of the Body: Medical Regimens and the Rationalization of Diet’, The 
British Journal of Sociology 33, no. 2 (June 1982): 254, https://doi.org/10.2307/589935; Deborah 
Lupton, The Imperative of Health: Public Health and the Regulated Body (London ; Thousand Oaks, 
Calif: Sage Publications, 1995). 
375 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 1:140. 
376 Lupton, The Imperative of Health, 6. 
377 Lupton, The Imperative of Health; Turner, ‘The Government of the Body’. 
378 See Lupton, The Imperative of Health, 6. 
379 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural Memory in the 
Present (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003), 14. 
124 
 
‘inscriptive surface’” for the “work of [religious] representation-cum-discourse”, 
instead, the “body and bodily practices are central to the enactment of sacred space.”380 
In order to ensure conformity, both religion and the state coerce followers and citizens 
alike in regulating the body to deprive it of what it desires. The differences in coercive 
measures reflect the limitation and extent of the state and religious instruction. 
Religion relies largely on metaphysical coercion, and the latter on financial as well as 
legal coercion (such as through taxation on sugary drinks and jail term for those 
endangering public health). State regulation is limited within the scope of explicitly 
enacted policies and laws, whereas religious regulation on the body can often extend 
beyond state reach. This transcendence past the sphere of the state is reflective of how 
fatwas function, which can convey religious norms and mandate various forms of self-
regulation that the state cannot. 
When these sets of competing state-religious demands collide, the result can be a 
mediation of each other’s positions. Religious decrees in the modern state – examined 
through state fatwas – can change, just as state policies can evolve. This is one of the 
subthemes that I explore in this chapter. Briefly put, the contradictory views that both 
the state and religion hold, which played out through the control and regulation of the 
body, can mediate and mould each other’s opinions. 
The role of fatwas vis-à-vis the state (and to some extent the society) will be examined 
in the following two case studies. The first one will look at population control 
measures in Singapore, and how state fatwas resisted them. The second case study 
demonstrates how the fatwas responded to multiple state and societal petitions to 
include Muslims in a nationwide organ transplant programme. 
3 State Fatwas vs. State Policies 
3.1 Population Control Policy 
Singapore’s population control policy evolved from being staunchly anti-natalist to 
the opposite which rewards parents with more cash the more children they have. From 
1960 to 1987 – as the state sought to limit population growth – rigid and controversial 
policies were put in place to discourage births. Fatwas issued at the time opposed the 
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state position and discouraged birth control. They even declared certain aspects of the 
policies to be prohibited in Islam. Yet the state policies persisted and met success, until 
1987 when the state position changed to promote natalist population policies. 
3.1.1 State Control of Population 
Although various institutions have called for anti-natalist policies not long after the 
end of World War II, the Singapore state formally began its population control 
programmes only in 1960. The birth rate in post-war Singapore was at a high with the 
total fertility rate exceeding 6 children per woman. This was attributed to several 
reasons such as familial expectations and cultural preference for large families.381 
In 1949, the Singapore Family Planning Association was established and ran up to 27 
clinics and various family planning programmes across Singapore.382 The association 
grew with the help of state and non-state funding, and eventually was taken over by 
the state-run Singapore Family Planning and Population Board in 1965.383 The first 
state-run family planning campaign was launched in 1960 with the aim of 
discouraging large, unplanned families. In 1972 the National Family Planning 
Campaign was launched as the state took a more aggressive approach to family 
planning policies. Policy changes included measures so that families stop at only two 
children. Known as the “Stop at Two” campaign, it was the most notable family 
planning campaign in Singapore and spanned fifteen years, from 1972 to 1987.384 (See 
Figure 4) Among the measures to penalise couples with more than two children were 
through an increase in their accouchement fees, cancellation of maternity leaves, and 
relegation of school registration for children from large families in favour of those 
from smaller families. In addition, the campaign also provided controversial 
‘motivation’ for couples to promote the use of contraceptives and permanent 
sterilisation. This involved awarding financial benefits for those who took these birth 
control measures. Abortion was also liberalised in order to realise the population 
control target. 
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Figure 4 Family planning campaign posters produced between 1974-1983 
Despite the initial resistance to these programmes, it went on to be a success. In the 
1950s, the number of births among Malay-Muslims exceeded six children per 
female.385 This continued until the mid-1960s when the average number of birth per 
female dipped below six. By 1980 the overall total fertility rate in Singapore had 
declined to below replacement level to 1.8 children, with Malay-Muslim births 
hovering at just above two children per female.386 
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In the 1980s, Singapore’s economic growth and ageing population meant that it needed 
to maintain a sizeable workforce, so the family planning programme was revised to 
incentivise larger families. At first, a slew of controversial measures was introduced 
to encourage what can only be described as eugenics, which incentivised large families 
of only the economically well-off,387 the vast majority of which are the ethnic Chinese 
population. The most glaring one was the Graduate Mother’s Scheme in which school 
registration was prioritised for children whose mother has a recognised university 
degree or professional qualification. These ‘highly educated’ mothers also received 
generous tax relief for having more children.388 Meanwhile women which the state 
regarded as having ‘low’ educational qualification were discouraged from having 
children; they were instead encouraged to undergo sterilisation in return for a 
S$10,000 cash grant.389 For these ‘lower-educated’ women, undergoing sterilisation 
would also ensure that their children get priority registration for school.390 
Unsurprisingly, the contentious scheme was criticised by many and proved so 
unpopular that it was scrapped just a year later.391 
From 1987 onwards, the state advocated a slightly different pro-natalist policy known 
as the “Have Three or More (if you can afford it)” campaign. Some previous measures 
to disincentivise large families were amended. The relegation of school registration 
for families with more than two children was removed. Financial subsidies were given 
to those who placed their children in approved child care centres. Those with larger 
families also received some forms of assistance when moving to bigger properties. 
Women undergoing sterilisation would receive “compulsory counselling” in order to 
discourage them.392 Yet several controversial measures remained, such as the 
sterilisation-for-cash programme for low-income families. Tax relief, although 
modified, was still pegged to the mother’s educational qualification.393 
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In the year 2000, a new programme to encourage more births known as the Baby 
Bonus Scheme was introduced. The programme, which is still in place today, offers 
S$8,000 in cash for each of the first two newborns, and S$10,000 each for child 
number three and four.394 Other incentives include a special bank account that the 
government will match dollar-for-dollar in contribution, and also a $4,000 grant for 
the child’s national medical savings account.395 Various tax reliefs were also 
introduced for parents, including working mothers. However even until today 
Singapore’s population has yet to reach a birth rate that could replace itself, a leading 
factor behind a more liberal immigration policy.396 
3.1.2 Instructing Muslim Families 
The National Family Planning Campaign was launched in July 1972 with the aim of 
reducing the birth rate in Singapore. There were several publicity projects for the 
campaign, among them the telecast of a television forum for the Muslim community 
with panellists including the registrar of the Syariah Court.397 In the forum, the 
registrar stated that while family planning is allowed, permanent sterilisation is not 
permitted in the religion. 
The Fatwa Committee discussed the matter of birth control in August 1972, a month 
after the National Family Planning Campaign was launched. A petitioner had 
requested a state fatwa on male vasectomy, but no definite answer was recorded.398 A 
definitive fatwa on birth control was reached in November 1974, which came as a 
response to a letter sent in by a member of the public. The letter, from a female nurse, 
reads:399 
I have three children. Two girls and a boy. All three are now in school. 
 
394 ‘Baby Bonus Scheme’, Ministry of Social and Family Development, accessed 14 July 2018, 
https://www.msf.gov.sg/policies/Strong-and-Stable-Families/Supporting-Families/Pages/Baby-
Bonus-Scheme.aspx. 
395 ‘Baby Bonus Scheme’. 
396 Yuen Sin, ‘Parliament: Singapore’s Total Population Likely to Be “significantly below” 6.9 
Million by 2030’, The Straits Times, 1 March 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-
no-major-changes-expected-to-immigration-policy-josephine-teo. 
397 Mas Merah, ‘Jarang Beranak Dengan Makan Pil Tidak Merbahaya [Reduce Births by Eating Non-
Harmful Pill]’, Berita Harian, 25 July 1972; A key reason behind this ruling is the prohibition to 
permanently change an aspect of the human body. However temporary physical changes are generally 
allowed. For further discussion see Abdel R Omran, Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam (London; 
New York: Routledge, 1992), http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=166215. 
398 ‘Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa [Fatwa Committee Meeting]’ (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 29 
September 1972). 
399 Translated by author from ‘Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa [Fatwa Committee Meeting]’, 
Lampiran (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 19 December 1974). 
129 
 
When I gave birth to them, I was not charged [for hospitalisation], and was 
allowed to use my leave entitlement i.e. 42 days of maternity leave and 34 days 
of annual leave. 
After the birth of the third child, I took [contraceptive] pills for 6 years 
following the family planning policy. 
Unfortunately I gained weight and felt unwell. The doctor advised me to stop 
taking the pills and “go for ligation”. After getting my family’s opinion, they 
advised me to have another baby and “then ligate”. I am now pregnant (five 
months). My husband asked an ustaz [or religious teacher] at the place where 
he is studying religion, and he said that ligation is prohibited for Muslims. 
What worries me is that I have to pay penalties: 
1. Full accouchement fees $480/= (even though I am a nurse in a 
government hospital). 
2. I will not get any maternity leave. 
3. My fourth child will have no place in school. 
 
However if I ligate after the birth of this child, these penalties will be waived. 
What is your opinion on this? I hope you will give me a written answer to the 




This letter was written in the context of the state’s anti-natalist policy at the time which 
introduced penalties for families with more than two children.400 Evident in the letter 
above, these included an increase in maternity fees and the cancellation of maternity 
leave. In response, the Fatwa Committee minutes of meeting simply recorded that 
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sterilisation is prohibited except in life-threatening circumstances.401 In other words 
since the petitioner’s medical and financial situations were not life-threatening, the 
state fatwa ruled that ligation is prohibited for her.  
Not all fatwas were made public. Yet despite the population control policy going in 
full swing in the 1970s, it was still a surprise that the state fatwa on birth control 
methods was not publicised. However for those looking for an official fatwa on the 
policy, the lack of it was made up by comments in newspapers from individual 
members of the ulama, all of which articulated the same line: no permanent ligation 
nor sterilisation is permitted, while temporary contraceptives were allowed. 
The state fatwa on family planning and sterilisation was eventually publicised in June 
1984. In it, a familiar message was reiterated: family planning was allowed to benefit 
the children in order to “protect [them] from physical weaknesses and nurture them to 
be strong and healthy,” and that going for sterilisation to obtain monetary benefit is 
prohibited “especially for fear of being unable to provide food or poverty.”402 The 
position of the ulama was clearly drawn from the onset; family planning and various 
forms of contraceptives were allowed but not irreversible ligation and sterilisation. 
Furthermore the tone was consistent: birth control can even be encouraged in certain 
circumstances such as to ensure the well-being of mothers and babies. This particular 
instruction as well as warning against making financial concerns the ultimate 
consideration, were emphasised in the media amidst the national birth control 
campaign.403 
In October 1984, the Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs petitioned the Fatwa 
Committee on a series of question on birth control matters. One of the questions was 
on ligation, to which the state fatwa allowed only if it can be reversed. Another 
question on couples obtaining monetary reward for ligation was answered as follows: 
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“If they are doing it (ligation) for monetary reward then it is discouraged. This 
is because ligation is originally discouraged except if it is established to be 
reversible, with several conditions, among them it does not cause harm and not 
done out of fear of poverty. Thus the couple’s action [of undergoing ligation] 
with that intent [of monetary reward] is discouraged because Islam originally 
encourages having children.”404 
It is noteworthy that a state fatwa was requested by a government minister just months 
after the exact same decree was issued. It is therefore not implausible to argue that the 
questions were made with the intent to have the fatwa reviewed by the Fatwa 
Committee. This is because the petition of state actors with direct bureaucratic access 
to the Fatwa Committee depicts significantly more urgency and seriousness compared 
to questions from the public. Furthermore, the petitioner was the Minister-in-Charge 
of Muslim Affairs, whom MUIS – the Fatwa Committee’s parent body – answers to. 
This placed additional pressure on the Fatwa Committee. Yet as we shall see in the 
next section, direct fatwa petitions from state actors are not uncommon, especially 
when state fatwas challenge the official state policy. 
The Fatwa Committee also publishes fatwa booklets called Kumpulan Fatwa (Fatwa 
Collection) from time the time. These booklets contain a collection of various fatwas 
for the reference of the Muslim public. Among the fatwas mentioned was a question 
on family planning. It talked about the state policy known as the Small Families 
Improvement Scheme, which gave incentives for families with no more than two 
children. While describing it as a “good scheme to help poor families and prevent 
dropouts among poor students”, the five-page fatwa also cautioned that it is prohibited 
if is done out of fear of poverty, and doing so “contradicts the Islamic creed.”405 The 
fatwa also highlighted the traditional religious recommendation of marrying with the 
intent to produce children, at the same time stressing that quality is as important as 
quantity. It then outlined the rules of using contraceptives; that it is allowed if it does 
not cause bodily harm, and if the reason is for health rather than financial concerns. 
The fatwa also specifically said: 
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“… [The method of contraception] taken by participants that is stipulated [in 
the scheme] should be elaborated. If it permanently stops reproduction, that is 
prohibited, then this scheme cannot be accepted in Islamic law.”406 
In the final paragraph, the fatwa ended with a glaring statement: 
“In Islam, ‘assistance’ is defined as giving without conditions. When 
conditions are made, then it is no longer ‘assistance’.” 407 
Clearly it was a remark directed at the state policy of giving financial incentives to 
families who follow the family planning programme. Although the state has since 
changed its policy to encourage more births, some of these selective birth control 
policies remain.408 
As a result of the population control policy, the overall birth rate in the country 
dropped. The anti-natalist population control programme, which lasted until 1987, was 
deemed a success. Some even claim that the policy to reduce birth rate was so 
successful that Muslims in Singapore stood out as the first Muslim population in the 
world to have achieved sustained replacement-level fertility.409 There were several 
social and economic factors behind this. Singaporeans by then were essentially urban 
dwellers with a high literacy rate and employed in non-agricultural activities. These 
developments resulted in a more open attitude towards state birth control 
programmes.410  
According to Saw, economic and social developments overwhelmed Islamic teachings 
concerning birth control, so much so that religious opinions – including fatwas – 
opposing it “no longer pose a serious obstacle” to reducing the birth rate of Muslim 
families.411 The state-led birth control policies were therefore, according to him, 
implemented “with the blessing of their religious leaders” as Malay-Muslims 
responded “positively to the subsidized family planning services.”412 Such claims 
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should be qualified since not all aspects of the policy received the outright support of 
religious elites. Also, while the mainstream religious opinion – demonstrated through 
fatwas – discouraged small families, it did not prohibit it. In some cases, fatwas also 
encouraged small families (as shown in the booklet). Also, the position of the Fatwa 
Committee differed from state policy by permitting the use of temporary 
contraceptives only, while all forms of permanent birth control methods such as 
sterilisation were prohibited. Therefore to say that religious opinions did not affect the 
policy is inaccurate, especially since there are reports which stated that Muslims were 
“known to refuse sterilisation ‘point-blank’”.413 This, to me, can be explained by the 
clear prohibition against permanent contraceptives, which was disseminated through 
the media and teachings of Islamic religious teachers in Singapore. Furthermore 
despite these policies leading to smaller families overall, Muslims families – until 
today – still retain the highest birth rate in the country.414 
This particular episode shows the legal-bureaucratic limitation of state fatwas. Despite 
their recognition through the legal enactment AMLA and bureaucratic link to the state, 
state fatwas were not consulted by the policymakers in the drawing up of the 
nationwide population policy programme. Therefore in this case, the formalised legal-
bureaucratic authority of fatwas was irrelevant in affecting the state policy. 
However this did not mean that fatwas issued were rendered ineffectual. This is 
because in addition to their legal-bureaucratic connection, state fatwas also possess 
another channel that can affect how religious praxis is shaped in a country, and that is 
by directly addressing the Muslim population. This facet of state fatwas’ authority is 
what I referred to earlier as traditional-societal authority, and represents their 
traditional role as the de facto religious instruction for the Muslim community, in spite 
of what the state decides. This form of authority is largely derived from the traditional 
function of fatwas in Muslim societies which serve as a guide for religious conduct. 
Fatwas are, at their core, a set of religious instructions based on traditional Islamic 
corpus, and predates the modern state. Therefore the traditional-societal authority of 
fatwas is largely distinct from the authority vested unto them by the modern state, and 
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secures their relevance to followers seeking religious instruction. More importantly 
this distinctiveness allows state fatwas to challenge state decisions as it provides an 
organic channel of dissemination, which in this case instructed Muslim families to 
resist the state policy. 
Where formalised legal-bureaucratic authority failed to shape state decisions, this 
episode showed two distinctive ways in which the informal traditional-societal 
authority of state fatwas was asserted: the various media platforms, and the consistent 
message of the fatwa not only among Fatwa Committee members but also other 
religious elites. The mainstream media was instrumental in broadcasting state fatwas 
for the Muslim community, as seen in the television programmes and newspaper 
coverage. In case this was insufficient, the self-published fatwa booklet provided an 
additional channel for state fatwas to be publicised, which even allowed for a more 
detailed and lengthy explanation of the religious instruction. 
Yet the media are merely platforms. The same consistent message against 
discouraging births was shared very early on and consistently among the local ulama. 
This was evident in the 1972 television forum in which the registrar of the Syariah 
Court prohibited any forms of permanent birth control. Such a message was then 
reiterated and repeated by other religious teachers in the country, as the letter 
reproduced earlier affirmed. I argue that this consistent and unanimous tone is just as 
vital, if not more important than state fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic authority. This is 
because it allows fatwas to be more organically and effectively instructed to the 
masses. While the media represent a useful way to publicise fatwas, informal authority 
relies on individualised links and organic relationships between the petitioner and the 
instructor. As the letter above stated, when the husband of the letter-writer asked his 
religious teacher whether ligation is allowed, he was given the same answer as what 
the state fatwa mentioned. This consistency lent more credence to the fatwa itself and 
bolstered the traditional-societal authority of state fatwas among Muslims in the 
country. 
3.2 Organ Donation Policy 
This case study on the development and evolution of the organ donation policy in 
Singapore is divided into two sections. The first one discusses the early development 
of organ donation fatwas, which reveals their traditional-societal authority on the 
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Muslim community. The second part discusses the legal-bureaucratic aspect as the 
Fatwa Committee was petitioned by the state in drawing up a nationwide organ 
donation policy known as the Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA). 
3.2.1 Prohibiting Organ Donation 
The debate on the permissibility of organ donation for Muslims began in June 1973, 
sparked by the launch of the National Kidney Foundation. The foundation was 
established to assist kidney patients and promote renal research. This led to questions 
among Muslims on the religious permissibility of kidney transplant.415 The request for 
a fatwa came not only from the public, but also journalists from the newspaper Berita 
Harian who pressed the Fatwa Committee to quickly come to a decision on the 
matter.416 Berita Harian is the main Malay-language newspaper in Singapore and as 
such caters not only to Malay issues, but also Islamic issues because the vast majority 
of Muslims in Singapore are of the Malay ethnicity. In the same month, the newspaper 
published articles featuring Muslims who had already pledged their organs for 
transplant,417 and those who were waiting for a state fatwa.418 Readers even requested 
a public seminar to discuss the issue,419 all of which signalled strong public interest on 
the matter. 
Before the Fatwa Committee was supposed to deliberate on the issue, the newspaper 
published a letter from a prominent religious scholar who was also a member of the 
Fatwa Committee. The letter said that organ donation is prohibited,420 and served as a 
precursor of what was to come. Days later, the Fatwa Committee decreed that organ 
donation is not permitted for Muslims.421 The fatwa was publicised in the newspaper 
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and afterwards a slew of rejoinders was published contesting the fatwa and requesting 
the decision to be reviewed.422 Among those who criticised the fatwa was Syed 
Hussein Alatas, a lecturer at the National University of Singapore and an important 
public intellectual.423 On 10 August 1973, his point-by-point rebuttals against the state 
fatwa was published in Berita Harian. In it he cited other fatwas around the world that 
permitted organ donation, including in neighbouring country Malaysia.424 
That was only the beginning. A week later, Alatas published a second rejoinder, this 
time expounding on related fatwas including the Mufti of Singapore’s alma mater the 
Al-Azhar University in Egypt that permitted blood transfusion for “public benefit”.425 
He argued that if blood transfusion is permitted, then so should organ donation. Alatas 
also criticised the local fatwa body for what he saw as their literal interpretation of 
religious texts and lack of independent reasoning for prohibiting organ transplant. 
The Fatwa Committee responded against these claims and explained their position in 
more detail, among them was that they regarded organ transplant as experimental in 
nature, and therefore deemed unsafe.426 The Fatwa Committee issued a second 
response the following week, essentially justifying the religious prohibition against 
removing organs after death for whatever purpose.427 The newspaper then allowed a 
final response from Alatas in the subsequent instalment.428 To summarise the 
argument, the side proposing organ transplant viewed it as a benevolent deed that 
embodies religious principles and should therefore be encouraged, while the opposing 
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party – i.e. the Fatwa Committee – cautioned that organ removal offends the divine 
sanctity of the human body and should therefore be prohibited. 
Alatas later compiled the debate into a book, which he said was to highlight the “type 
of thinking that hinders Muslims from success.”429 The book title, Biarkan Buta (Let 
Him Remain Blind), serves as a paranomasia; a reference to blind patients suffering 
due to the state fatwa prohibiting organ transplant, as well as the Fatwa Committee’s 
short-sightedness on the matter. Alatas criticised the Fatwa Committee for lacking “the 
understanding of today’s sciences, disrespecting intellectual faculty” and practising 
“narrow interpretation” of the Islamic scripture.430 Nonetheless the debate was praised 
by many,431 including Muslim organisations, which said it resulted in a deeper 
understanding of the issue.432 
The newspaper debate also captured – more than once – the candid nature of the 
discussion, bordering on mockery and cynicism. One reason why the debate became 
heated was because it touched the raw nerve of the Fatwa Committee who exclusively 
addresses religious issues. As fatwas are the most prominent form of religious 
instruction in the country, having their religious credibility publicly questioned would 
be taken as a direct challenge on their traditional-societal authority. As such, the 
replies from the Fatwa Committee were also just as curt, and perhaps even made them 
more adamant to hold on to their position for over a decade. 
More than a decade later in 1985 and prior to the first HOTA enactment, the organ 
donation fatwa was amended to allow kidney transplant for Muslims.433 This came 
with stringent conditions such as the recipient being in a life-threatening condition, 
and contingent on the permission of the donor and two male guardians.434 The response 
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was met with positive reception from the Muslim public, although Alatas refused to 
give detailed comment.435 
This episode showed the importance of informal traditional-societal authority, a key 
facet of how state fatwas operate and remain relevant to Muslims. This informal 
traditional-societal authority is the most essential element of state fatwas and 
represents their core function in the Muslim community, i.e. as the de facto religious 
instruction. As such when the informal authority of state fatwas was criticised and 
questioned, the Fatwa Committee fervently protected this domain since it signalled a 
strong challenge against the most essential form of fatwas’ authority in the society. 
Yet this is only one aspect of state fatwas’ authority. If informal traditional-societal 
authority marks state fatwas’ relevance with members of the Muslim community, then 
there is also the formalised legal-bureaucratic authority that positions religious 
demands in the domain of bureaucratic actors – i.e. the state – which I will discuss in 
the next section. 
3.2.2 The Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA) 
Organ donation in Singapore was done on a largely voluntary basis until HOTA was 
enacted in 1987. HOTA is a public organ donation system which assumes automatic 
consent from Singapore citizens. All healthy adults are included under the law, and 
unless they opted out, upon demise their organs (covering kidneys, livers, hearts and 
corneas) will be donated to other patients. There were several state fatwas issued on 
Muslim organ donation which evolved over time. Initial fatwas had prohibited 
Muslims from any form of organ donation. By 1987 when the national organ donation 
system HOTA was introduced, the fatwa had changed to allow organ donation for 
Muslims. However it required explicit consent from the donor and the donor’s 
guardians, and as a result Muslims were excluded from HOTA because it is based on 
presumed consent. Over time, however, the state fatwa gradually softened and allowed 
presumed consent (instead of explicit consent) for Muslim organ donors. This paved 
the way for the inclusion of Muslims in HOTA in 2008. 
The evolution of the organ donation fatwa took over three decades. The first state 
fatwa on organ donation was recorded in July 1973 when a petitioner asked about the 
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permissibility of organ transplant after death.436 The fatwa answered that it is 
prohibited for several reasons, among them: they viewed the human body as temporal 
custodianship that should not be tampered with. Furthermore, the fatwa reasoned that 
since organ donation is not religiously sanctioned when a person is alive, the 
prohibition remains upon death as well. 
The next mention of organ donation in a fatwa was more than a decade later in 
January/February 1985. The state – through the Ministry of Community Development 
– had requested a fatwa for the proposed organ donation programme later known as 
HOTA. The state was drawing up a policy that would automatically assume all 
Singapore citizens as voluntary organ donors unless they opted out. There were 
deliberations on the extent of severity that might allow for exceptions, but the fatwa 
discussions concluded that organ donation, by default, is prohibited. 
Throughout the same year, the Fatwa Committee continued to discuss the 
permissibility of organ donation. These discussions at times included other religious 
teachers in Singapore. Gradually, the position of the Fatwa Committee softened; by 
the end of the year, a fatwa was issued allowing organ donation in life-threatening 
cases, albeit with several conditions.437 If the donation is done after death, then it is 
contingent on the permission of the donor and two male guardians.438 As the mufti at 
the time summarised: 
“…It is permissible to take the organ from a dead person to save the life of 
another who is in need of this organ, provided that the donor is an adult who 
permitted this during his lifetime and that the deceased’s next-of-kin also gave 
his permission.”439 
Muslim parliamentarians also met with the Fatwa Committee and brought up 
comparative views on organ donation from other parts of the world, some of which 
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did not require guardian consent.440 Given that the position of the Fatwa Committee 
was already known, and the draft of the organ donation policy was coming to a close, 
it is not implausible to assume that the meeting was held to relax the stringent 
conditions stated in the fatwa, specifically the condition that requires the consent of 
two male guardians. In a meeting, the mufti stated, aware of the mounting pressure to 
comply: 
“As the middle way, the relevant [organ donation] law should include 
exception for Muslims; only in the event of a darurah (life-threatening 
emergency), that a [Muslim] person can donate and accept organs. Before the 
organ is taken from the deceased Muslim, the consent of his/her relatives 
should be obtained, and in the case of those who do not have relatives, then 
MUIS is their guardian.”441 
What the Fatwa Committee proposed was an ‘opt in’ policy, whereby Muslims were 
exempted except if they explicitly consented to have their organs donated after death. 
As the state is implementing a system in which those refusing to donate must manually 
‘opt out’, the state fatwa was essentially pushing for Muslims to be excused from 
HOTA. This proposal was accepted. In July 1987, HOTA was passed in Parliament. 
The act allowed the automatic removal of organ after death by the state. Part II of the 
Act reads: 
(2) No authority shall be given under subsection (1) for the removal of the 
organ from the body of any deceased person — 
…(g) who is a Muslim.442 
While the state fatwa permitted Muslims to donate their organs, stringent conditions 
were set that contradict those laid by policymakers. These conditions blocked Muslims 
from being included in the automatic organ donation system. 
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As the years progressed, it became apparent that Muslims were under-represented 
among organ donors, and the number of Muslim organ donation pledges remained 
low. Seven years after HOTA was introduced, only 572 of a quarter million Muslims 
in Singapore had pledged to give their organs through HOTA. And even then, only 
one actual organ donation was made.443 
By 1997, the number of Muslim kidney pledgers rose to 6,600, still a very small 
number.444 This dismal response to organ donation was further exacerbated by the 
stipulation that Muslim donors required the endorsement of two male guardians. This 
created a unique problem; by the year 2000, more than 12,000 Muslim pledge cards 
were rejected because there were no proper endorsement from qualified guardians. 
This meant that potential Muslim donors cannot donate their organs despite their 
desire to do so.445 
HOTA – which initially only covered kidney transplant – was amended in 1998 and 
2004 to cover more human organs. While it was previously limited to the kidney, the 
changes were made to include the liver, heart, and cornea, as well as donors who died 
from non-accidental causes. In public consultations prior to these amendments, there 
were calls to automatically include Muslims in the Act.446 The Fatwa Committee was 
petitioned by various groups to amend its fatwa so that Muslims can be included in 
HOTA. 
A key driver behind the petitions to have the organ donation fatwa reviewed was not 
the emphasis on organ donors, but the implication for Muslim renal patients. This was 
because a person cannot be listed as an organ recipient from the national pool of organ 
donors, except if he or she is an organ pledger in HOTA. Therefore, the blanket 
exclusion of Muslims from HOTA also excluded all Muslims from being included in 
the list of eligible recipients, which is a problem since the number of Muslim renal 
patients was on the rise. 
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Among those calling for a fatwa amendment was the Muslim Kidney Action 
Association (MKAC), a volunteer organisation that provides for the welfare of kidney 
patients. Together with the Ministry of Health, the group provided several reports over 
the years to justify Muslim inclusion in the organ donation system. The reports mainly 
addressed the health and social impact of the lack of Muslim donors. It also showed 
the rising number of Muslim renal patients and the difficulties they face because of 
their exclusion from HOTA. 
These reports also steered clear of any religious argument since this could be 
misconstrued as encroaching on the expertise of the Fatwa Committee, which might 
evoke a defensive response as seen in the earlier newspaper debate with Alatas. 
Amidst these developments, the Fatwa Committee amended the fatwa to expand the 
definition of guardian whose consent was required prior to organ donation. Instead of 
male next-of-kin, consent was now accepted from any two male witnesses. The fatwa 
amendment also permitted the inclusion of other parts of the body for transplant.447 
Yet these changes did not bring about significant response as the procedure for 
Muslims organ donation was still done through manual pledging.448 
Further petitions took place, led by the MKAC, and in 2007 a new state fatwa was 
eventually issued. The fatwa not only eliminated the need for witnesses or next-of-kin, 
but also allowed automatic presumed consent from Muslim donors. To justify 
presumed consent, the fatwa stated that since the consent is revocable, it is therefore 
analogous to normal consent.449 This effectively meant that Muslims could be included 
in HOTA. The fatwa also cited two key reasons for this change: the proportionately 
higher number of Muslims with renal failure, and the small number of actual organ 
donors among Muslims.450 According to the fatwa, this underlined the dire need of 
organ donation in the country, which led to the amendment. Following this change, 
Muslims were officially included in HOTA in 2008. 
This episode demonstrates how state fatwas can affect state policies. Despite the 
widely authoritarian and secular characteristics of the state, the decrees made by the 
 
447 Bakaram, ‘Theories of Iftā’ in Islamic Law with Special Reference to the Shāfi‘ī School of Law 
and Their Application in Contemporary Singapore’, 227. 
448 Bakaram, 217. 
449 Office of the Mufti, ‘Fatwa on Organ Donation’ (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 2007), 
http://www.officeofthemufti.sg/Fatwa/hota%282007%29%28eng%29.html. 
450 Office of the Mufti. 
143 
 
Fatwa Committee disrupted what was supposed to be a straightforward 
implementation of a health policy. State fatwas were able to affect the state policy due 
to their legal-bureaucratic authority, which places significant relevance on them for 
issues concerning Muslim religious affairs. Their relevance to the state is enshrined 
through the bureaucratisation of religious institutions that situated them within the 
constituency of state bureaucracy. This made the state recognise their formalised 
authority, and even carved out policy exemptions so as not to contradict these religious 
decrees. 
Yet formalised authority in an authoritarian state is a peculiar thing. To be clear, the 
state is not obliged to consult or petition state fatwas in its policies. This underlines 
that even the decisions of a highly bureaucratic authoritarian state can be inconsistent, 
and shows the convoluted, if not messy nature of state decision-making process. The 
previous example of population control policy is a testament to this, as the state 
implemented rigid policies to suppress the number of births without consulting fatwas. 
However for the organ donation policy, the state chose to do so, and once this 
bureaucratic authority is invoked the policymakers cannot ignore the feedback of its 
religious constituent. What is clear is that amidst the muddled bureaucratic conditions 
that intertwine multiple sets of demands and interests, the legal-bureaucratic authority 
of state fatwas allowed them to set a foothold in the state decision-making process. 
This enabled the fatwas to disrupt state policies to the extent that policy exemptions 
had to be created for Muslims. 
4 Between Traditional Reverence and Modern Relevance 
4.1 Preserving Traditional-Societal Authority 
For state fatwas, informal traditional-societal authority is just as important, if not more 
important, than formalised legal-bureaucratic authority. This is because unlike the 
latter, informal traditional-societal authority does not rely on bureaucratic conditions 
nor legal recognition (although it may benefit from it). Traditional-societal authority 
only concerns the direct relationship between fatwas and the people they address: the 
Muslim community. The difference between formal legal-bureaucratic and informal 
traditional-societal authority also means that state fatwa issuers have the option to 
choose the most effective channel of authority to assert the fatwas. This also indicates 
that state fatwas can retain a distinct relationship with their intended audience, 
independent from state influence. 
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The cases presented above show how, when not included in the policymaking process, 
state fatwas relied on informal authority to assert religious authority. In addressing the 
population control policy, state fatwas largely agreed with the overall goals of the 
policy, i.e. reducing poverty and promoting economic progress. However they 
strongly disagreed on several of the methods involved, which included permanent 
sterilisation and selective assistance schemes. Yet as fatwas were not consulted in 
drawing up the policy, they were officially powerless to shape it. As such, the state 
was able to implement its population control policies with minimal disruption from its 
religious constituent. 
Despite that, there were multiple platforms for state fatwas to assert their authority and 
disrupt the policy. While iterating that birth control is permissible, state fatwas 
prohibited Muslims from sterilisation, and even encouraged them to have large 
families. Not only was the same message disseminated via multiple media platforms, 
ranging from television to newspapers to booklets, but religious teachers also became 
conduits to relay fatwas to the Muslim public. 
The connection of state fatwas to religious teachers are crucial because it represents 
the voluntary and organic relationship between the religious bureaucrats as well as 
non-state religious elites. These religious teachers also control their own unique 
channels of dissemination, such as weekly religious sermons and events held in 
mosques and homes, all of which are pervasive and persuasive avenues to challenge 
state policies. Having them repeat the same opinion as the fatwa contributes to the 
establishment of a religious norm and demonstrates how Statist Islam manifest in 
Singapore.  
Yet Statist Islam is not shaped by religious elites alone. By focusing on state fatwas, 
this chapter reveals how members of the Muslim community can affect the outcome 
of religious decrees. In examining the organ donation episode, the role of the Muslim 
community in shaping state fatwas should not be undermined. The long-winded and 
heated newspaper debate on the fatwa that prohibited organ donation indicated that 
state fatwas could be challenged. Alatas provided adequate theological evidence in 
support of organ donation, while the Fatwa Committee countered with its own set of 
arguments and in the end stood by its decision. 
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Furthermore because state fatwas can be contested, this means that there must be an 
alternative should an individual refuse to follow them. After all, a fatwa at its core is 
a voluntary religious instruction, except if it is backed by law. Yet the impact of 
Alatas’ challenge was questionable. This is because despite being a relatively new 
religious body, state fatwas possess immense influence since they represent an age-
old tradition in the Islamic faith. Furthermore, the fatwas were issued by a group of 
senior and established ulama, who even without the fatwa office already command 
considerable level of religious clout. This combination contributes to a strong 
traditional-societal authority that is difficult for one such as Alatas to challenge. 
But where Alatas failed, other members of the Muslim community managed to inform 
state fatwas. Prior to the fatwa amendment that allowed Muslims to be included in 
HOTA, the volunteer group Muslim Kidney Action Association (MKAC) had actively 
petitioned for the fatwa to be reviewed. They provided several proposals over the years 
but it was not until 2007 that these proposals were finally accepted, leading to a change 
in HOTA policy for Muslims. Yet even as the MKAC lobbied the Fatwa Committee 
to amend its fatwas, they were careful to steer clear of any theological argument. This 
cautious approach showed emphases on scientific evidence, material interests, and 
also global Islamic norms. In essence, the MKAC made a case based on scientific and 
policy evidences rather than a theological one. This was clearly to avoid challenging 
the traditional-societal authority of state fatwas as that might elicit a defensive 
response that could even protract the cause, an unintended consequence of Alatas’ 
fiery debate. The MKAC was careful not to contest the informal traditional-societal 
authority of fatwas; a largely abstract concept embedded in fatwas’ traditional 
religious and societal representation, yet embodies the guarded sectoral interests of 
religious elites. 
Coming back to Statist Islam, because state fatwas hold the highest official authority 
to instruct religious norms, they possess enormous influence especially when 
addressing the religious validity of state decisions. The first case study showed how 
the religious position on population control policy was affirmed through state fatwas. 
This was then reiterated by other religious elites, namely religious teachers who then 
asserted the practice among their followers. At the same time, the ‘statist’ element also 
creeps into these religious instructions as the fatwas also accepted some aspects of the 
state’s policy, in particular the recommendation for smaller families which arguably 
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goes against the normative Islamic view on family planning. The combination of these 
demands exemplifies how Statist Islam is shaped in Singapore. 
For the second case study, Statist Islam is demonstrated in how organ donation among 
Muslims in Singapore was shaped by state fatwas. The eventual outcome of the fatwas 
was not only formed by state regulation that penalised non-donors, it was also 
influenced by the Muslim community who constantly pushed for change. These 
negotiations took over three decades, and it was only after the Fatwa Committee 
accepted these societal recommendations that Muslims in Singapore can be presumed 
organ donors. This shows the various demands and interests involved in shaping 
Statist Islam, evident through an examination of state fatwas and religious praxis.  
4.2 Asserting Legal-Bureaucratic Authority 
These two case studies also demonstrated the extent of formalised legal-bureaucratic 
authority on fatwas and how they relate to state policies. The state still is the most 
significant actor as only it can choose whether or not fatwas are relevant in its decision-
making process. As such the legal-bureaucratic authority of state fatwas begins with 
the state. When this formalised authority is invoked, the state is tied in a bureaucratic 
connection with the fatwa, thus allowing its policy to be shaped by the religious 
decree. 
State policies have significant impact on fatwas. This is because state decisions affect 
everyone in the country, including Muslims. This compels the issuance of fatwas, 
especially if the policies encroach on the sectoral interest of religious elites. The case 
studies above on population control policies and organ transplant policies are 
testament to this. 
The Fatwa Committee had to issue fatwas on the state population control policy which 
involved the use of birth control methods, as well as funding assistance for those who 
took part in the state-sponsored birth control programme. Similarly the organ donation 
fatwas, which were deliberated multiple times, had to be reviewed on many occasions 
as the state came up with an organ donation policy. Earlier fatwas on organ donation 
– permitted in emergencies – served as an ambiguous, perhaps even rhetorical 
guidance which would not make the fatwa immediately applicable for the Muslim 
public. Before HOTA was enacted, previous state fatwas on organ donation carried a 
cautious tone: it was forbidden, except in certain conditions. An interested party would 
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thus have to petition the Fatwa Committee with specific circumstances and wait for a 
fatwa to be issued. But with a nationwide organ donation policy being drawn up, state 
fatwas had to be more specific in addressing the issue. As HOTA assumes automatic 
consent, fatwas on organ transplant were amended and placed explicit conditions that 
would permit a Muslim to be an organ donor. 
I have also explained how petitions from various actors could affect a fatwa. The legal-
bureaucratic recognition of fatwas grants state actors access to the Fatwa Committee. 
Their petitions were made in the form of official memos, and at other times 
government ministers themselves would hold special meetings with the Fatwa 
Committee.451 While these ministers were present at several meetings with the official 
task of “providing clarification on the intricacies of the issue”,452 their presence clearly 
risked undermining the direction of the discussion. This tells of the various levels of 
‘pressure’ used by the state which initially was kept as distant, impersonal messages, 
failing which it was followed up by government ministers themselves joining in fatwa 
discussions. Although these petitions advanced by state actors led to stubborn 
responses, it also showed the capacity of the state to affect these deliberations by 
including its own representatives in these religious consultations. 
Having clear bureaucratic connection to the state therefore opened up fatwas to 
challenges by state actors. Despite clear postulation from the state, I argue that state 
fatwas remained largely autonomous. Aside from examples of state petitions cited 
earlier – in which the mufti noted that state policy should find a ‘middle way’ to 
accommodate state fatwas – more explicit statements can be found in other instances. 
For example, the Fatwa Committee minutes of meeting recorded that it “should avoid 
being perceived as being inconsistent, and easily change a fatwa every time it gets 
nudged or pressured.”453 Thus the bureaucratic playing field, while allowing fatwas to 
enter policy negotiations, also opened fatwas to state interventions. 
 
451 In Singapore, government ministers here refer to the parliamentarians who are affiliated to the 
ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) which has dominated the government since independence. The 
opposition made a relatively significant political breakthrough only in 2011.  
452 ‘Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa [Fatwa Committee Meeting]’ (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 28 
May 1986), 1. 
453 ‘Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa [Fatwa Committee Meeting]’ (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 10 
April 1996), 3. This statement came when discussing the issue of Advanced Medical Directive 
(AMD) also known as a living will, in which a patient issues an advance decision to refuse treatment 
for when he or she is unable to communicate to the physician. The fatwa stated that three specialists 
are required to confirm the status of the patient being “terminally ill”. In 1996, there was a letter from 
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I also demonstrated the extent of formalised legal-bureaucratic authority on state 
policies, in particular when state fatwas were included in policy formulation. In such 
a case, state policies became tied to the fatwas – albeit voluntarily – even though they 
were not legally obliged to do so. This is interesting because it was not legal coercion 
that made the state tie itself to fatwas, rather it was bureaucratic logic that forced this 
adherence. When fatwas remained unchanged, the state had to accommodate them (by 
creating exemption for Muslims from HOTA). This also means that once the fatwas 
were revised, the state had to amend its policy (i.e. by including Muslims in the organ 
donation system). This arbitrary manner on how the state engaged its religious 
constituency is reflective of the convoluted, messy nature of even the most 
bureaucratic of authoritarian states. Solely by being recognised as the state fatwa in 
Singapore, unwritten bureaucratic logic made policymakers adhere to these religious 
decrees, and enabled fatwas to advance religious demands in state policies. 
5 Conclusion 
To conclude, these two case studies which span a period of more than three decades 
highlight the complicated relationship between fatwas and the state. State fatwas 
remain a key reference point for Muslims in Singapore (and elsewhere). Because of 
that, they are a coveted legitimisation instrument that can be susceptible to changes 
due to transformations in state policies societal pressures, and lobbying efforts. 
State fatwas form a useful tool that can shape normative religious praxis in a country. 
While legal and bureaucratic recognition accords state fatwas with positional authority 
in the bureaucracy, it does not guarantee their relevance in affecting state decisions, 
especially if the state arbitrarily decides when this occurs. Hence state fatwas are very 
reliant on their informal traditional-societal authority that represents a more consistent 
form of reverence among Muslim followers, and is – to a large degree – independent 
of state whim. This also explains why state fatwas exhibit proclivity to rely on informal 
traditional-societal authority; it embodies the very core of their function that enables 
religious decrees to be continuously sought after even when they are not recognised 
by state power. This is evident not only in cases where state fatwas were not consulted 
 
a non-elected member of parliament asking the fatwa committee to review the requirement; since the 
AMD Act requires only two specialists to ascertain the status of the patient, it falls short of the 
fatwa’s requirement of having three specialists. The fatwa committee stood by their decision, citing 
that the issue for AMD is less time-sensitive than HOTA, thus there should be no difficulty in 
obtaining three specialists. 
149 
 
in state decisions, but also in popular online fatwas that spread beyond countries and 
borders. For state fatwas, this channel of authority enables them to contest state 
decisions, and preserve a brand of Islamic observation in a country. 
These contestations culminate in how Statist Islam is shaped in a secular authoritarian 
milieu. Through its bureaucratic power and capacity to exercise unilateral policies, the 
state possesses great advantage in influencing religious observances. Yet rather than 
the state solely dictating policies that affect religious positions, I have shown that state 
decisions can be tempered through state fatwas, which embody the direct connection 
of religious instruction to the Muslim community. This indicates that Statist Islam – 
the culmination of state-religious negotiation – is not merely the domain of the 
authoritarian state and societal pressure, but also prone to contestations through 
fatwas. 
The case studies in this chapter revealed the scope in which state policies engaged 
fatwas, and vice versa. Despite examples of aggressive implementation of state 
policies and the proximity of the fatwa institution to the state, state fatwas remained 
obstinately persistent. The bureaucratisation of Islamic religious institutions, as I have 
pointed out in previous chapters, is thus not a complete subjugation of bureaucratised 
constituents but a relationship built on persistent negotiations and contestations. The 
benefits of being closely positioned to each other is both a blessing and a curse for the 
actors involved, and this bears true for both the state and the fatwa institution. 
Because of this, state fatwas are very much an oddity in state bureaucracy; formally 
dependent on state powers to preserve religious authority, yet autonomous enough to 
express religious demands against the state. And while state fatwas are expected to 
reflect societal norms and expectations, they can also prove resistant to societal 
demands. These glimpses of ambivalence to affiliate to either state or society persisted 
through negotiations over various numbers of issues. This suggests that state fatwas 
are neither acting in societal nor state interests, rather they represent the sectoral 
objectives of religious elites, which as mentioned in previous chapters include the 
expansion of religious institutions, the preservation of orthodoxy, and upholding 
public morality.454 
 
454 Pierret, Religion and State in Syria, 163–64; Skovgaard-Petersen, ‘A Typology of State Muftis’. 
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In the next chapter, I shall investigate another form of formalised authority that state 
fatwas depend on. If bureaucratic authority allowed fatwas to affect state policy, legal 
authority will show us what happened when state fatwas were challenged by the court. 
We shall see, yet again, the informal traditional-societal authority, or the ‘softer’ side 




Chapter 5: Contesting Legal Authority: Islamic Law in Civil 
Law 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter on organ donation and family planning policies demonstrated 
how state fatwas played a key role in negotiating and informing religious demands 
against the state while preserving the sectoral interests of religious elites. Whereas the 
family planning episode highlighted the informal traditional-societal authority of state 
fatwas, the organ donation policy showed how their formalised legal-bureaucratic 
authority was asserted. 
For this chapter, the question that I ask is if state fatwas could negotiate the outcome 
of state policies by being included in policymaking process, how would they fare when 
they are brought to court? Also, how do state fatwas retain their authority when they 
were judged to be repugnant to the law? In other words, as the court decided that 
certain religious rulings issued in state fatwas were contradictory to civil law, how do 
these fatwas remain relevant to the very society that they seek to instruct? These 
questions are central to my thesis because it examines the extent of state fatwas’ 
formalised authority. If the previous chapter scrutinised formalised authority that 
stems from bureaucratic relationship, this chapter will look at another channel of 
formalised authority, one that relies on legal recognition. 
I will examine the legal authority of state fatwas by analysing court cases where they 
were challenged. The points I wish to make are threefold. Firstly, although the 
recognition of fatwas in the legal framework can be described as a way to regulate 
religious interests, it did not restrict them from contesting court judgements. Secondly, 
in reconstructing how state fatwas asserted their informal authority in the aftermath of 
legal challenges (a similar pattern when they came into conflict with state policies), it 
became apparent that state fatwas continued to give advice that was inconsistent with 
the law while attempting to reconcile these legal differences. Thirdly, the outcome of 
these legal episodes demonstrated the extent of policy feedback in negotiating with 
the judiciary. This is rooted in the differences in how the Muslim legislation in 
Singapore, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), is interpreted in state 
fatwas and court judgements. The differences in interpretation resulted in these legal 
episodes that reveal another facet where Statist Islam is contested and defined. 
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The following discussion is divided into four main parts. The first part will briefly 
establish the background and current context of Islamic law in Singapore’s legal 
system. It will also underline the importance of court judgement as an indicator of 
state fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic authority. The second part will detail three court cases 
that challenged the authority of state fatwas. These stem from fatwas on Muslim 
inheritance law that were brought to court and later amended to concur with court 
judgements. The third part will analyse the limitation of state fatwas’ legal authority, 
despite which they managed to maintain their initial religious rulings through informal 
traditional-societal authority. I will then conclude with the assessment that the legal 
authority of Islamic institutions and Islamic law in Singapore is prone to 
‘harmonisation’ projects designed to accommodate contradictions between religious 
and secular laws. This exhibits the legal limitation of feedback effect through state 
fatwas. 
2 Background 
While Shariah law covers all aspects of Islamic ritual practices, social conduct, and 
even penal law, its recognition in the modern state is mostly confined to inheritance, 
marriages, and divorces. In the secular civil law framework, these components come 
under Islamic family law. This is an inheritance of colonial legacy which had included 
Islamic family law as a recognised religious practice. 
Islamic family law in the post-independence period does not differ in theory from the 
earlier practices gleaned from classical Muslim works. Marriages, divorces, and 
inheritance laws are based on the same classical practice of more than a millennium 
ago. But the legality of Shariah law in Singapore today is situated within the secular 
legal framework. As the state oversees the application of law, and by legislation 
endorses both forms of Islamic and secular civil laws, this leads to complications 
between the two. Although observance of Islamic family law remains largely 
unchanged throughout time, its inclusion into the secular law framework 
problematises how it is being practised. It has thus been argued that significant changes 
to Islamic law occurred because of its application in the modern state.455 
 




Today, Islamic law in Singapore operates in three main areas: marriages, divorces, and 
inheritance, all provisioned in Singapore’s Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA), the legal statute which regulates Muslim religious affairs. The foremost 
inheritance instrument for Muslims is the Islamic intestate law called farāiḍ (alt. 
faraid) which distributes fixed portions of a property for eligible heirs. Another 
instrument is the Islamic will called waṣiyyah (alt. wasiat) in which only a maximum 
of one-third of the deceased’s property can be allocated for non-heirs.456 Other 
religious inheritance instruments mentioned in AMLA include nadhar (vow, alt. 
nazar), and waqf (charitable endowment, alt. wakaf).457 AMLA gave legal recognition 
to these instruments and made them legally sound within civil law. By enabling the 
legal recognition of these Islamic inheritance instruments, complications arise on how 
exactly they should be implemented vis-à-vis secular inheritance law. Ergo, legal 
complication occurs not because Islamic intestate law is not recognised, rather due to 
its secular-legal recognition. 
It could also be said that the overarching secular legal framework does not completely 
inhibit the practice of Islamic law. In fact, Islamic family law is empowered in the 
secular legal framework through a niche statute for Muslim administration. However, 
the ambiguity of written law resulted in the incongruent interpretation of how Islamic 
and civil laws interact. Furthermore, Singapore’s unique authoritarian policies create 
an extra layer of complication for state fatwas as these policies also challenge some of 
the traditional religious positions backed by these fatwas. 
To illustrate, the Singapore state mandates a compulsory savings plan on its citizens. 
Present law dictates that twenty percent of a Singaporean worker’s monthly salary is 
credited to the Central Provident Fund (CPF) account. The function of the account is 
restricted to certain medical, housing, and retirement expenditures. In line with a law 
known as the CPF Act, the fund allows for the nomination of a single person as the 
nominee of the account, who will then inherit the money upon the demise of the 
 
456 The waṣiyyah is typically bequeathed to those who are not eligible for a share in farāiḍ, for 
example a friend of the deceased. 
457 While the farāiḍ exclusively pertains to next-of-kin relatives, waṣiyyah, nadhar, and waqf provide 
additional options for the deceased to distribute his money to non-relatives, institutions, and 
organisations. However since the waṣiyyah is capped at a maximum of one-third of the total property, 
this means that the deceased has no say on how two-thirds of his property is going to be distributed 
through farāiḍ. The farāiḍ effectively prevents the deceased from striking out any qualified heirs in 
obtaining a share of his property. 
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account holder. However this was not readily recognised by the Fatwa Committee, 
which in a 1971 fatwa regarded the nominee of the account merely as a trustee who 
has to distribute the money to eligible heirs by farāiḍ.458 
Another example is Singapore’s public housing system. The vast majority of the 
population resides in flats purchased from the state-linked Housing and Development 
Board (HDB). These flats can either be bought by one owner or shared through other 
manners of holding such as joint tenancy. Joint tenancy means that both the owners 
retain an equal share of the property, and when one of them passes, the surviving 
owner will inherit the whole property. However, the Fatwa Committee did not 
recognise the right of survivorship in Shariah, and regarded the status of the surviving 
owner as a trustee instead of a surviving tenant who inherits the property. 
These differences are facilitated through AMLA, which allows Muslims to dispose 
their wealth according to Islamic law. However over time as civil law continues to 
change and evolve, it forces the amendment of state fatwas to be more in line with the 
secular legal system. Yet as I will show, state fatwas persistently promote their 
interpretation of Islamic inheritance law that contradicts court judgement. This 
indicates how Statist Islam continues to be shaped by state fatwas despite restrictions 
placed by the courts. 
2.1 Policy, Law, and Fatwa 
At a cursory glance, Singapore practices a wholly secular legal system that 
incorporates both secular and Islamic laws in family legislations. There are certain 
accommodations for Muslims in exercising their religious rights when it comes to 
family law. For example the institutions in charge of marriages and divorces are the 
Registry of Muslim Marriages and the Syariah Court respectively, while non-Muslims 
come under the purview of the Registry of Marriages. 
The reason for this distinction is rooted in the statutes. Laws pertaining to Muslim 
marriages, divorces and inheritance are covered under AMLA, while non-Muslims are 
covered under various other laws. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the legal provision for 
Muslims is a result of several social, political, and historical factors. This resulted in 
the legal doctrine that “all cases regarding the ceremonies of religion and marriages 
 




and the rules of inheritance, the laws and custom of the Malays will be respected”, i.e. 
left to the discretion of Malay rulers. As the throne was forced out, the religious 
vacuum in Singapore was filled by religious elites who then reigned as the highest 
religious authority on the island, eventually obtaining official recognition under the 
Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance in year 1880. This stamped state approval on their 
position; they became not only the Muslim community’s religious representatives, but 
the ones whom the political authorities have to officially deal with in matters of 
religion. 
The restriction to operate in the domains of marriage, divorce, and inheritance does 
not necessarily mean the diminishing legal relevance of Islamic religious elites. 
Limiting their role to these specific realms of family law also forced them to be more 
entrenched in these domains. This resulted in the resolute stubbornness of religious 
elites to loosen their grip when challenged as these areas represent the last fragments 
of legal relevance for the ulama. Their modern legal significance was eventually 
cemented with the integration of Malay-Muslim provisions in Singapore’s constitution 
in 1965, and AMLA a year later. 
2.2 Fatwa and Soft Law 
In a state that prides itself for being secular, the court can define how seriously this 
claim is asserted. Because state fatwas instruct Islamic religious observances, and 
given how prevalent such observances are in daily life, there are bound to be areas 
where religious decrees and secular law overlap. 
However a (secular) court deciding on religious matters is a problematic issue. For a 
start, judicial inquiry into religious questions is parallel to what is known as the 
“political question doctrine”.459 This means that just as the courts do not have the 
authority to resolve political questions because these enquiries ideally rest on the 
political branch of the state, religious questions must also fall on the jurisdiction of 
religious bodies and not the courts. The judiciary should also avoid examining 
religious questions as it can compromise the claim of state-church (or indeed state-
Shariah) separation. This is analogous to courts answering political questions, where 
 
459 Jared A Goldstein, ‘Is There a Religious Question Doctrine-Judicial Authority to Examine 
Religious Practices and Beliefs’, Cath. UL Rev. 54 (2004): 499. 
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the result would raise concern over the separation between the judicial and the political 
branches of the state.460 
For the Singapore state, however, such concerns arguably bear little significance. This 
is because one factor to consider when discussing Singapore courts (or even Southeast 
Asian ones in general) is the authoritarian government’s reputation for exploiting the 
rule of law. While many Southeast Asian governments claim their judiciary to be 
independent of the executive branch,461 there is no shortage of academic studies 
arguing otherwise especially when an involved litigant is a high-ranking political 
member of the state.462 The Singapore state is also known to have incarcerated critics 
without trial for supposed subversion,463 and in more recent times bankrupted 
opposition politicians through an arbitrary interpretation of the defamation law.464 The 
Singapore state is therefore described as a “hyper-judicial” organisation that takes 
advantage of the legal system in order to retain power and pursue political goals.465 
Where religious matters are concerned, the courts have the power to either expand or 
limit the scope of religion in the state. Examining how courts judge state fatwas 
essentially marks the reach of the court’s secular legal interpretation of religious 
matters against the authority of these fatwas. Previous accounts of state-religious legal 
contestations in Singapore lead some to assess that the country practises a “quasi-
 
460 Goldstein, 500. 
461 ‘Mahkamah Malaysia Bebas Daripada Mana-Mana Pengaruh [Malaysian Courts Are Free of Any 
Influence]’, MStar Online, 16 September 2016, http://www.mstar.com.my/berita/berita-
semasa/2016/09/16/mahkamah-malaysia-bebas/; ‘Second Reading Speech by Minister for Law, Mr K 
Shanmugam, on the Administration of Justice (Protection) Bill’, Ministry of Law, 15 August 2016, 
http://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/parliamentary-speeches-and-responses/second-
reading-speech-by-minister-for-law--mr-k-shanmugam--on-th1.html. 
462 Hoong Phun Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxford University Press, 
2017); Min Aun Wu, ‘The Malaysian Judiciary: Erosion of Confidence’, Australian Journal of Asian 
Law 1, no. 2 (1999): 124; Francis Seow, ‘The Politics of Judicial Institutions in Singapore’ (1997), 
http://www.gn.apc.org/sfd; Francis T Seow, Beyond Suspicion?: The Singapore Judiciary, vol. 55 
(Yale Univ Southeast Asia Studies, 2006); Rodan and Hughes, The Politics of Accountability in 
Southeast Asia; C Neal Tate, ‘The Judicialization of Politics in the Philippines and Southeast Asia’, 
International Political Science Review 15, no. 2 (1994): 187–97; Garry Rodan, Transparency and 
Authoritarian Rule in Southeast Asia: Singapore and Malaysia (Routledge, 2004). 
463 Ping Tjin Thum, ‘Justifying Colonial Rule in Post-Colonial Singapore’, New Naratif (blog), 
accessed 15 April 2018, https://newnaratif.com/research/justifying-colonial-rule-in-post-colonial-
singapore/; for debate on the issue cf. Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘ORIGINAL SIN’?: Revising the 
Revisionist Critique of the 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2015). 
464 Seow, ‘The Politics of Judicial Institutions in Singapore’; Rodan and Jayasuriya, ‘The 
Technocratic Politics of Administrative Participation: Case Studies of Singapore and Vietnam’. 
465 Turner, ‘Soft Authoritarianism, Social Diversity and Legal Pluralism: The Case of Singapore’, 77. 
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secular”466 legal approach. This is because religion is, to some extent, accommodated 
in the secular public life yet “subordinated to government priorities and 
imperatives”.467 This assessment is also supported by the arbitrary “informal 
standards” that the state exercises to interpret the written constitution, which in essence 
underlines the authoritarian norms of the Singapore state.468 
Yet this does not mean that examining court judgements is a futile attempt at 
understanding state-religious dynamics. Even if we were to take the secular-religious 
arbitration in courts as a space where religious contestations are allowed to occur, legal 
battles indicate how much of this pre-approved boundary can be pushed. This is a 
crucial point because, as this chapter will illustrate, state fatwas do not stop being 
useful once they were overruled by the court. Rather there is an additional side to them 
that sheds light on how – in an authoritarian state no less – state fatwas can circumvent 
court decisions. This chapter therefore not only examines the outcome of court cases 
concerning fatwas, but also explores how legal secular-religious boundary in 
Singapore is contested beyond the courts. 
Exploring how state fatwas function beyond the courts further reveals the extent of 
their informal traditional-societal authority. In the previous chapter, we have seen how 
these fatwas contested against official state pronouncements through various forms of 
authority. I have also mentioned how the traditional-societal authority of state fatwas 
represents their essence in instructing the Muslim community. 
As traditional-societal authority allows state fatwas to promote Islamic legal norms 
beyond official legal channels, it replicates a form of soft law: an instrument that 
abstains from forcing legal obligations on groups or individuals while not neglecting 
legal adherence to particular responsibilities and commitments.469 If formalised legal-
bureaucratic authority equates to hard law because it depends on the relevant written 
legislations, informal authority or soft law typically constitutes resolutions and 
guiding principles. Unlike hard law, soft law is “not restricted to the text of any one 
 
466 Thio, ‘Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: Managing Religious Harmony in Singapore’s 
Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State’, 252. 
467 Thio, 253. 
468 Thio, ‘Soft Constitutional Law in Nonliberal Asian Constitutional Democracies’, 414. 
469 Rodley, ‘Non-State Actors and Human Rights’, 533. 
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convention” or law, and this gives soft law practitioners a “uniquely flexible and 
independent role,”470 analogous to how state fatwas operate. 
The applicability of soft law is not limited to the themes of human rights law, 
commercial law, or transitional justice which it originates from,471 but also local 
constitutional law. Thio, in describing the legal characteristics of Southeast Asian 
countries, argues that the ability to translate constitutional law into soft law is a feature 
of “nonliberal Asian democracies with strong governments and weak courts”.472 The 
ambiguity of the constitutional text is interpreted by the state to protect its interests via 
“informal norms”,473 consequently affecting the role of religion in the public sphere. 
Here, soft law is deployed through legal interpretation; the constitution is marshalled 
as an informal regulation to encourage groups and individuals to abide by certain state-
sanctioned norms. 
Literature on soft law in Singapore typically address it as an instrument or extension 
to promote normative behaviour on citizens. In a separate article, Thio examined the 
2003 Declaration of Religious Harmony in Singapore, a soft law instrument that lacks 
legal status, yet “exerts some degree of legal impact and influence in shaping state-
society relations.”474 Mathew meanwhile iterated Singapore’s unenforceable “soft-law 
measures” which combined norms and institutions to manage religions.475 Just like 
Thio, he cited the Declaration of Religious Harmony that was later followed by the 
state-sponsored establishment of the Inter-Religious Harmony Circle, a grouping of 
various religious leaders that motivates self-policing behaviour. Tan – in narrating the 
state’s methods in managing terrorism – cited the flexible and discursive qualities in 
soft law that enables it to set “normative standards and enable social learning” and 
complements hard law.476 
These studies on religious management and soft law raise two points that I wish to 
make. Firstly, when discussing ‘religious harmony’, we should see it beyond the 
 
470 Piccone, ‘The Future of the United Nations Special Procedures’, 727. 
471 Anna Di Robilant, ‘Genealogies of Soft Law’, The American Journal of Comparative Law 54, no. 
3 (2006): 499. 
472 Thio, ‘Soft Constitutional Law in Nonliberal Asian Constitutional Democracies’, 798. 
473 Thio, ‘Between Eden and Armageddon: Navigating Religion and Politics in Singapore’, 365. 
474 Thio, ‘Soft Constitutional Law in Nonliberal Asian Constitutional Democracies’, 416. 
475 Mathews Mathew, ‘Understanding Religious Freedom In Singapore’, The Review of Faith & 
International Affairs 11, no. 2 (2013): 32. 
476 Eugene KB Tan, ‘From Clampdown to Limited Empowerment: Soft Law in the Calibration and 
Regulation of Religious Conduct in Singapore’, Law & Policy 31, no. 3 (2009): 355. 
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façade of physical interactions between members of religious groups. This is because 
the state also banks on religious harmony as an indicator of the efficacy of its 
authoritarian policies. The more ‘harmonious’ the relationship between the various 
religions, the more the state can claim legitimacy for its policies, or even expand them. 
The management of ‘religious harmony’ therefore does not stop at ‘good’ relations 
between religions, but also between religious law and state law. As the cases below 
will show, there is a conscious attempt by the state to harmonise between different sets 
of laws, specifically Islamic and secular laws. This shows that the state management 
of religious affairs extend beyond simply ensuring cordial relations between faith 
groups, but also that the overarching dictum of state secularism is not contested in 
legal terms, not even by state fatwas. 
Secondly, the studies provided important contextual background to the hard law/soft 
law dynamic in Singapore. They also addressed the complementary feature of soft law 
to hard law. However by analysing state fatwas as a form of soft law, it becomes 
apparent that they do not necessarily complement the hard law that is AMLA. This is 
because the final word on AMLA’s interpretation lies with the court. State fatwas 
meanwhile, as we have seen in the previous chapter, utilise their informal soft law 
authority to contest state decisions. If soft law complements hard law, then clearly 
state fatwas’ hard law is not AMLA since that is supposed to conform to state demands 
and can be restricted by the court. Rather the hard law basis of state fatwas is 
something else: the written rulings of Islamic religious law, i.e. the Shariah. In other 
words, the Shariah provides the explicit legal basis of religious law, which state fatwas 
then act as a soft law instrument to promote normative Shariah-based religious 
behaviour among Muslims. Which is why, as we shall see, state fatwas can contradict 
secular court decisions because it is wholly driven by another set of law, and not 
AMLA. 
3 Judging Fatwas 
I will present three state fatwas to support the points above. (See Table 2) The first 
fatwa concerns the Islamic inheritance instruments of farāiḍ and nudhriyyah (alt. 
nuzriah). Typically when a Muslim dies, his property is distributed according to a 
fixed-ratio intestate system called farāiḍ. A key characteristic of the farāiḍ is that a 
male heir typically gets double of what a female heir gets because, among other 
reasons, financial support for dependents rests almost completely on the male heir. 
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Alternatively, a Muslim has the choice to issue an Islamic will, subject to the 
conditions that it does not exceed more than one-third of his property, and bequeathed 
only to non-heirs. Then there is the lesser-known instrument called nudhriyyah, a 
contract undertaken by a Muslim to distribute his wealth according to his own pre-
determined ratio, effectively bypassing the farāiḍ and one-third limit of the will. But 
as nudhriyyah is not explicitly stated as an inheritance instrument in AMLA, 
complications arose when the Fatwa Committee and civil court took opposing views 
on its validity. 
The second fatwa relates to joint-tenancy agreement where two parties become joint 
owners of a property. According to Singapore civil law, the right of survivorship 
applies upon the death of a joint owner, i.e. the deceased’s half-share will 
automatically be transferred to the remaining co-owner, whether or not a will is 
recorded.477 So even if the deceased left behind a will that includes a property bought 
on a joint-tenancy agreement, the inclusion of that property in the will is void. This, 
however, was refuted by a state fatwa which dismissed the right of survivorship in 
Islamic law. The fatwa decreed that upon the death of a Muslim joint owner, the 
deceased’s ‘half share’ – i.e. 50% of the property – must be distributed according to 
farāiḍ. This means that, and this applies only to Muslims, the surviving joint owner 
gets only half of the property, while the deceased joint owner’s share is passed to his 
or her heirs. But in 2008, a new fatwa was issued to allow the surviving joint tenant to 
inherit all of the property, effectively giving a nod to the predominant practice in civil 
law. 
The third fatwa pertains to CPF nomination. The CPF is a mandatory retirement and 
savings plan for all Singapore citizens. A percentage of an individual’s income is 
channelled into the CPF account which is typically used on mortgage payment, 
medical expenses, and pension savings. As there are very stringent restrictions on its 
usage, the money in the account tends to accumulate through income and interest 
earnings. Each CPF account holder can name a nominee who will inherit the money 
in the account upon the account holder’s demise. Initially for Muslims, this nomination 
did not allow the nominee to inherit the funds in the account. Instead, as decreed in a 
 





state fatwa, the nominee is regarded only as a trustee who then has to distribute the 
funds to the deceased’s heirs according to farāiḍ. However in 2010, the state fatwa 
was amended to allow the nominee to inherit the funds. 
 Fatwa 1: 
Nudhriyyah 




1957   Enactment of CPF Act 
1966 Enactment of AMLA 
1971  Original fatwa on 
joint tenancy 
 
1979   Original fatwa on CPF 
nomination 
1990   Saniah bte Ali v 
Abdullah bin Ali 




2004 Mohamed Ismail Bin 
Ibrahim and Another 
v Mohammad Taha 
Bin Ibrahim 
  
2006   (2006-2010) CPF Act 
amendments 2007 Amendment of 
nudhriyyah fatwa 
 
2008  Amendment of fatwa 
on joint tenancy  
2009  Shafeeg bin Salim 
Talib and Anor v 
Fatimah bte Abud 
bin Talib and Ors 
2010   Amendment of CPF 
nomination fatwa 
Table 2 Timeline of the state fatwas and legal events mentioned in this chapter 
162 
 
These episodes demonstrate how state fatwas became entangled in legal cases. The 
recognition of fatwas in the modern state is not solely based on their bureaucratic link, 
but also their legal status. This legal aspect of state fatwas underlines their recognition 
by the courts and their position within the larger legal framework. Examining the role 
and authority of state fatwas in the legal domain will assess the effects of policy 
feedback through the courts. Fatwas’ legal authority is also examined, especially as 
they were supported by, and later found to have contradicted AMLA. To be more 
exact, this chapter shall detail how these fatwas were reinforced and readjusted in the 
face of legal repercussions, and the measures taken by the Fatwa Committee to ensure 
the continued relevance of state fatwas, thus shaping Statist Islam beyond court orders.  
3.1 Nudhriyyah 
Traditionally upon the death of a Muslim property owner, the property is divided to 
eligible heirs according to the Shariah intestate law called farāiḍ. Even if the deceased 
issued a will – called a waṣiyyah – it has to abide by several conditions, among them 
it cannot exceed more than one-third of the total property. What is left after setting 
aside for the will (and various other expenses such as outstanding loans) is then 
distributed according to the farāiḍ which divides the property only to the spouse and 
closest biological heirs, typically the parents and children. 
As mentioned above, nudhriyyah is an instrument that allows the owner to circumvent 
the conditions of a will. Prior to the court case, there were many petitions for state 
fatwas on nudhriyyah. Interest in nudhriyyah stems from exceptional scenarios, such 
as where the potential male heirs displayed irresponsible, or even criminal tendencies. 
As the male usually gets the lion’s share in farāiḍ, the prospect of leaving a large 
portion of the inheritance to suspect male heirs has led to petitions from individuals 
and lawyers representing property owners who want to exercise nudhriyyah. Another 
scenario where nudhriyyah could be invoked is if the family has adopted children 
whose allocation are not guaranteed under farāiḍ. Nudhriyyah allows all of a 
deceased’s property to be distributed exactly as he or she wants, which ensures a 
certain amount to be given to those left out of the inheritance. 
While the Muslim will also provides a way for the cases mentioned above, there are 
several differences between it and nudhriyyah. The key distinction between a Muslim 
will and nudhriyyah is that the former is restricted by stringent rules; the Muslim will 
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cannot exceed one-third of the total property, and it also cannot be given to someone 
who is receiving a share through farāiḍ. So for a Muslim parent who has a son and a 
daughter and wants to set aside an extra amount for the daughter, the will is invalid 
because she is already an eligible heir under farāiḍ. This is where nudhriyyah becomes 
a desired instrument for some because it allows for the property to be divided 
according to the owner’s discretion. 
Before moving on to the case, let us briefly look at the development of nudhriyyah as 
an instrument of Islamic law in Singapore. Laws pertaining to intestate law and 
testaments are governed under the Intestate Succession Act and Wills Act. For 
Muslims, however, it comes under AMLA, which in Part VII stated the “distribution 
of Muslim estate to be according to Muslim law,” and that the “disposition by will, 
etc., to be in accordance with Muslim law”.478 In particular, section 111(1) of AMLA 
addressed the stipulations of Muslim will, that “no Muslim domiciled in Singapore 
shall…dispose of his property by will, or by any nomination…except in accordance 
with the provisions of and subject to the restrictions imposed by the school of Muslim 
law professed by him.” Section 112(1) meanwhile outlined the intestate distribution 
of the Muslim estate (farāiḍ), by stating that “any Muslim person domiciled in 
Singapore dying intestate, the estate and effects shall be distributed according to the 
Muslim law as modified, where applicable, by Malay custom.” 
AMLA also gives legal recognition to various other Islamic inheritance instruments 
such as farāiḍ, waqf or religious endowment, and the charity vow of nadhar. My focus 
in this chapter, nudhriyyah, is linked to the charity vow nadhar. Nudhriyyah itself is a 
derivative of nadhar, both sharing the same root word. Nadhar is defined as “an 
expressed vow to do any act or to dedicate property for any purpose allowed by the 
Muslim law.”479 AMLA stipulated that a nadhar exceeding more than one-third of the 
property to be invalid,480 a well-accepted feature of Islamic inheritance law that 
safeguards the shares of biological heirs. 
Nudhriyyah meanwhile is a variation of the nadhar in which a Muslim vows to 
distribute the property before his death. The nudhriyyah contract comes into effect 
prior to a person’s death, specifically “3 days before the Deceased’s death, or 1 hour 
 
478 Administration of Muslim Law Act, pt. VII. 
479 Administration of Muslim Law Act, sec. 2. 
480 Administration of Muslim Law Act, sec. 60. 
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before his death in the case of a sudden death.”481 Because nudhriyyah is essentially a 
transaction made before death, the state fatwa argued that this excludes it from being 
a will (which is a transaction effective upon death). As such, the fatwa sees nudhriyyah 
as not tied to the conditions of the Muslim will. This means that nudhriyyah can exceed 
more than one-third of the property, and that it can be allocated even for eligible farāiḍ 
heirs. 
Fatwas on nudhriyyah were recorded in the 1990s, although according to the former 
mufti Syed Isa Semait the practice of nudhriyyah in Singapore is not a contemporary 
one.482 Nudhriyyah could be traced back to Yemeni roots where early Muslim 
missionaries in Southeast Asia originated from. However it is not popular in the 
greater Muslim world. Even in neighbouring Malaysia, nudhriyyah is not widely 
accepted as a valid Islamic succession instrument. 
While nudhriyyah in Singapore is accepted as a form of estate planning in lieu of the 
Muslim will and farāiḍ, it did not garner public attention until a court case in 2004. 
Mohamed Ismail Bin Ibrahim and Another v Mohammad Taha Bin Ibrahim 
(henceforth Mohamed Ismail) revolves around the dispute of a property worth S$1.3 
million left by a father of ten who passed away in 1997. He had instructed one-third 
of his property to be willed to mosques, one-third distributed according to nudhriyyah, 
and one-third to be distributed according to farāiḍ. Among the recipients included in 
the nudhriyyah contract were his wife and five of his children.483 
However the validity of nudhriyyah was disputed by the deceased’s son and daughter 
– the plaintiffs in the case – who insisted their father’s property to be distributed 
according to farāiḍ. The case was then brought to the high court. The fact that the high 
court can judge whether a state fatwa is valid already demonstrates the jurisdictional 
primacy of the civil high court over Islamic law in Singapore. But to what extent does 
the civil high court preside over Islamic law? And how does the judgement of the court 
affect future state fatwas? 
 
481 Mohamed Ismail bin Ibrahim and Another v Mohammad Taha bin Ibrahim (High Court 22 
September 2004). 
482 Interview with Syed Isa Semait, August 2016 
483 It might be of relevance note to say here that the nudhriyyah was not approved by Singapore’s 
Syariah Court. However this point is excluded from this research as it seems that the Singapore’s 
Syariah Court was unaware of the fatwa on nudhriyyah for the aforementioned property. 
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This warrants a closer look at the court proceeding and its aftermath. The expert 
witness for the plaintiffs argued that the nudhriyyah was invalid because of the severe 
distinction between nadhar and nudhriyyah; while the former is an established 
instrument, the latter is said to be absent in legal textbooks and “is not known nor 
practised in Indonesia, Malaysia or any part of the Muslim world of the Shafii 
school.”484 The Shāfi`ī (alt. Shafii) school refers to the most prevalent school of 
Islamic law in Southeast Asia, and one of the four schools in the world today. Each of 
this school of thought is also called a madhhab (alt. mazhab) that reflects a distinct 
interpretation of Islamic law. 
The mufti at the time – Syed Isa Semait – acted as the expert witness for the defendant. 
He cited several reasons for the validity of the nudhriyyah; such as its long-held 
practice among Yemeni Muslims and references in religious literature. In his 
testimony, he claimed that the practice is at least 500 years old, and that more than 36 
Singapore state fatwas allowing nudhriyyah were issued since 1997.485 
During the court case, fatwas on nudhriyyah were still being issued. Although aware 
of the potential complication due to the ongoing court case, these fatwas nonetheless 
decreed that nudhriyyah is a sound instrument, yet cautioned that this position will not 
relate to the court’s pending judgement.486 This caveat was the right step for the Fatwa 
Committee as nudhriyyah was eventually ruled invalid in the civil court. The full text 
of the judge’s statement is a fascinating read, but in summary the judge decided that 
nudhriyyah was found to be in contradiction of section 60 of AMLA that limits all 
forms of Muslim will to only one-third of the property.487 He also contested the 
validity of nudhriyyah in classical Islamic law literature, and cited a legal precedent 
in 1933 when a form of nudhriyyah was invoked but dismissed by the High Court of 
the Straits Settlement.488 
 
484 Mohamed Ismail paragraph 22. 
485 Mohamed Ismail paragraph 24; Khartini Khalid, ‘Panel Fatwa Sepakat Ia Sah’, Berita Harian, 6 
July 2004. In an interview the author did with the ex-mufti in 2016, he said that the deceased himself 
was a knowledgeable Muslim, having learned from Singapore-based ulama of Yemeni descent Syed 
Umar Alkhatib 
486 ‘Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa [Fatwa Committee Meeting]’ (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 6 
April 2004). 
487 Mohamed Ismail paragraphs 49–51. 
488 Mohamed Ismail paragraph 47. 
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Court decisions pose serious legal challenge to the authority of state fatwas as the 
instructor of Islamic law in the country. Despite the ‘hyper-judicial’ characteristic of 
the Singapore state, the judiciary is still a largely respected institution. Its judgement 
therefore directly undermined state fatwas and suggested that they can be made legally 
redundant by simply referring them to the civil court. 
In the aftermath, members of the Fatwa Committee issued critical responses to stamp 
their authority on the subject. In a commentary that was published in a local newspaper 
following the verdict, a Fatwa Committee member stated that although nudhriyyah is 
not a subject that is widely covered in classical Islamic law textbooks, the 
interpretative (ijtihādī) characteristic of the instrument does not mean that it should be 
dismissed.489 The same commentary also challenged the judge’s interpretation of 
AMLA and provided justification for state fatwas on nudhriyyah by presenting the 
different opinions among classical Islamic jurists. This last point could be taken as 
direct response to the court judgement, as the judge had said: 
…[A]t best, [among the classical scholars] not all but a few hold the view that 
a vow in favour of some children over others may be valid in some exceptional 
circumstances such as necessity and want of support. Furthermore…there are 
strong differences amongst the scholars…There is no indication…that scholars 
have an agreed position to give validity to the vow. There is clearly an absence 
of consensus or Ijmaa [on the matter].490 
In a separate commentary, another member of the Fatwa Committee commented that 
while the judge’s decision stands, it concerns only this specific case and that Muslims 
should still follow the state fatwa on nudhriyyah.491 Clearly the Fatwa Committee was 
determined on making its position well-known among the Muslim community. 
Yet the court ruling also resulted in several changes in the fatwa-making process. In 
2005, one year after the nudhriyyah case, a former civil court judge was made a 
member of the Fatwa Committee. The reason given was this would ensure that state 
fatwas are “more appropriate to AMLA.”492 Subsequent fatwas on nudhriyyah only 
 
489 Mohd Murat Md Aris, ‘Amalan Nuzriah’, Berita Harian, 24 October 2004. 
490 Mohamed Ismail paragraph 45. 
491 Hasbi Hassan, ‘Keputusan Mahkamah Tidak Jejas Kewibawaan Mufti’, Berita Harian, 7 
November 2004. 




advised on the contract’s literal written expression, and not its legal validity. They also 
included explicit caveats that nudhriyyah is only recognised within the Shafi’ī school 
of thought, and that the fatwa should be taken separately from the high court 
decision.493 
In 2007, the Fatwa Committee issued a religious guidance called irshād (alt. irsyad) 
on nudhriyyah. An irshād, bearing similarity to a fatwa, is simply described as a 
“religious guidance”.494 More technically, an irshād is a “provisional answer” picked 
from the existing corpus, i.e. without having to come up with a unique religious ruling, 
while state fatwas address “complicated issue which would require at times novel 
Islamic rulings and are based on very extensive and in-depth research”.495 The exact 
differences between the two is debatable, as it would be hard to imagine that the rigour 
exercised in issuing a fatwa is absent from the process of issuing an irshād, or that 
fatwas are simply distinguished by whether a topic has been previously addressed in 
Islamic literature. But what is clear is that as an official religious instruction, an irshād 
does not reach the rank of a state fatwa. 
The 2007 irshād began by defining nudhriyyah as a vow “made by someone to give 
part or all of his wealth before his death to another party.”496 It then explained the 
religious justifications and conditions for the contract and outlined how nudhriyyah 
should be exercised. The irshād also stated that in order “to strengthen the… 
[nudhriyyah] legally”, one can engage a lawyer or make a Statutory Declaration. The 
irshād also contained a reminder common in previous decrees on nudhriyyah, that the 
contract cannot be drawn up out of spite to omit certain heirs from the estate. It then 
provided a sample nudhriyyah contract. (See Figure 5) 
 
493 ‘Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa [Fatwa Committee Meeting]’. 
494 Office of the Mufti, ‘Irsyad’, MUIS: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, accessed 3 October 2017, 
https://www.muis.gov.sg/officeofthemufti/Irsyad/index.html. 
495 Musa Furber, ‘Irshad and Fatwa: Clarifying What Is Meant by Singapore’s MUIS’, Musa’s Muftic 
Musings, 17 May 2014, http://musafurber.com/2014/05/17/irshad-and-fatwa/. 
496 Office of the Mufti, ‘Irsyad: Nuzriah in Islam’, MUIS: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, accessed 3 




Figure 5 A sample contract included in the 2007 nudhriyyah irshād 
The content of the irshād supported the earlier position of the state fatwa, similar to 
what was issued following the court verdict: that nudhriyyah is still a valid religious 
instrument despite the court ruling otherwise. By issuing the irshād the validity of 
nudhriyyah is not only reiterated, but the position of the state fatwa is also officially 
reasserted. 
Issuing an irshād instead of a fatwa also provided a way to preserve state fatwas from 
contestation. If a state fatwa is contested by other entities, especially the judiciary, it 
chips away at the fatwa’s authority. However as an irshād does not reach the level of 
a fatwa, it provides an extra degree of separation. After all, a lesser, ‘provisional’ 
opinion that is exposed to criticism is not the same as criticism directed against an 
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established position. Therefore an irshād provides an alternative to fatwas, and the 
associated caveat – it being a mere recommendation and not a proper fatwa – insulates 
state fatwas from dispute. 
Despite the irshād insisting on the validity of nudhriyyah, the case jolted the Fatwa 
Committee to be more aware of the differences between its decisions and secular law. 
The irshād provided a way for the Fatwas Committee to persist on religious decisions 
which contradict civil law without having to deal with their direct consequences. 
3.2 Joint Tenancy 
Joint-tenancy contract is also known as joint property ownership where two parties 
become equal owners of a single property. According to Singapore civil law, the right 
of survivorship applies upon the death of a joint owner. So when a joint owner dies, 
the other joint owner will automatically inherit the deceased’s share, whether or not a 
will was made.497 
The Fatwa Committee did not readily accept the right of survivorship as a recognised 
religious practice. Earlier state fatwas instructed that the surviving joint owner will 
only be getting his own half of the property, while the deceased’s share is given out to 
the respective heirs.498 This means that the share of the surviving owner is fixed at 
only 50% of the property. The other half of the estate is distributed to the deceased’s 
heir according to farāiḍ. However this changed in April 2008 when the state fatwa 
decreed that the surviving joint owner is allowed to inherit all of the property as an 
alternative to farāiḍ.499 Interestingly one year after this fatwa amendment, the court 
overruled the old fatwa.500 
The issue of joint tenancy played out in court in Shafeeg bin Salim Talib and Anor v 
Fatimah bte Abud bin Talib and Ors (henceforth Shafeeg). The case concerned the 
property of an Obeidillah bin Salim bin Talib who passed away in 2005. He was a 
Muslim of Yemeni Arabic descent (his ethnicity being relevant to the court 
judgement). He left behind a wife – the joint tenant of the property – and two adult 
 
497 ‘Manner of Holding’. 
498 Kumpulan Fatwa, vol. 3 (Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 1998), 38. 
499 Office of the Mufti, ‘Fatwa on Joint Tenancy (2008)’ (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 2008), 
http://www.muis.gov.sg/cms/oomweb/fatwa.aspx?id=14386. 
500 Shafeeg bin Salim Talib and Another v Fatimah bte Abud bin Talib and Others, 2009, para. 68. 
Hooker questioned whether the originating summon for this case in 2007 led to the updated joint-
tenancy fatwa a year later. MB Hooker, ‘Succession to Muslim Estates in Singapore: Sources of Law 
and Choice of Law’, Australian Journal of Asian Law, 15.2 (2014), 1–34 (p. 28).  
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children. According to the inheritance certificate issued by the Syariah Court – and in 
accordance with the old fatwa – half of this property was to be given to the wife by 
virtue of matrimonial property,501 while the remainder was to be given to the 
deceased’s relatives in accordance with farāiḍ. As only Muslims are included under 
farāiḍ, his children were excluded because they had renounced Islam. The wife, who 
was the joint owner, instead claimed all of the property for herself under the right of 
survivorship, and then gave parts of it to her two children. 
This case was brought to the court by the relatives who were deprived of their share 
due to the wife’s claim. They argued that the deceased’s half-share should be 
distributed according to farāiḍ and obtained a state fatwa to support their proposition. 
The court document outlined the significance of the case: (emphasis mine) 
It is not in dispute that in a joint tenancy, upon the death of one joint tenant, 
his interest passes to the other joint tenants. The deceased’s interest cannot pass 
by will or intestacy and therefore it does not form part of his estate. In the 
present case, if the deceased and first defendant [i.e. the wife] were non-
Muslims, there would not be any dispute that the deceased’s interest in the 
Property had passed to the first defendant upon his death. The question is 
 
501 According to the Fatwa Committee, the half she received was due to the property being 
matrimonial property (harta sepencarian), but the first defendant claimed it under joint-tenancy right. 
Para. 18 of the judegment said: “The plaintiffs’ position is that it does and they rely on the Majlis 
ruling that “the [Property] is considered as a matrimonial property (harta sepencarian) as the 
deceased and his wife had jointly owned it. Therefore, half of the [Property] is considered as 
inheritance and should be distributed according to Islamic Inheritance law [i.e. farāiḍ]”. However this 
ruling does not pertain to a determination of the distribution of the estate of a Muslim person which is 
what section 112(1) provides for. The ruling purports to determine that half the Property belongs to 
the Estate. The question is whether, in relation to the Property which, during the deceased’s lifetime, 
was held by him as joint tenant with the first defendant, section 112 (or any other provision in AMLA 
or any other written law) has altered the common law right of survivorship.” 
Also in para. 65 of the appeal judgement: “A fatwa obtained by a private party for the purpose of 
court proceedings will not ordinarily have the same standing as a fatwa obtained by the court for 
various reasons. First, there is a likelihood that the party may frame a question based on assumed or 
hypothetical facts. The 2007 Fatwa given in the present case is a good example. The question…was 
misleading because it assumed the very question to be decided, ie, whether there was any half share in 
the Property that was still vested in the Deceased which could pass to the Estate. The 2007 Fatwa was 
given on that assumption, and it went further to provide a question which the Appellants had not 
asked, ie, whether the Property was harta sepencarian. The 2007 Fatwa ruled that the Property “is 
considered as a matrimonial property as the deceased and his wife had jointly owned it”, which is 
irrelevant as it had not been established that the Deceased was a Malay for the purposes of 
section 112(3) of AMLA. Furthermore, the 2007 Fatwa might also be inconsistent with the power of 
the court under section 112(3) of AMLA which provides that it is the (civil) court (and not MUIS) 
which is empowered to make a division of the harta sepencarian in such proportions as the court 
thinks fit.” See Shafeeg bin Salim Talib and another v Fatimah bte Abud bin Talib and others (Court 
of Appeal 18 March 2010). 
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whether the fact that the deceased and first defendant were Muslims changes 
the law…it would be necessary to consider the position of the AMLA in the law 
of Singapore.502 
The plaintiffs made two arguments to support their case. First, that the law on joint 
tenancy should be modified in this case because the deceased is a Muslim. However 
the judge rejected that, saying there was “no such provision [in written law] and the 
plaintiffs can only cite section 112(1) of the AMLA.”503 Section 112 stated that for 
“any Muslim person domiciled in Singapore dying intestate, the estate and effects shall 
be distributed according to the Muslim law as modified, where applicable, by Malay 
custom.” But since the deceased was not of Malay ethnicity, the judge deemed this 
section to be irrelevant to the case.504 
Secondly, the plaintiffs submitted that state fatwas should be adhered by the court, 
which instructed that the property should be distributed according to farāiḍ. The judge 
disagreed and mentioned at least two reasons for not doing so. One, that the fatwa was 
petitioned by the plaintiffs and was thus not directed at the court; and two, the judge 
felt the case was “not a question of Muslim law.”505 Essentially, the court was free of 
the fatwa’s instruction. 
The judge also cited an earlier case in 1990 in which a state fatwa was denied by the 
court. The case pertained to the CPF Act in which the court had rejected farāiḍ for a 
deceased Muslim’s CPF account – contrary to a state fatwa – and ruled that the 
deceased’s nomination of the account should be upheld.506 (This case will be detailed 
in the next section.) 
The most significant remark is reserved near the end of the court judgement, where 
the judge said: 
 
502 Shafeeg paragraphs 10–11. 
503 Shafeeg paragraph 18. 
504 Shafeeg paragraph 16. 
505 Shafeeg paragraph 21. 
506 In Saniah bte Ali v Abdullah bin Ali, the defendant, Saniah bte Ali, had inherited her step-brother’s 
CPF account following his death; she was earlier named as the sole nominee of the account. This was 
contested by the deceased’s brother, who produced a certificate of inheritance from the Syariah Court 
which stated that he was entitled to the estate. The civil court ruled in favour of the defendant. This 
case is explained in more detail below. 
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…I am unable to find anything in the AMLA, or any other primary and 
secondary legislation, which suggests that the common law right of 
survivorship in a joint tenancy should not apply to Muslims. 
This quote underlined the judge’s decision against the fatwa: when AMLA comes into 
conflict with civil law, a restricted reading of the legislation is preferred to reconcile 
the differences. While section 112 of AMLA clearly stated that Muslim properties are 
to be distributed according to Islamic inheritance law, the court viewed the civil law 
on right of survivorship was to be upheld. Though at first glance this might seem to 
be a controversial decision as it abrogated AMLA, a clearer explanation would be that 
the court had to interpret the two conflicting statutes – AMLA and the right of 
survivorship law – as literally as possible to reconcile interpretive differences. As a 
result, due to AMLA’s silence on the right of survivorship, and the civil law’s 
explicitness on it, the only rational outcome for the court was a literal one: to apply 
the right of survivorship on Muslims, despite the state fatwa saying otherwise. 
The case highlighted the reach of the civil court over religious issues, and specifically 
state fatwas, yet the nuances should not be understated. Firstly, the fatwa would have 
remained incontestable by the civil courts as long as it was adhered to by the intended 
recipients. Fatwas are undeniably pertinent in Muslim societies, even Muslim 
minorities in secular states like Singapore. Fatwas command a degree of compliance 
from Muslims due to their traditional-societal authority and entrenchment in everyday 
religious life. But if a fatwa was brought to court, it is then subject to legal conformity. 
Even though state fatwas are recognised in AMLA, they did not hold up when 
challenged in the domain of civil law, so much so that the newspaper report for the 
appeal judgement was headlined “General law will prevail over fatwa,”507 which was 
also a phrase used by the court.508 
Secondly, this case shows how civil courts interacted with state fatwas and 
demonstrated the legal limit of their formalised legal-bureaucratic authority. Although 
state fatwas are non-binding, they “may also have binding effect if accepted as basis 
for legal judgment by any Court in Singapore including the civil court.”509 In the 2009 
 
507 KC Vijayan, ‘General Law Will Prevail over Fatwa’, The Straits Times, 25 March 2010. 
508 Shafeeg paragraph 69. 
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high court judgement on the joint-tenancy case, the judge was cautious not to consult 
fatwas in his judgement because he did not view the case to be a matter of Muslim 
law. He declared: 
The plaintiffs urged me to make a… request [for a state fatwa] under 
section 32(7). I declined to do so because I am of the view that the issue I have 
to decide on, ie, whether half the Property belongs to the Estate, is not a 
question of Muslim law and section 32(7) is invoked only where a question of 
Muslim law falls to be decided.510 
Section 32(7) of AMLA, which the judge was referring to, stated: (emphasis mine) 
If in any court any question of the Muslim law falls for decision, and such court 
requests the opinion of the Majlis [i.e. Islamic Council of Singapore] on the 
question, the question shall be referred to the Legal Committee [i.e. the Fatwa 
Committee] which shall, for and on behalf and in the name of the Majlis, give 
its opinion thereon in accordance with the opinion of the majority of its 
members, and certify such opinion to the requesting court. 
The judge’s statement reflected his reluctance to petition a fatwa, lest it becomes a 
basis that might sway the court decision. In the 2010 appeal of the same case, the 
plaintiffs raised the question of state fatwas’ bindingness.511 The Court of Appeal 
effectively struck it down, and more significantly ordained that the fatwas are not 
binding to the court. Instead, they hold similar status to that of an expert opinion: 
A fatwa is a ruling on a religious issue in Islam given to any Muslim who asks 
for it. Its authority as advice or precept depends on the moral authority and 
standing of the religious leader giving the fatwa. But a fatwa issued on an issue 
of law is a scholarly opinion on what the Islamic law is on that issue. No fatwa 
is binding on the party seeking it or to whom it is directed, unlike a ruling of a 
judge on an issue in a case. For this reason, a fatwa stands in the same position 
as an expert opinion on any matter before the court and may be accepted in 
evidence on any issue of Muslim law on the same basis as an expert opinion 
 
510 Shafeeg paragraph 21. 
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on the civil law. The authority of that opinion must depend on the authority 
and learning of the person or institution giving the fatwa.512 
Evident in the statement above, the Court of Appeal ruled that the state fatwa is only 
as valid as the “moral authority and standing” of the fatwa issuer in court. Not only 
that, the judgement also clarified the legal authority of state fatwas in the court; the 
court is not obliged to consult them, and even if it does the fatwa itself is not binding. 
The judgement said: 
Section 32(7) of the AMLA merely provides that the Legal Committee shall 
give an opinion on an issue of Muslim law if requested by the court. It does 
not say that such an opinion is binding on the court if requested by the court.513 
In April 2008, the fatwa on joint tenancy was amended to be in line with civil law 
joint-tenancy contracts.514 It decreed that the surviving joint owner is allowed to inherit 
all of the property, similar to the concept of the right of survivorship. In technical 
religious terms, the fatwa invoked the instruments of nudhriyyah and hibah ruqbā (a 
conditional form of gift inter vivos) as religious justification. 
According to the fatwa: 
If no other arrangement or agreement has been made between the joint owners 
of a property, upon the death of one of the joint owners, the surviving joint 
owner will not have full ownership of the property. 
…If, however, other arrangements or agreements have been made between the 
joint tenants, either through a “hibah ruqba” (ruqba-gift) or a “nuzriah” (vow) 
which expressly states that the property is to be given wholly to the surviving 
joint tenant, in the event of death of one of the joint tenants, then the entire 
property shall vest in the surviving joint tenant. This is consistent with the 
present laws on joint-tenancy in Singapore.515 
However just like the irshād on nudhriyyah in the previous section, the amendment of 
the fatwa signalled the right of survivorship to be an alternative to the established 
instruments of Islamic inheritance law. This is because this amendment does not in 
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any way abrogate the initial fatwa that regarded joint owners as eligible for only the 
half-share of the property. The fatwa amendment also explicitly mentioned that joint 
survivorship applies only if “arrangements or agreements have been made between 
the joint-tenants,” indicating that the default position is still the original fatwa. This is 
further qualified by the customary caveat in inheritance fatwas, warning against 
vindictiveness in exercising the ‘right of survivorship’: 
The other heirs of the estate of the deceased cannot, however, compel the 
surviving joint tenant to sell the property until such time as it is suitable for the 
surviving joint tenant to sell it. At the same time, the surviving joint tenant 
cannot delay the sale of the property without reasonable grounds as it may 
encroach on the rights of other beneficiaries. 
As such, although the fatwa might have been amended to be more congruent with civil 
law, it is clear that the original fatwa still represents the principle position of the Fatwa 
Committee. 
3.3 CPF Nomination 
As mentioned above, the Fatwa Committee validated the right of survivorship in joint-
tenancy contracts through various Islamic legal instruments in 2008. In 2010, another 
inheritance fatwa was issued, this time on the compulsory savings and retirement 
account known as CPF. The fatwa allowed CPF account owners to nominate another 
person to inherit the money by recognising it as a religiously accepted instrument 
called hibah (gift inter vivos). 
In civil law, the CPF Act mandates that a CPF account holder is allowed to nominate 
one person who will inherit the money in the account at the account holder’s demise. 
However this nomination was not immediately recognised in state fatwas. In a 1971 
fatwa, a CPF nominee is considered a trustee and not a beneficiary.516 He or she will 
not inherit the money in the account as it will be distributed according to the traditional 
Islamic inheritance law, the farāiḍ. However in August 2010, the fatwa was amended 
to recognise the nomination as a valid financial instrument in Shariah by invoking 
hibah.517 The nominee, as such, will receive the money in the CPF account upon the 
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death of the account holder. Since the nomination is not religiously recognised as 
farāiḍ nor a Muslim will, the religious acknowledgement came in the form of hibah. 
This means that the state fatwa agrees with the legal status of the CPF. Yet the new 
ruling merely provides an alternative to the account holder because farāiḍ execution 
for CPF account is not totally abrogated by the fatwa. Rather, the new decree provides 
a choice for the account holder on how his wealth is distributed. So should the account 
holder decides to give away all his CPF money to the nominee, he has the option to 
do so through hibah. But the initial position that regarded the nominee as a trustee 
(and not beneficiary) still remains. 
The case that embodied this issue is Saniah bte Ali and others v. Abdullah bin Ali 
(henceforth Saniah), which played out in Singapore High Court in 1990. The case 
concerns Saleh bin Ali, a Muslim who died intestate. He had named his step-sister 
Saniah bte Ali – the plaintiff – as the nominee for his CPF account. According to the 
CPF Act, as the nominee Saniah would be the sole beneficiary of the account. 
However as the sole beneficiary, this would deprive the other heirs of the money in 
the account. The case was brought to court when the deceased’s brother Abdullah bin 
Ali – the defendant – argued that Saniah should act as a trustee, in line with the 1971 
fatwa. A variation of this fatwa was reproduced in a fatwa booklet which was used to 
support the defendant’s claim to the estate. 
The fatwa reads: 
According to the Islamic Law, a deceased’s Central Provident Fund [CPF] 
money constitutes part of his estate and thus must be divided amongst his 
beneficiaries and in accordance to the Islamic inheritance law. The person 
nominated by the member of the Central Provident Fund shall act only in the 
capacity of a “representative” [or trustee]. The nominee will not be entitled to 
anything unless he/she is one of the beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate as 
stipulated by the [Islamic] law of inheritance [i.e. farāiḍ].518 
This fatwa was however rejected by the presiding judge, who said: 
In my opinion, the fatwa is merely an opinion… and is not binding on this 
court which has full jurisdiction to decide on the matter in issue. What is before 
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me is not really a point of Muslim law… Though the parties in dispute are two 
Muslims, and their dispute is on the moneys paid out of the Fund on the death 
of a member who was a Muslim domiciled in Singapore, the true issue raised 
before me is which of the two parties is entitled to such moneys under the CPF 
Act and the AML Act, and not under any Muslim law. and the issue turns on 
the proper and true construction of sections 23 and 24 of the CPF Act and 
section 112(1) of the AML Act. For the reasons I have given and on the 
construction I have placed on sections 23 and 24 of the CPF Act and section 
112(1) of the AML Act, I cannot, with respect, accept the fatwa as correct.”519 
In the paragraph above, the judge rejected the bindingness of the fatwa. The defendant 
had argued that since the CPF Act came into effect in 1957, and AMLA came into 
effect in 1968, the latter repeals the former in matters concerning Islamic inheritance 
law. However the judge viewed that the relevant sections in the CPF Act were not 
“inconsistent with or repugnant to” AMLA.520 Specifically, the judge referred to 
sections 23 and 24 in the CPF Act which “treated a member’s moneys in the Fund as 
a species of property distinct and separate from the estate of the member… the moneys 
payable out of the Fund on the death of a member are specifically excluded from the 
estate of the deceased, and that being so, the moneys do not form part of the estate of 
the deceased member and are therefore not subject to section 112(1) of the AML 
Act.”521 
There were no immediate changes to the state fatwa following this verdict in 1990. 
One of the possible reasons for this was the ambiguity of the written civil law that still 
remained. As such in the decades following Saniah, religious questions on the CPF 
nominations were answered according to the original fatwa and not the court decision, 
i.e. the CPF nominee is a trustee of the CPF account, and not a recipient. This however 
changed when the CPF Act underwent several amendments between 2006 and 2010. 
These changes included explicit mention that if no nomination was made, then the 
CPF accounts of Muslims have to be distributed according to the Islamic intestate law 
in AMLA, i.e. farāiḍ. But if a nomination was made, and that means the CPF Act was 
invoked, then this would be prioritised over AMLA. As the changes gave precedence 
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to the CPF nomination over Islamic law, the amendment prevents CPF nomination 
from devolving into intestate property.522 
The amended state fatwa in 2010 considered this revised legislation and essentially 
gave a religious nod to the new law by applying the religious concept of hibah. In one 
stroke, CPF nomination was now a religiously accepted instrument. However this 
comes with a caveat seen also in similar fatwa amendments that circumvented the 
farāiḍ: 
“…CPF contributors must be aware that a nomination cannot be made with the 
intention and purpose of unfairly denying the rights of the other beneficiaries.” 
The Fatwa Committee – with its knowledge of state mechanisms – was aware of the 
legal ambiguity of its fatwa and thus resisted any changes to it. But once this ambiguity 
was removed, the state fatwa had to be reconsidered by providing additional options 
so that it does not run afoul of the law. Yet even as the fatwa changed, it remained the 
same by insisting on the farāiḍ over the new position, similar to previous examples 
cited in this chapter. 
4 State Fatwas in Civil Law 
4.1 Interpreting Legal Authority 
The episodes above demonstrated the limits of state fatwa’s legal authority. The legal 
recognition of fatwas through AMLA made them directly relevant to aspects of 
religious administration as well as the practice of Islamic family law. As Islamic 
family law interacts with other related legislations – such as civil inheritance law, the 
CPF Act and the joint-tenancy contract – state fatwas not only became a reference 
point for religious edicts that satisfy Muslim demands, but more importantly they 
inform how Islamic law is practised in the secular legal framework. In turn this 
allowed state fatwas to become a mode of negotiation with other key state appendages, 
not least the judiciary. 
Yet these negotiations are not merely a result of the fatwa provision in state legislation. 
The circumstances surrounding each event also deserve scrutiny. Even in authoritarian 
Singapore, written law remains a platform of contestation due to its inherent 
 
522 Also relevant to note here are the criticisms against the amended legislation. See Barry C Crown, 
‘Death and the Central Provident Fund: Legislatve Intervention: Central Provident Fund 
(Amendment) Act 2006, Section 12’, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 2007, 145–46. 
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ambiguities. As cases overlap between the demands of Islamic and civil laws, these 
ambiguities also culminate. State fatwas as legally-recognised religious instructions 
define and interpret the finer details of Islamic law in Singapore. The complications 
arose when the civil court disagreed with these interpretations, and vice versa. 
The civil court took a restricted interpretation of AMLA as it attempted to minimise 
legal conflicts between opposing pieces of legislation. The Fatwa Committee 
meanwhile read AMLA in more expansive light. It is apparent that the Fatwa 
Committee regarded AMLA as a starting point on how religious law should be applied 
in the state, and thus expanded its interpretation and applicability by introducing 
various religious instruments – such as nudhriyyah – which it argued is rooted in 
AMLA even through it was not explicitly mentioned there. 
The court’s restrictive approach could be seen in the resources it cited, the clearest 
perhaps in the nudhriyyah case in Mohamed Ismail. The court interpreted Islamic law 
through a selection of literature listed as authoritative in section 114(1) of AMLA, 
under the header ‘Proofs of Islamic Law’.523 Several of these books were specifically 
cited in the 2004 judgement as proof against the validity of nudhriyyah.524 Since 
nudhriyyah was not explicitly mentioned in the collection of Islamic law literature 
above, this was used to justify the court verdict that nudhriyyah was an invalid 
instrument. While the court rested its case on the exact literature mentioned in section 
114(1), the Fatwa Committee’s choice of literature on Islamic law went beyond that. 
They relied on a different set of literature as proof, specifically the Yemeni tradition 
of Islamic law which supports nudhriyyah.525 More importantly, they contradicted the 
expressly stated words in AMLA and challenged the enshrined references mentioned 
in section 114(1). 
The state fatwas said that nudhriyyah is a legally valid instrument because it is a 
derivative of nadhar, the latter which is mentioned in AMLA. According to AMLA, 
nadhar is valid with the explicit conditions of not exceeding more than one-third of 
the property, and not being allocated to heirs who are eligible for farāiḍ. Because the 
court took a restrictive interpretation of AMLA, it refused to recognise nudhriyyah. 
 
523 The immediate following sub-section also mentioned that: “(2) The Minister may on the advice of 
the Majlis by notification in the Gazette vary or add to the list of books set out in subsection (1).” 
524 Mohamed Ismail paragraph 54. 
525 Specifically, they relied on treatises such as Bughyat Al-Mustarshidīn [The Aspiration of the 
Seekers of Guidance] and Sharh Al-Yāqūt Al-Nafīs [Commentary on the Precious Ruby]. 
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The state fatwas meanwhile interpreted AMLA as a legal platform to realise the 
demands of Islamic law and not the final word on it. Nudhriyyah – seen as an extension 
of nadhar – was therefore a valid inheritance instrument, so much so that it does not 
even require the two conditions of nadhar. 
In the joint-tenancy and CPF nomination cases, state fatwas initially rejected the use 
of certain financial instruments – i.e. right of survivorship and account nomination – 
as a mode of Islamic inheritance. But this changed as the CPF system started to mature; 
many decades after it was introduced, the early generations of Singapore citizens who 
relied on CPF accounts began to pass away. This leads to more awareness on the issues 
surrounding the CPF account in inheritance, and questions on the validity of the 
various intestate options were explored. The need to minimise legal complications and 
ensure the relevance of Islamic law also became more pressing. The relevant state 
fatwas were amended and allowed these previously-unacknowledged instruments to 
be used by Muslims. This means that state fatwas have to accommodate civil law 
instruments. 
The initial reluctance to include these modes of inheritance in state fatwas, as well as 
the subsequent acceptance, reflected the predicament arising from civil court decisions 
and legal amendments. If state fatwas disregarded the legal consequences, then they 
would not only be repugnant to civil law, but might also be irrelevant because the civil 
courts have the ultimate say when presiding over religious matters. But if the fatwas 
were to simply embrace the court decisions at the expense of traditional religious 
positions, this would contradict the normative practice in Shariah and also undermine 
their informal traditional-societal authority particularly as farāiḍ remains the de facto 
practice among Muslims. As such, these court cases demonstrated the constant push-
pull negotiations between these institutions, and how state fatwas fought to remain 
legally relevant. 
A central factor behind these contestations is the interpretation of AMLA. It is safe to 
say that AMLA was originally designed to operate in harmony with secular law. Yet 
its interpretation differs between the Fatwa Committee and the civil courts. For the 
Fatwa Committee, AMLA is an exclusive statute for Muslims which is almost 
insulated from civil law. For the courts, AMLA is a statute that is subject to the greater 
secular civil law framework. When in doubt, the Fatwa Committee regards AMLA as 
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a regulation that can be expanded to fit the wider breadth of Islamic law. The courts 
however see AMLA a fixed representation of Islamic law that should be reconciled 
with the written demands of secular law. 
4.2 Informal Authority, Soft Law, and Statist Islam 
Aside from the established legal-bureaucratic embeddedness of state fatwas in the 
secular legal framework and their persistent negotiation of authority through informal 
means, these events also demonstrated the position that state fatwas play through 
policy feedback. As we have seen in previous events when state fatwas differed from 
state policies, they relied on their traditional-societal embeddedness to assert their 
position. Similarly for this chapter, the reliance of state fatwas on traditional-societal 
authority remained consistent. 
What is pertinent to note here is that what caused state fatwas to be brought to court 
was the initial state policy that regulates religious affairs through AMLA. This turned 
state fatwas into religious decrees with an official enough position to be taken 
seriously in the civil court. The observation of Islamic inheritance law, supported by 
state fatwas, differentiated the inheritance practice for Muslims and created a gap with 
the secular civil law. Yet over time this gap was bridged by attempts to unify the 
differences. While this can be regarded as an attempt to minimise the feedback effect 
of fatwas on civil law, a careful reading of the amended fatwas indicates that they play 
a reserved role in informing Muslim adherence to civil law. This is because the 
amended fatwas merely provided an alternative to the initial decrees, rather than 
changing the fatwas altogether to fit civil law requirements. 
Furthermore these cases highlighted novel ways in which religious instructions were 
asserted. Aside from rejoinders that tackled the court judgements in the newspaper, 
state fatwas were amended and irshāds were issued. Although these religious 
statements considered the views of the court, they did so by both acknowledging and 
contradicting the judgements, thereby exemplifying the soft law feature of state 
fatwas. Bearing in mind the previous chapter in which state fatwas negotiated against 
state demands, a similar pattern emerged here: when the formal legal-bureaucratic 




Because the hard law relevance of state fatwas was constrained by the court, they have 
little room to manoeuvre except by influencing the Muslim community directly. In 
some cases, Fatwa Committee members issued public rejoinders in the local 
newspaper. These commentaries not only addressed the court decision, but more 
importantly the subtext was that the fatwas were correct in the eyes of Shariah, despite 
the court saying otherwise. Then the relevant state fatwas were also reviewed, either 
through amendments or issuing fatwa-like statements (i.e. irshāds). Although the court 
decisions were considered in these decrees, it was not to an extent which undermined 
the original fatwa. 
In doing so, state fatwas reveal that they do not necessarily have to adhere to the 
‘official’ court-ruled interpretation of AMLA. Rather state fatwas can assert their 
unique interpretation and even stick to it when challenged by the court. Therein lies 
the soft law characteristic of state fatwas. But since soft law is complementary to hard 
law, and fatwas exhibited contradiction against AMLA, then what is the hard law 
reference of Singapore state fatwas? The answer can be found in the sources that 
fatwas used to justify their position. These cases showed that state fatwas do not 
necessarily rely on court-approved books and tomes, or even established ones in 
classical Islamic tradition. Instead, as I pointed out earlier, they referred to a unique 
set of references that is derived from the Yemeni Muslim legal tradition. This means 
that state fatwas are shaped by their unique legal history and heritage, and for the case 
of Singapore it is distinct enough even from its closest neighbour Malaysia. It shows 
that in inheritance law, the hard law reference of Singapore state fatwas is not the legal 
statute AMLA, nor a generic form of Islamic law, and not even that of a major school 
of thought. Rather the hard law reference of Singapore state fatwas is unique and 
rooted in the development of a particular Islamic legal tradition derived from the 
primary Islamic sources, and this holds true for state fatwas of many countries too. 
This summarises the role of state fatwas in defining the legal position of religious 
praxis in the state and shaping Statist Islam. In courts, state fatwas function to 
negotiate the legal boundaries of religious praxis. Even as legal proceedings led to 
their amendments, state fatwas were still able to temper the directives of civil law by 
providing options within the fatwa itself. Those who want to adhere to civil law were 
not admonished, just as those who choose the preferred traditional position were given 




This chapter has examined how state fatwas prevailed even when they were being 
legally challenged. The fatwas under consideration within this chapter effectively 
intersect between religious tradition and secular legislation. By being a nodal point 
between Islamic law and civil law, state fatwas gained the privilege of informing how 
exactly Islamic law applies in Singapore’s secular legal framework. 
Following from the bureaucratic authority of state fatwas discussed in the previous 
chapter, this chapter investigated their legal authority. Both of these legal and 
bureaucratic links formalised the authority of state fatwas by connecting them to the 
greater structural relevance of the secular state. This chapter argued that as AMLA 
made fatwas legally relevant, this legal recognition can be affected by court rulings. 
As a contingency, state fatwas can assert informal traditional-societal authority 
directly on the Muslim community, something that operates beyond the court’s reach. 
This is significant because it allows state fatwas (or other fatwa-like statements) to 
challenge court judgements. 
With regards to the wider argument developed in this thesis, these episodes reflect the 
legal extent of fatwas’ policy feedback, as well as the shaping of Statist Islam through 
informal soft law. I have shown that even as AMLA was endorsed as the hard law 
instrument that justified religious rulings, state fatwas also contested (or at the very 
least expanded) the explicit expressions of AMLA. This is because the form of hard 
law that Singapore state fatwas are based on is not AMLA, rather a unique form of 
Islamic legal tradition that differs even from the neighbouring countries (with whom 
religious heritage is very similar). This unique religious legal tradition manifests 
through state fatwas which promotes a distinctive form of Islamic praxis in the 
country, and expressed in Statist Islam. 
I presented three court cases where state fatwas were challenged in the civil court. In 
each of these cases, the court judgement went against the fatwa. Because this 
challenged the formalised legal authority of state fatwas, they relied on informal 
linkages in order to exert their relevance. Almost similar to previous patterns, the 
newspaper became a platform to challenge court decisions. In addition to that, 
religious decrees were also issued as irshāds and not fatwas, thereby creating 
additional vehicles for religious instructions to be disseminated. By not calling these 
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decrees fatwas, the irshād provided an alternative platform for the Fatwa Committee 
to rule on controversial issues, which then shifted attention away from actual fatwas 
and shielded them from criticism. 
As the fatwas’ impact in court were deemed non-binding, they had to be amended to 
take into account the court decisions in order to retain relevance to secular-legal 
precedents. Yet these amendments upheld the position of original fatwas, and at the 
same time introduced alternative practices in the updated religious decrees, thereby 
‘harmonising’ the religious-secular differences. 
In a statement addressing the difference between secular inheritance law and Islamic 
inheritance law, the Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs noted: (emphasis mine) 
“The guiding principles to deal with these [legal] issues are clear. First, the 
Fatwa Committee will continue to develop fatwas that are beneficial to the 
community… Second, the fatwas will try to minimize any gaps or perceived 
contradictions between civil and Muslim law. Third, the Fatwa Committee will 
continue to adopt a progressive approach when deliberating on fatwas, keeping 
abreast of the latest developments in both Islamic and civil laws… The Fatwa 
Committee will also learn from other legal systems on how harmonization is 
being carried out…”526 
This ‘harmonisation’ is not a clear-cut case that prioritises a set of law over the other. 
Instead, as argued in this chapter, despite attempts to ensure that parallel sets of law 
do not contradict each other, state fatwas can still rely on their soft law application to 
circumvent hard law court judgements. Therefore attempts at ‘harmonisation’ do not 
necessarily end up in consonance; the air of dissonance is still heard. Secular law might 
have prevailed over state fatwas in court, but as I have argued the fatwas’ traditional 
religious positions still persist over court judgements. As a result, the legal restrictions 
reflect a way in which Statist Islam is shaped in Singapore, one which constantly 
requires the re-shaping of religious demands not only through state policies, but also 
legal judgements. 
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Indeed the fast-changing world presents constant challenges to traditional religious 
interests. These challenges originate not only from local actors but also those abroad, 
thanks to the ubiquity of the internet and social media. In the next chapter, we shall 
see how the informal authority of state fatwas are formalised in order to regulate 




Chapter 6: Managing Internet Fatwas: Formalising Informal 
Authority 
1 Introduction 
I have illustrated how state fatwas negotiate state policies and court judgements. When 
included in the policymaking process, state fatwas became the reason for religious 
exemption in a national state policy. But when they were not formally consulted, state 
fatwas relied on informal traditional-societal authority to challenge state decisions. I 
have also shown how state fatwas became entangled in civil court cases. In all these 
examples, while leveraging on formalised legal-bureaucratic authority to engage the 
political and legal bodies, state fatwas maintained a distinct engagement with the 
Muslim community through their traditional-societal religious authority. This 
displayed how they operate at several levels of segregation with various segments of 
their audience in order to effectively assert the suitable form of authority. 
In this chapter, I will investigate the contestation of state fatwas’ traditional-societal 
authority which leads to the strengthening of their legal-bureaucratic authority. The 
contestations to be examined in this chapter originate from the Muslim society itself. 
It is here that I will scrutinise how the internet opened up various channels that allowed 
various segments of the Muslim society, both domestic and overseas, to engage with 
and challenge state fatwas. Consequently as the state (and religious bureaucracy) 
attempted to fend off overseas decrees and fatwas that call for violent extremism, the 
position of state fatwas were reinforced to preserve the local brand of religious praxis. 
I argue that these measures not only demonstrated the extensive reach of state fatwas 
to legitimise local norms and discredit foreign ones, but also forced their acceptance 
among religious teachers by formalising their relationship with them. Doing so 
involves the policing of religious classes throughout the country by expanding the 
legal role of state fatwas (and religion). 
If earlier chapters argued that state fatwas circumvented state policies and legal 
decisions by relying on their informal religious authority, this chapter will demonstrate 
the contrary: how formal bureaucratic and legal control is exploited to expand fatwas’ 
religious authority. I will look at the various measures imposed by the religious 
bureaucracy to discredit foreign radical fatwas.  
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The centralisation of fatwa issuance created a single avenue for religious queries and 
enabled a single body of religious experts – the Fatwa Committee – to issue official 
religious instructions. State fatwas consequently became a highly sought-after form of 
religious instruction and the main reference point for religious queries in Singapore. 
Yet the growth of internet use in recent times created new challenges for state fatwas. 
Unfettered online access enabled the exchange of information, including religious 
questions and answers. Various fatwa issuers became adept at using the internet to 
spread religious views to new audiences across new borders. Among these new actors 
are radical groups that call for religious extremism and violence. Concerns over 
national security compels the state to ensure that the significance of state fatwas is 
protected. 
The secular state can become a target for religious extremists due to the very nature of 
its political system. State fatwas can however deter such justifications by providing 
religious rebuttals, but more importantly their bureaucratic link represents a tacit 
legitimising symbol for the secular state. This link implies tolerance, if not co-
operation, between the sacred and secular, and blurs the binary narrative of secular-
religious conflict. Another common justification for terror attacks against the state is 
its military collaboration – the so-called “crusader coalition” – with the US.527 This is 
one the reasons why Singapore – a non-Muslim secular state in a Muslim-majority 
area – has been described as an “iconic target” for terrorists.528 
Measures were taken to deter such attacks from home-grown radicalised individuals. 
This includes directly and indirectly bolstering the authority of state fatwas through 
weekly Friday sermons that discredit extremist ideas, as well as creating a new 
accreditation system for religious teachers which makes it compulsory for local 
religious teachings to be in line with state fatwas. This marks one of the most 
significant development in the formalisation of religious authority in recent times; it 
formalises fatwas’ informal relationship to religious teachers by mandating their 
adherence. This also demonstrates the extent of feedback effect that entrenches the 
legal authority of state fatwas, and empowers them to directly and authoritatively 
inform Statist Islam. 
 





After this opening statement, my argument will be structured as follows: the next part 
will provide a brief conceptual discussion of religious authority and the internet. The 
following section will then illustrate how mass media have changed the landscape of 
religious authority, and the ways various religious elites have attempted to curb the 
intrusion of new religious influences that pose a challenge to them. I will then examine 
the dissemination of radical fatwas and scrutinise the measures taken in Singapore to 
reject them, which ultimately reinforced the authority of state fatwas. The two 
measures I focus on are Friday sermons and a new law that regulates Islamic religious 
teachers called the Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS). The final part will conclude 
with the assessment that these measures underline the unprecedented function of state 
fatwas in regulating religious knowledge in a secular state. 
2 Religious Authority and the Internet 
The internet has facilitated the spread of a wide range of opinions as well as diverse 
views on almost any issue. As a result, anyone can easily justify their religious position 
simply by searching and citing online content, a phenomenon known as fatwa-
shopping.529 The vast majority of fatwa-shopping concerns religious rituals or 
theological debates, and therefore lies outside the interest of the state. However since 
online fatwas and decrees come from many sources and address many topics, fatwa-
shopping can also provide an opportunity to justify political opposition, or even worse 
acts of violence. This free flow of information could therefore pose security concerns, 
especially for an authoritarian state which normally regulates potential platforms of 
contestation. 
As such there has been no lack of attempt by the state to regulate internet content, even 
if it is extremely difficult, if not impossible. In China for example, certain search 
providers and social media websites are blocked and users are channelled to local 
state-sanctioned alternatives. Meanwhile Turkey is known to periodically block social 
media sites and even messaging applications especially during times of political 
uncertainty. Many countries are also known to block access to pornographic 
websites.530 Yet despite these restrictions, internet users have found ways to access 
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blocked information, typically by rerouting access via internet proxies, or encrypting 
their virtual presence using special programmes and applications. It is therefore almost 
impractical to restrict access to specific internet content. 
As the internet becomes a convenient platform to share and spread ideas, it also results 
in the flourishing of religious opinions and influences online. The internet has 
undeniably facilitated a more ‘democratic’ process that engages with those in power, 
including religious authorities.531 These engagements can morph into contestations 
that threaten existing structures of authority, as the introduction chapter of this thesis 
demonstrated when the Singaporean extremist, through a video spread via the internet, 
threatened Western targets and called Muslims to join the radical cause. Exploiting 
the media to contest power is however not new. The free flow of information has 
always created new challenges against the traditional assumptions of religious 
authorities. The introduction of new forms of media over the ages – print publication, 
radio and television broadcast, and the internet – threatened the role of traditional 
figures of religious scholarship, the ulama, who found that they no longer possess the 
exclusive claim to religious interpretation. For example, Sufism – credited with the 
spread of Islam in Southeast Asia – has long been the predominant authority presiding 
in local religious institutions.532 At the rise of politico-religious contestations in the 
early 20th century, those who wanted to challenge the dominance of these state-
affiliated religious elites utilised new channels of media, notably print publication, to 
disseminate their ideas in the Malay world. 
A key reason for the establishment of a centralised fatwa body in Singapore was to 
enable local religious elites to issue their own religious decrees for local consumption, 
rather than having Muslims obtain fatwas from abroad.533 Today, the ubiquity of the 
internet allows almost anyone to access alternative fatwas that challenge state fatwas. 
While the rise of print and mass media was viewed with great suspicion by religious 
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elites and fatwa issuers (as I shall explain later), the so-called new media – the internet 
– has given rise to even more complications, especially as it reaches unprecedented 
levels of penetration and interactivity between content producers and consumers. 
This is further complicated by the fact that Sunni Islamic religious authority has no 
centralised system on the global scale akin to the papacy. In the current nation-state 
system, the closest that a religious institution can get to a centralised system is by 
aligning themselves to political authority such as the government of a state or country, 
which typically results in its embeddedness in a complex legal-bureaucratic network. 
Whether political authorities subsume these religious institutions, or allow it to operate 
with democratic features, the existence of an Islamic religious bureaucracy is largely 
contingent on political authority. By being situated between the state that it advises 
and the society that it instructs, the bureaucratised religious institution becomes a 
conduit for religious consultation and societal instruction. 
The religious bureaucracy also overlaps with political and legal authority, and presents 
itself as what Mandaville has termed the “centre-periphery” of religious authority.534 
Mandaville refers to centre-periphery to depict the hybridity occurring within Islam 
between the centre of Islamic knowledge in the Middle East and the peripheral Islamic 
societies located elsewhere. However the term centre-periphery here is borrowed to 
mean the relationship between the centre of Islamic religious authority today – which 
is the religious bureaucracy including the fatwa institution – and the Muslim society 
at its periphery. While the religious bureaucracy has arguably been the ‘centre’ of 
religious authority which instructs the ‘peripheral’ Muslim society, this dichotomy is 
not exempt from the geographical and institutional reconfiguration brought about by 
the internet, which expands the role of ‘peripheral’ actors across new societies and 
borders, creates new arenas of contestation, and challenges the ‘central’ authority of 
traditional religious institutions. 
In general, studies on religion and the internet have examined the engagement of 
various religious communities online, the effects on identity construction, and the 
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changing boundaries of a ‘community’.535 These were largely based on a binary 
assumption of the outcome: that these processes lead to either a desirable utopian result 
that creates a democratic and civil engagement between various religious 
interpretations, or a dystopian consequence that deepens cleavages between groups 
and incites hostility.536 Literature concerning Islamic religious authority on the internet 
has not escaped this postulation as well, as I shall explain below. 
The abundance of online religious opinions and fatwas has levelled the playing field 
and facilitated fatwa-shopping, in which a religious position could simply be justified 
by choosing from a wide range of online fatwas. There is no shortage of religious (or 
pseudo-religious) opinions which justify traditionally forbidden acts in the Islamic 
belief, such as consuming intoxicants or even engaging in militant activities, all which 
can be found online without much effort. The rise of these religious opinions signals 
the ‘decentralisation’ of Islamic religious authority, which, Bund cautions should be 
seen “in conjunction with shifting frameworks associated with religious authority, 
including concepts associated with decentralization from the traditional locations of 
`ulama’ power.”537 The internet therefore affects Islamic religious authority in more 
ways than one. ‘New’ religious opinions or fatwas do not necessarily have to be overt 
in challenging traditional religious authority, but could also subtly affect changes that 
“potentially introduce ‘relativism’ into religious authority.”538 This changes the nature 
of ‘traditional’ religious authority, and enables a Muslim to determine his or her own 
degree of adherence to religious norms and practices “without having to abide by the 
restraints of group participation” in real life. 539 In this context, it further leads to the 
“desacralization” of religious practices,540 by selecting elements from practices that 
were initially observed as a whole. As religion becomes desacralised, religious 
practices become trivialised in everyday life. As a consequence, this might also push 
 
535 For an overview of this, see: Heidi Campbell, ‘Internet and Religion’, The Handbook of Internet 
Studies 11 (2011): 232–50; Heidi Campbell, ‘Who’s Got the Power? Religious Authority and the 
Internet’, Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication 12, no. 3 (2007): 1043–62. 
536 Morten T Højsgaard and Margit Warburg, Religion and Cyberspace (Psychology Press, 2005); 
Douglas E Cowan, Cyberhenge: Modern Pagans on the Internet (Routledge, 2004). 
537 Gary Bunt, IMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2009), 278. 
538 Roxanne D Marcotte, ‘Fatwa Online’, Political Islam and Global Media: The Boundaries of 
Religious Identity, 2016, 239. 
539 Mohammed El-Nawawy, Islam Dot Com: Contemporary Islamic Discourses in Cyberspace 
(Springer, 2009), 239. 




some religious followers who, in order to compensate for what they deem as Muslims’ 
departure from religious tradition, adopt fundamentalist interpretations. As Turner 
claims, these online contestations could also create an “inflationary expansion of 
claims to purity and strictness that has a compulsory upward trajectory”, and as a result 
“push Islam towards a fundamentalist view of law that is incompatible with customary 
arrangements and prescriptions.”541 
Be the outcome utopian or dystopian, what underlines both these sets of claims is one 
thing: the significance of religious authority. The proliferation of online fatwas led 
some observers to describe the phenomenon as a “crisis of authority” on the internet,542 
in which multiple fatwa issuers – despite disparity between their training and 
qualification – vie for religious authority in a chaotic domain. As Muslims attempt to 
reproduce and recontextualise familiar settings “in locations far remote from those in 
which they were originally embedded,” this would result in a “new form of imagined 
community, or a reimagined umma”.543 
The literature above has discussed the rise of online fatwas, the fatwa-shopping 
phenomenon, and their ramification on the Muslim identity. In this chapter, however, 
I am going to risk a less speculative assumption by taking the argument back to how 
state-linked religious institutions attempt to wrest back religious authority from these 
‘new’ actors in an unfamiliar domain. While it might be true that old and new media 
have produced the “systematization of Islamic thought…outside the traditional 
sources of authority”,544 this chapter argues that traditional structures of authority still 
persist through various formalised and informal means. One way these traditional 
sources or structures preserve their authority is by creating narratives that dismiss 
these ‘new’ fatwas. This is done by emphasising state fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic 
authority and employing hard law measures which guarantee adherence through legal 
coercion. 
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3 Managing Religious Authority in the Media 
3.1 Print Media 
I will now trace the development of mass media with particular reference to Islamic 
religious elites. As fatwas are religious instructions communicated to the masses, they 
are also picked up by newspapers, radio and television programmes, and the internet. 
These media platforms help to disseminate fatwas but they also act as a double-edged 
sword; as they facilitate fatwas’ dissemination, they also enable their contestation. 
The relationship between religion and the media has always been complicated. When 
Benedict Anderson explored the origins of national consciousness, he credits the 
impact of “print-capitalism” for the success of the Reformation movement.545 
Protestantism also rose due to its exploitation of print media to mobilise for “politico-
religious purposes”.546 The utilisation of print media by religious groups was also 
successfully replicated by pioneering Islamic religious reformists – i.e. the Islamists – 
at the turn of the 20th century, which helped them to circumvent the traditionalists’ 
monopoly of mainstream media platforms at the time. 
When print media became popular in Egypt in the 1800s, the ulama or religious 
scholars viewed its introduction with suspicion.547 Before print media, they would earn 
their living by hand-copying old religious manuscripts into new books. Not only that, 
they would also interpret and explain these texts to the Muslim masses. When print 
media emerged, it affected not only the traditional livelihood of these ulama, but also 
risked diminishing their scholarly importance as it was feared that this could lead to 
careless transmission of religious texts by commercial printers.548 Print media would 
therefore bypass their traditional-societal relevance since readers were not necessarily 
interested in the ulama’s explanation and interpretation of the texts. Rather, especially 
among the rich, these printed scriptures became collector’s items.549 With their role as 
the interpreter of the sacred texts compromised, these texts would also be relegated as 
traded goods, thereby weakening their religious authority. 
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To avoid the breakdown of “textual authority”, the ulama pushed for the establishment 
of a religious body consisting of qualified scholars who would be responsible for 
printing religious books and journals.550 This was contingent clearly on their good 
relationship with the state. Yet as some ulama were wary of print media, others were 
quick to take advantage of it.551 There were other religious elites who filled the demand 
for originality by being authors and editors.552 Others took advantage of mass 
publication by promoting their religious agendas unto the masses, most notably by the 
likes of reformists/Islamists such as Rashid Rida, who founded the journal Al-Manar. 
Rida himself had a background in journalism and religious studies and operated from 
Cairo, which was then the “new-media hothouse” owing to advent of Arabic 
mechanical print.553 
Rida’s media-centred activism and quick adaptation of print publication inspired 
others to do the same.554 This idea of using print publication to disseminate religious 
ideas was taken up by his counterparts in Southeast Asia – known as the Kaum Muda 
(Young Faction) as discussed in Chapter 3 – namely Sheikh Muhammad Tahir 
Jalaluddin and Syed Sheikh al-Hadi. They came up with the Singapore-based journal 
Al-Imam (1906-1908) as a media platform for Islamist reformist ideas.555 This later 
continued with the Penang-based journal Al-Ikhwan (1926-1930), and the newspaper 
Saudara (1928-1941). These publications included fatwas from Egypt which 
supported religious reformism, especially as it lent credence to their agenda. 
These efforts encountered several challenges fronted by the religious traditionalists 
known as the Kaum Tua (Old Faction), who viewed them as a counter-current to 
existing religious practices in Malaya. Some of the measures to contain these new 
ideas included denouncing them in newspaper columns and issuing fatwas against 
their teachings.556 More notably, the connections of the Kaum Tua to the political 
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authority also allowed them to enact legislation that prohibited the spread of reformist 
ideas and publications, so much so that any religious teachings or publications without 
prior permission faced serious penalties.557 The pulpit was also regulated to prevent 
messages that challenged traditional religious practices,558 a key agenda of the Kaum 
Muda. All this meant that the movement of religious teachers who brought ‘new’ 
religious influences that contest the status quo was severely restricted. These measures 
taken by the religious bureaucracy at the time are very similar to how the current 
religious bureaucracy in Singapore attempts to restrict the inflow of online fatwas from 
abroad. As we shall see later, formalised legal-bureaucratic authority is invoked to 
preserve state fatwas and discredit those that contradict them. Not only was the pulpit 
utilised, but legal measures were introduced by mandating the accreditation of 
religious teachers in Singapore, which aims to standardise the content of religious 
teaching and restrict the spread of unapproved religious content. 
3.2 Radio and Television Broadcast 
Over time, print media was supplemented by radio broadcast. And just like how print 
media was met with suspicion, there was a distrust among the ulama over initial radio 
broadcast. Events in Saudi Arabia reflected the apprehension of these religious elites. 
In the 1940s when the Saudi Arabian king Abdulaziz Al-Saud wanted to introduce 
radio stations, he had to broadcast Quranic recitations as a way to attract the ulama’s 
approval.559 This paved the way for acceptance among religious elites, and before 
long, religious programmes became common on Saudi Arabian airwaves as well as 
other Muslim-majority countries. These forms of mass media allowed Muslims to 
interact with muftis in ways never before imagined. Fatwas, which used to be private 
one-to-one consultation with a mufti, were now publicly aired on radio and even 
changed certain cultural attitudes. Messick described how women engaged radio 
fatwas more actively than men, which also shaped the types of fatwa broadcast on 
radio.560 
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Despite these developments, the real ‘democratisation’ of mass media began with the 
advent of satellite television. Compared to state radio and television stations which 
were highly regulated, satellite television allowed religious programming from private 
companies. The nature of satellite television also enabled these programmes to reach 
audiences beyond its original border. 
When satellite television was first introduced in the Middle East, the religious 
authorities there had initially declared them impermissible.561 Among the reasons for 
this was that satellite television channels, unlike state-run television broadcast, was 
free from any form of censorship. Furthermore international religious programmes, 
especially those featuring charismatic Muslim preachers, could also threaten the 
religious authority of the local state-sanctioned religious bodies. These religious 
programmes, as I shall explain later, promote political and religious views that could 
contest a “nationally defined Islam”.562 
Despite that, satellite television grew exponentially and even impacted the way 
religious programmes were broadcast. Because they rely heavily on advertisement 
revenues, satellite television stations are closely attuned to consumer demands. This, 
in turn, empowered the viewers and affected the content of television programmes, 
including religious ones. Echchaibi noted: 
“…in order to appeal to a more media-saturated audience, religious producers 
are flaunting their skills by making religious preaching less shabby and 
threatening. The on-screen graphics and studio sets are comparable to 
entertainment television, making religion a cool commodity for 
consumption.”563 
In essence, the highly commercialised nature of satellite television changed the way 
religious programmes are presented. Some of these religious satellite television 
channels were observed to have changed their programming grid to “include contests, 
documentaries, live audience talk shows, children’s cartoons and a series of lifestyle 
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programmes,” which are hosted by “well-known, stylish Egyptian actresses who quit 
their ‘impure’ acting career to become ‘light’ preachers”.564 The themes of these 
religious programmes also became varied, “from sentimental and medical advice to 
women’s rights in marriage.”565 
Satellite television not only produced popular religious programmes, but also created 
Muslim televangelists. While states generally welcome the “depoliticisation of Islam” 
through religious entertainment in these programmes, their consequences are viewed 
with caution. This is because satellite television programmes are not restricted to 
national borders, and lead to the “transnationalisation of religious authority” which 
challenges a “nationally defined Islam”.566 In other words, the popularity of these 
programmes turned them into a powerful platform to challenge an established form of 
Statist Islam in Arabic countries, which has preserved the endurance of their political 
rulers. A key example of contestation through satellite television programmes is 
Aljazeera’s weekly show called Al-Shari`ah Wal-Ḥayah (Shariah and Life) which 
featured the Islamist ideologue Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. The Qatar-based religious scholar 
is a very popular religious figure whose programme attracted an estimated 35 million 
viewers per week.567 Not only is he a prominent critique of authoritarian Arab regimes, 
he is also considered the spiritual figure of Islamist political opposition. During the 
Arab Spring, he provided religious justification for the uprising and was welcomed in 
Egypt after Hosni Mubarak’s downfall.568 
In many ways, the changes that satellite television made to the consumption of 
religious content is testament to the shaping of a ‘nationally defined Islam’. In relation 
to my thesis, however, there is a key difference between what constitutes this 
‘nationally defined Islam’ and Statist Islam. A national form of Islam should not solely 
represent state interest, but also capture the more deliberative aspects of state-religious 
dynamics, as illustrated in how the Saudi Arabian king appealed to the ulama to 
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approve radio programmes. Statist Islam is a more accommodative concept that 
amalgamates various aspects of state-religious relations. In order to preserve a 
normative form of local religious praxis, the state has a vested interest in ensuring the 
continued relevance of the local ulama and state fatwas, which contributes to the 
endurance of the ruling government. This also means that state-aligned religious elites 
are placed at an advantageous position to assert their authority and affect state 
decisions, as my thesis has demonstrated thus far. 
3.3 The Internet 
As the ulama viewed the advent of print media, radio, and television with suspicion, 
it is no surprise that when the internet was first introduced, religious authorities gave 
a disapproving opinion, especially given the limited role of the state in censoring its 
content.569 However compared to satellite television, Al-Kandari and Dashti found that 
the initial fatwas on the internet were “almost equally divided” between those 
supporting and rejecting it, although opinions against internet softened over the 
years.570 
When the internet was in its early years, the ‘Islamic presence’ online was largely 
limited to practical information catering to Muslims living in Western countries, such 
as information on prayer times and location of mosques.571 Over time, official 
religious institutions – including established ones such as Egypt’s Al-Azhar and 
prominent individual ulama – began to make their online presence felt.572 At this time, 
Islamist movements also began to sprout online, “mostly devoted to criticizing the 
Arab and Islamic regimes.”573 As the internet gradually became a more essential form 
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of communication, it also turned into a platform for the spread of local and 
transnational fatwas.574 
These fatwas were especially important for Muslims who have limited access to 
reputable muftis, typically those in non-Muslim majority countries. These fatwas were 
useful in instructing overseas Muslims on acts of daily worship, and providing 
religious guidance on socio-religious issues as a minority citizen. Fatwas – even 
unofficial ones – therefore function to preserve a form of religious norm even in a 
foreign environment, which demonstrates their role in shaping an authoritative form 
of religious praxis. Online fatwas mark a form of “de-territorialisation” as Muslims 
living overseas looked for answers online against forms of ‘westernisation’ that 
encroach upon the Muslim life.575 While Olivier Roy uses the term “de-
territorialisation” in the context of Islamists who physically cross over state borders,576 
Echchaibi refers to the “de-territorialisation” of fatwas as “a sign of peaceful identity 
protest” coming from religious “individualist revivalists”.577 According to Echchaibi, 
this happens as the “pious middle classes are extending patterns of religious 
expression,”578 which creates a demand for fatwas, just like how the commercialised 
demands of modern Muslim consumption perpetuate more religious satellite television 
programmes. 
Examining fatwas therefore indicates a contemporary necessity of the Muslim society 
and helps to locate the symbolic authority of Muslims on the internet. This relates to 
what Mandaville referred earlier to as the examination of the “centre-periphery” of the 
Muslim community as religious institutions wrestle to become the reference point that 
bridges between the core and the periphery in the discursive spaces of the internet. 
Online fatwas address many issues and can come from many sources. Among them 
are radical groups which issue decrees inciting acts of violence, a subject that this 
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chapter focuses on. However I must note here that the popularity of such fatwas among 
Muslims are low. In fact the most popular form of online religious sources “are not 
the militant ones, but those promoting a moral renewal of the individual.”579 This is 
also supported by the finding that political religious messages “risk positioning 
Muslims in their particularities at a higher level.”580 In order to capture a larger, 
transnational audience, “a high degree of abstract reasoning is required.”581 In other 
words, online sources that address very specific issues such as militancy and 
radicalism are not quite relevant (nor appealing) to the day-to-day Muslim life and 
therefore attract a very limited audience. However online religious sources that touch 
on generalisable issues such as spirituality and acts of worship are simply more 
relatable to Muslim audiences of varying political contexts, thus making them more 
popular. This, however, does not mean that radical fatwas deserve less scrutiny, 
because even one individual who takes it seriously can pose grave danger to the society 
that he or she lives in. As such the state and state-linked religious bodies simply have 
to give more attention to these radical decrees and take measures to curb their 
influence. 
4 Regulating Religious Influences 
Fatwas fulfil the demand for religious instructions, which become more pressing in 
global political events. One example is war, the very nature of which compels many 
people to take a stand and voice their convictions even if it does not directly affect 
them. Combined with the demand for religious opinions in such events, fatwas became 
an international religious phenomenon. Fatwa issuers thus hold the power to interpret 
the ‘Islamic view’ on war. I have mentioned that Haddad’s examination of fatwas on 
the Gulf War shows their disparity according to their affiliation.582 Fatwa bodies tied 
to countries allied to the US tend to support the war, while independent institutions 
and those linked to Islamist groups opposed it. Examples such as these lead to claims 
that fatwas are exploited to justify the political position of their parent entity, and in 
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doing so contributed to the deepening fissure between the state and the religious 
opposition. 
The subsequent US invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein led to a power 
vacuum that resulted in the flourishing of militant Islamist groups. More recent events 
in Syria enabled these groups to gain territory there. As these groups’ existence rely 
on religious legitimacy, they also issued fatwas and religious decrees to justify their 
agenda. There were fatwas calling Muslims all over the world to join the radical group 
known as the Islamic State (IS),583 or to commit attacks in Western countries,584 all of 
which were couched in religious terms. These were then spread via the most 
convenient way possible: the internet. As these ideas cross beyond the borders of their 
authors, it forces localised religious bodies to address them. As such, it is very 
pertinent to look at how state fatwas wrestle religious authority amidst the muddle of 
online fatwas. 
In many countries such as Saudi Arabia,585 Jordan,586 Turkey,587 and India,588 fatwas 
were issued against violent extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the IS. In addition 
to fatwas, other channels of dissemination were also utilised. For example, the 
Egyptian state fatwa institution Dar Al-Iftaa published a downloadable book in 2014 
titled The Ideological Battlefield to disprove radical ideas. This is in addition to 
numerous books and treatises by prominent religious leaders that condemned acts of 
terror.589 
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Religious pronouncements also came in the form of collective statements that 
challenge militant fatwas. These are usually issued by a group of ulama. While state 
fatwas are typically directed towards the domestic audience, combined statements 
merge the influence of both prominent state-affiliated and independent ulama and 
cater to a transnational audience, which make them more appealing to the masses. An 
example is the Amman Message issued in 2004. It condemned religious sectarianism 
brought by militant groups and was endorsed by some 500 Muslim political and 
religious elites worldwide. Another collective statement is the Mardin Declaration, 
which reviewed a well-known classical fatwa on the imperativeness of armed jihad 
(religious struggle).590 The Mardin Declaration addressed a famous fatwa by the 14th 
century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, which is often quoted by extremists to justify religious 
militancy. The declaration stated that the classical fatwa has been erroneously cited 
and did not actually support armed jihad.591 Another example of a collective religious 
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statement is the Letter to Baghdadi. Published in September 2014, it was issued as an 
open letter to the IS leader who had called on Muslims worldwide to join the group. 
The open letter also explained why the very establishment of the IS cannot be justified 
according to Islamic law and laid out the qualifications for a mufti, therefore 
challenging IS’ credentials in issuing fatwas. This letter was signed by more than 100 
prominent Islamic scholars.592 
These collective statements, while not exactly defined as fatwas, clearly functioned as 
one. Not only were these statements issued by qualified religious experts, they also 
provided clear religious instructions, and even directed them against an existing 
‘religious’ opinion. Yet these were not issued by particular fatwa bodies, rather a 
combination of individual ulama and religious institutions. The reliance on collective 
statements makes sense because it means that the message they wanted to relay is 
covered in a single document, and their combined endorsement would also mean wider 
popularity. This was clearly one of the intents of these collective religious statements; 
although they were addressed to the militants, they also function to “discourage 
potential radicals from joining the…ranks” of radical groups.593 
Despite these efforts, the onslaught of militant propaganda persists. Especially in the 
age of the internet, controversial and polemical opinions – whether religious or 
otherwise, preaching violence or political reform – are very difficult to contain. This 
brings us back to examine the efforts of local religious authorities to fend off these 
radical fatwas from their border. 
In Southeast Asia, the state/official fatwa issuers of different countries took different 
measures to address these radical foreign fatwas. In Indonesia, the two largest Islamic 
groups there – the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah – issued religious 
condemnations against the IS.594 Both of these groups, and several others, are 
 
592 ‘Letter to Baghdadi’, Open Letter to Baghdadi, accessed 26 July 2018, 
http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/. 
593 Samuel Smith, ‘International Coalition of Muslim Scholars Refute ISIS’ Religious Arguments in 
Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi’, The Christian Post, 25 September 2014, 
http://www.christianpost.com/news/international-coalition-of-muslim-scholars-refute-isis-religious-
arguments-in-open-letter-to-al-baghdadi-127032/. 
594 ‘Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama Leads Charge against ISIS’, The Straits Times, 28 November 2015, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesias-nahdlatul-ulama-leads-charge-against-isis; Joe 
Cochrane, ‘From Indonesia, a Muslim Challenge to the Ideology of the Islamic State’, The New York 




represented in the Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI, the centralised religious entity 
tasked to issue fatwas. Yet as a central religious body, the MUI did not issue fatwas 
against the IS as it regarded the matter as clearly prohibited, whereas fatwas are issued 
only to clarify murky religious issues.595 Meanwhile in Malaysia, the official fatwa 
body issued a fatwa against the IS in 2014. The fatwa mentioned that the “inclination 
and excitement of Muslims to wage [armed] jihad on behalf of ISIS [Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria] or ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] on Syrian soil is the 
result of confusion in understanding the true concepts of jihad and martyrdom 
according to Islamic law.”596 
In Singapore, numerous statements condemning terrorism and promoting religious 
peace were issued by the Office of the Mufti and Islamic Religious Council of 
Singapore (MUIS).597 The Mufti of Singapore himself had publicly condemned 
terrorism.598 This includes what I mentioned in the opening of this thesis when a 
Singaporean militant was featured in an IS propaganda video, in which the mufti 
warned Singaporean Muslims against falling for religious misinterpretation.599 The 
mufti also weighed in on other terrorism-related issues. For example when a terror 
suspect escaped from a Singapore jail in 2010, the mufti warned that harbouring a 
fugitive contradicts Islamic principles.600 
Despite the Fatwa Committee being the state-sanctioned religious instructor in 
Singapore, they were not the main religious group associated with addressing religious 
extremism and terrorism. Much of these efforts were led by various others, notably 
the Islamic non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As early as 2003, a book entitled 
Muslim, Moderate, Singaporean was jointly published by a local religious NGO 
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together with a local mosque. The book outlined “six principles of moderation” for 
Muslims in Singapore.601 In the same year the Singapore Islamic Scholars and 
Religious Teachers Association (Pergas) – an influential religious body – organised 
the Convention of Ulama which aimed to “define and combat extremism,” and resulted 
in the publication of a book titled Moderation in Islam in the Context of the Muslim 
Community in Singapore.602 Perhaps the most prominent organisation that specialises 
in addressing religious extremism is the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). The 
RRG is a voluntary group consisting of religious scholars in Singapore. It was set up 
in 2003 to respond to self-radicalised individuals, and also to rehabilitate and counsel 
detained terror suspects. 
In Singapore, it would seem that state fatwas remain in the backdrop of efforts 
countering religious extremism. There were no specific fatwas against violent 
extremism, instead statements condemning terrorism were made individually by the 
mufti or attributed to the religious administrative body MUIS. The collective effort of 
religious leaders formed the bulwark of countering extremist ideas, which were more 
varied in nature. More notably these efforts represent the traditional-societal link of 
religious elites to the Muslim audience, which reinforces the ‘soft’ side of adhering to 
religious instructions. 
State fatwas already possess formal recognition that enables them to invoke legal and 
bureaucratic authorities. However can they play a more formal role in preserving local 
religious norms to counter terror and radical religious decrees imported from abroad? 
My case studies will look at how the legal-bureaucratic link of state fatwas in 
Singapore was invoked to fend off radical fatwas. I will highlight two key projects that 
preserve state fatwas and discredit foreign ones: Friday sermons, and the creation of a 
register of approved religious teachers called the Asatizah Recognition Scheme 
(ARS). 
These two measures show how legal-bureaucratic authority is exploited to preserve 
state fatwas. Friday sermons in Singapore are prepared by the religious bureaucracy, 
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specifically the Office of the Mufti. The register of qualified religious teachers 
meanwhile was a project whose objective was – among others – to give official 
recognition to religious teachers. It is impossible for these measures to be done without 
recognising the legal-bureaucratic authority of state fatwas in the first place. While the 
outcome of these two measures are manifold, they ultimately bolstered the authority 
of state fatwas over other (radical) fatwas. As a result, the legal-bureaucratic authority 
of state fatwas was expanded to define which religious content can be taught in the 
country, and entrenched their capacity in shaping Statist Islam. 
4.1 Friday Sermons 
The Friday sermon (referred to as khuṭbah, alt. khutbah) is a compulsory form of 
Islamic ritual. Every Friday, male Muslims are religiously obliged to congregate in 
mosques around mid-day to listen to these sermons, which is then followed by a short 
prayer. In Singapore, the Friday sermons for the mosques are prepared by the 
secretariat of the Fatwa Committee, known as the Office of the Mufti. While it is 
common for these sermons to be read with little or no changes, it is not mandated for 
imams to follow them. Yet according to several imams I spoke to, on certain occasions 
when their sermons were deemed to have deviated too much from the official prepared 
ones, they were contacted by the state security apparatus and asked to explain their 
reasons for doing so.603 This shows the authoritarian capacity of the state in 
maintaining its desired order through the pulpit. 
Friday sermons serve as a way for the state (if not the religious bureaucracy) to 
regulate religious norms and perceptions. Friday sermons that address terrorism and 
radicalism, therefore, should also be seen within the wider ambit of state effort to 
regulate religious affairs. After all, this is a compulsory weekly religious observation 
that fills up mosques every week and provides a direct way to disseminate ideas. From 
the state’s point of view, it is an immensely useful platform that can shape Muslim 
public opinion. 
The content of these prepared sermons varies and covers a wide range of topics, 
including Islamic law, spirituality, history, and more. As a theme, terrorism in sermons 
was addressed even before the September 2001 World Trade Centre attacks. For 
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example in June 2001, there was a sermon mentioning how Islam was wrongly 
depicted as a religion that promotes terrorism. In such sermons, there were little 
elaboration on malicious or deviant teachings associated with religious extremism and 
violent militant groups. Rather, the message of the sermon called for peaceful co-
existence with other faiths. The sermon stated: 
Know, my brothers, that Islam is not a religion of force. The Prophet in his 
struggles and striving never once used a sword to threaten a person to embrace 
Islam. And neither did he ever teach his companions to do that. Instead the 
Prophet showed us the proper manner of calling others to Islam. He showed 
and taught us to love, he showed and taught us to practice mutual respect 
whether or not such persons had faith.604 
In these pre-9/11 sermons, topics such as religious moderation and jihad – main topics 
related to terrorism – were usually couched as secondary themes to events in Islamic 
history. 
Understandably after the 9/11 incident and the subsequent terror attacks that followed, 
themes relating to religious extremism became more common and central in Friday 
sermons. These sermons began to directly address extremism and radicalism in 
religious beliefs, and emphasised religious tolerance, moderation, and reconciled 
religious living in a secular country. A February 2003 sermon said: 
Since the September 11 [2001] incident and the [October 2002] Bali blast, the 
Muslim ummah [or worldwide Muslim community] has been under a lot of 
exposure. Accusations such as terrorists, militants and extremists have been 
hurled at us. However, let us remain calm… Let us use these exposures in our 
favour and prove how beautiful, kind and great Islam is. Many of us Muslims 
are moderates who condemn terrorism, as such let us prove that stand of ours 
through constant dialogues with the non-Muslims.605 
Addressing jihad, another sermon from August 2003 stated: 
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Well-being and security are general foundations of Islam. Jihad in the form of 
war is not a key principle of Islam. It is used only to fight against tyranny, 
oppression, and invasion. It cannot be applied if there is a more effective 
alternative that can be used to achieve the stated objectives. As such Muslims 
should not feel apologetic for promoting the peaceful message of Islam. They 
should not feel awkward in condemning any forms of violence by anyone, if 
such violence is not based on acceptable reasons.606 
The pulpit was also invoked to address local arrests made by the police for terror-
related offences. After one such arrest in 2015, the sermon stressed the importance of 
obtaining religious education from recognised sources and called on Muslims to 
engage only accredited religious teachers. The sermon also said: 
If we are careless in our process of understanding religious teachings, the end 
result will be detrimental…There are still various types of deviant teachings 
that are accepted by the Muslim community… And there are also propagations 
of extremist teachings which focus on distorting religious texts for the purpose 
of terrorism. This is getting more amplified with the proliferation of borderless 
marketplace of information that is hard to be controlled on the internet. 
Therefore, groups which aim for ultimate destruction are utilizing the internet 
as a platform to propagate their teachings and ideologies.607 
And in a 2016 sermon titled The Virtues of Patience, the sermon mentioned: 
Trends that people go crazy over become out-dated and are forgotten within a 
few months. In fact, this “trend” also affects how some people attain 
knowledge and information – by using a shortcut method. They want to acquire 
knowledge fast and they prefer information to be presented in a short but 
succinct manner. This may result in individuals not being attentive enough in 
practicing patience in their lives… This includes being patient in seeking 
knowledge, and to clarify what we read from the Internet. Patience is also 
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important in developing our resilience to tackle the issue of terrorism that is 
threatening our society today.608 
Despite state fatwas not addressing religious extremism, the fact that these Friday 
sermons discussed these issues showed not only the preservation of a normative 
religious position, but more importantly supported the authority of state fatwas above 
foreign ones. Almost all of the mosques in Singapore use these prepared sermons, 
making the message consistent across the country. By raising suspicion on the 
credibility of online Islamic sources, these sermons also positioned local religious 
teachers as the most credible source of Islamic knowledge. Such a narrative not only 
discredits unverified online religious decrees, but also elevates the role of local 
religious instruction as a number of sermons stressed the need to look for “accredited” 
religious teachers.609 As I will explain in the next section, one of the stipulations for 
being accredited is that religious teachers cannot teach content which contradicts the 
opinion of state fatwas. Ultimately, these sermons reinforced the authority of state 
fatwas. 
Another issue that these sermons addressed is Singapore’s claim of being a secular 
state. In many ways, secularism is placed at the opposite end of religiosity.610 To 
mitigate public opinion on the state, state secularism has to be affirmed that it can co-
exist with Islam, or at least that it is not oppressive to the Islamic belief. In order to 
discredit the idea that the secular state is the polar opposite of religion and therefore a 
justifiable target for religious extremism, Friday sermons have to portray some form 
of secular-Islam conformity. 
My survey of Friday sermons showed a shift in the way state secularism is addressed. 
Earlier sermons advised Muslims to be more consistent in their religious practices 
despite being in a secular environment. A July 2000 sermon titled Islam and 
Secularism emphasised on modest dressing, filial and communal responsibility, and 
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called for Muslims to be proud in displaying their faith.611 While affirming that 
Muslims should follow the secular law in place, the sermon cautioned: 
Whosoever rejects the teachings of Islam will face difficulties in this world 
and the hereafter. We must be proud of Islam… But we must examine 
ourselves. Do we follow all of Islamic guidance and teachings? Or do we only 
follow Islamic rituals while applying non-Islamic ideas in other aspect of our 
lives…Is Islam wrong, or are we as Muslims wrong if we do not follow one 
hundred percent what Islam asks us to do?612 
Later sermons however were more explicit in reconciling the issues Muslims face 
when living in a secular state. A 2015 sermon stated: 
Today, we have seen negative influences in the world which may sow the seeds 
of hatred and cause division and disunity in the religious harmony of our 
country. They promote an exclusive understanding and practice of religion, 
and they reject diversity and differences in opinion, going against the grain of 
the diverse nature of humankind. Further, there are radical ideas that promote 
rigidity and extremist religious behaviours. For example, there are ideas that 
seek to instil doubts in Muslims that they cannot live in the modern world. 
They claim that one cannot practice Islam properly if one is to live in a secular 
country like Singapore. Hence, there are calls by radical groups such as ISIS 
to migrate to their territories which they claim constitute an “Islamic state”.613 
By explicitly reconciling the Islamic faith in the secular state, the sermons 
inadvertently lent legitimacy to the secular political system, and by extension the 
existing political authority. 
Another way to portray secular-Islam conformity through sermons is by removing all 
mention of state-Islam conflict in Singapore. This particular point was excellently 
illustrated by Mostarom. She argues that official Friday sermons in Singapore have 
been sanitised from mentioning political affairs.614 In her survey of official sermons 
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from 2006 to 2011, none of the sermons “made any reference to current political 
affairs, including those that were directly related to the Muslim community.”615 Issues 
that were deemed “politically sensitive or directly linked to politics” were 
“deliberately left out” of the weekly Friday sermons.616 Mostarom’s PhD thesis 
meanwhile noted how these prepared sermons remained quiet on controversial 
religious issues. They did not address controversial religious issues arising from state 
regulation of Islam,617 nor the 2011 remark made by the former Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew that Muslims should “be less strict on Islamic observances” and that 
integration is possible for “all religions and races except Islam.”618 In 2013 when an 
online petition was circulated to campaign for the hijab to be allowed for uniformed 
services (and consequently shut down), there was no reference to this in the Friday 
sermons.619 This is telling since in the context of an authoritarian state that regulates 
religious affairs, the “de-politicisation” of sermons itself is can be a political act to 
manage public opinion.620 
The regulation of Friday sermons indicates that while religious bureaucrats are, at 
times, well-positioned to inject their authority in state-sanctioned religious projects, 
they themselves have to abide by some semblance of bureaucratic logic and restriction. 
In the context of an authoritarian state, this hinders any criticisms against the 
government. I concede that for large parts, the proximity of the religious bureaucracy 
to the state does not function in a one-way communication, rather it operates through 
reciprocity. However there is a clear power asymmetry between the state and the 
Islamic religious bureaucracy,621 which is evident in Friday sermons. By remaining 
quiet on contested religious issues and attempting to reconcile secular-Islam 
differences, the sermons implicitly sanctioned the legitimacy of the state’s secularist 
authoritarian dictum. 
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The Friday sermon subjects a ready audience of adult Muslims week after week, 
through a network of mosques extending all over the country. It is therefore a useful 
platform not only to teach religious knowledge, but also endorse or question political 
legitimacy. As such, the control of Friday sermon is not a new phenomenon. The way 
the pulpit is regulated bears close similarity to the practice of the previous generation. 
Drawing on the example of the Malaysian state of Kelantan in the early 1900s, the 
imam of the mosque, who is typically approved by the state religious council, was 
given the mandate to appoint and fire the khatib or sermon-giver.622 The religious 
bureaucracy, with the ruler’s support, also set out guidelines for the content of Friday 
sermons, and asked mosque officials to report those did not abide by it.623 Both 
Kelantan a century ago and Singapore today regulate weekly Friday sermons and the 
content that should be addressed on the pulpit. Both sought to preserve the established 
religious orthodoxy and orthopraxy, as well as the political status quo. 
Friday sermons are also regulated in other countries. For example in Turkey, the 
sermons are prepared by the Directorate for Religious Affairs, known as the Diyanet. 
In 2014, sermons disseminated before the local elections implicitly supported the 
social media ban by the ruling AK Party.624 Similarly in Egypt when the military 
government took control in 1952, mosques were reasserted by the state, and along with 
it the regulation that Friday sermons were to iterate content showing “loyalty to the 
existing order”.625 Topics of the sermon were given out to preachers beforehand, with 
the option to read prepared sermon texts.626 
In essence, the regulation of Friday sermons in Singapore promotes a particular form 
of religious practice that is deemed ‘right’. As these sermons discredited foreign 
sources of religion that do not fit the local narrative, this effectively prioritised local 
sources. This reflects how the formalised legal-bureaucratic authority of the religious 
 
622 Ali, Islam and Colonialism: Becoming Modern in Indonesia and Malaya, 185. 
623 Ali, 186. 
624 Svante Cornell, ‘The Rise of Diyanet: The Politicization of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious 
Affairs’, The Turkey Analyst, 9 October 2015, https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-
analyst-articles/item/463-the-rise-of-diyanet-the-politicization-of-turkey’s-directorate-of-religious-
affairs.html. 
625 Bruce M. Borthwick, ‘The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication’, Middle East 
Journal 21, no. 3 (1967): 304; Asghar Fathi, ‘The Role of the Islamic Pulpit’, Journal of 
Communication 29, no. 3 (1 September 1979): 102–6, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.1979.tb01717.x.  
626 Bruce M. Borthwick, ‘The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication’, 305. 
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bureaucracy allows it to regulate the content of weekly sermons, and through them, 
lent credence to the religious authority of state fatwas in the Muslim community. 
Yet while state fatwas can claim to be the most reputable local religious instruction, 
religious knowledge and information are also obtained through other sources. Key 
interlocutors of the sacred texts are also those who teach religion to the masses: the 
religious teachers. In order to set a more consistent standard of religious message that 
follow the narrative set by the religious bureaucracy, the religious teachers – 
specifically regulation over them – have to be scrutinised. 
4.2 The Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS) 
The local term for an Islamic religious teacher is ustaz, pluralised as asatizah. As early 
as 1994, the Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS) was mooted with the objective to 
support the development of Islamic religious teachers and to ensure proper religious 
instruction in the country.627 One of the purposes of the scheme is to “prevent incidents 
whereby individuals [claiming to be religious teachers are]… involved in activities 
that are against the norms and ethics of the religion.”628 More pertinently, the scheme 
explicitly prohibits religious teachings that deviate from state fatwas, thereby 
guaranteeing the relevance of state fatwas in various religious classes and homilies. 
This turns state fatwas into a benchmark of acceptable religious teachings and 
mandates legal and doctrinal religious instructions to abide by them. Religious classes 
are effectively transformed into a platform that forcibly reiterates state fatwas to the 
masses. 
The scheme started in 2005 as a voluntary system. In 2017 it became mandatory for 
religious teachers to be registered and accredited. As of 2016, an estimated 80% or 
more than 1,800 Islamic religious teachers in Singapore were registered under the 
scheme.629 By registering under the ARS, an ustaz is permitted to teach religious 
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subjects in private classes, mosques, and homes. The accreditation is contingent on 
two main criteria: moral and educational qualifications. 
The legislative amendments for the ARS were made through an existing section in 
AMLA which gave the religious bureaucracy extensive powers over religious schools 
in Singapore. Section 87 of AMLA vested “control of Muslim religious schools” to 
the key religious administrator MUIS, and gave it power to register, establish, or reject 
the creation of Muslim religious schools. MUIS is also empowered to approve its 
curricula of instruction, and more importantly in section 9, “with the approval of the 
Minister, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this section.” I believe it is under 
this section that further rules were created for the ARS. Due to the formalised legal 
provision endowed on the religious bureaucracy, changes to what constitutes a 
religious teacher was made possible, even to the extent that it defines who the religious 
teachers are, and the content that they are allowed to teach. 
The ARS sets a particular moral code of conduct that the asatizah have to adhere to. 
The guidebook states that the applicant has to be “fit and proper” to teach at an Islamic 
education centre, with the following criteria:630 
In considering whether a person is fit or proper to teach, the following will be 
taken into account — 
(i) any conviction for any offence involving dishonesty, moral turpitude, 
violence or harm to children 
(ii) prior suspension or cancellation of ARS 
(iii) any behaviour of the person that does not satisfy a standard of 
behaviour generally expected of a teacher at an IECP [Islamic 
Educational Centres and Providers], or is otherwise disgraceful or 
improper 
The religious teacher must also fulfil at least 30 hours of training, called the 
Continuous Professional Education, within three years.631 Previously graduates of 
reputable foreign universities were automatically included in the system. But the 
 
630 Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS) And Islamic Education Centres & Providers (IECP) 
Regulation Handbook for Prospective Applicants (MUIS, 2017), 10. 
631 Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS) And Islamic Education Centres & Providers (IECP) 
Regulation Handbook for Prospective Applicants, 13–15. 
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changes now mean that even such graduates are not exempt and have to be certified. 
They are required to first attend a programme called Certificate in Islamic Thought in 
Context in order to become properly accredited under the ARS.632 
According to the scheme, the objectives of the Continuous Professional Education are 
threefold:633 
1. Continuously enhance asatizah’s knowledge and skills; 
2. Keep asatizah abreast of emerging trends and developments both 
regionally and internationally and their impact on the community’s socio-
religious life; 
3. Enable asatizah to deliver and provide religious guidance which is relevant 
and suited for Singapore’s context. 
Religious teachers risk being excluded from the register if they do not conform to these 
requirements.634 While this applies to those who break the code of conduct, ethically 
or morally, it also applies to those whose teachings are deemed locally unsuitable. The 
combination of both moral code and educational training would set a common 
standard for religious teachers in Singapore. Because those that do not meet the criteria 
risk expulsion, the ARS also safeguards the ‘industry’ from religious teachers who 
might be involved in criminal or religiously-unaccepted practices. 
The accreditation of the asatizah could be regarded as a way to ‘trademark’ the title 
of religious teachers, so that only persons teaching within accepted religious precepts 
are officially recognised by the religious bureaucracy. The characteristics of the ARS 
are hardly any different from that of other industries, such as accountants, lawyers, or 
doctors. However the scheme should also be seen from the perspective of the state’s 
religious regulation, which stems from the concern on the onslaught of foreign fatwas. 
These foreign fatwas not only challenge the local brand of Islam, but also threaten 
security in the authoritarian secular state. Furthermore because this local brand of 
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Islam has thus far been supportive, or at least tolerant, of the secular authoritarian state, 
it is within state interest to ensure its endurance. Therefore measures were taken to 
perpetuate local religious norms while restricting the propagation of ‘unapproved’ 
content among local asatizah by setting new legal measures through the ARS. 
I must be clear that I do not deny the benefit of a scheme that properly accredits and 
continuously trains its members. After all, proper supervision tends to encourage 
professionalism and competence, important virtues of any trade, even religious ones. 
However what I argue is that the ARS scheme should be looked beyond its purported 
claims. In examining the establishment of a new religious registry in Singapore, the 
state culture of religious management should be taken into consideration, just as the 
political and social contexts should be considered. In light of continued concerns over 
terrorism and radicalism, and initiatives that discredit suspicious religious opinions, 
the ARS facilitates the control of information that is being passed to Muslims via two 
channels. 
Firstly, the training stresses upon religious teachers to only address “religious 
guidance” that is deemed “relevant and suited for Singapore’s context”.635 Having to 
attend training at an average of 10 hours per year allows the accreditation body to 
impress upon the teachers to conform their teachings to accepted local religious norms. 
Even those who graduated from widely-recognised Islamic seats of knowledge 
overseas have to undergo specialised training to obtain the Certificate in Islamic 
Thought in Context, which would inform them with the type of content that is deemed 
suitable by the religious bureaucracy. 
Secondly, and this is the most important point this section makes: the teachings must 
abide by state fatwas. The ARS regulation stated that religious teachers “must be 
guided in matters of religious doctrine by the rulings of the legal (fatwa) 
committee.”636 The ARS regulation specifically iterated that under AMLA, “the Legal 
(Fatwa) Committee is the only official body to rule on points of Muslim law in 
Singapore. Accordingly, the religious positions (fatwas) of the Committee must be 
respected. Religious positions from other sources (including those that originate from 
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foreign fatwa bodies) which conflict with the fatwas from the Legal (Fatwa) 
Committee should not be privileged.” 
Not rejecting further considerations behind the ARS, its implication on state fatwas 
remains central to this thesis. Because foreign fatwas and other religious materials 
remain accessible and impossible to contain online, the interlocutors of religious ideas 
– the religious teachers – thus become the subject of the regulation. The ARS is 
explicit that only locally-relevant religious instructions issued by accredited religious 
leaders are accepted. To do so, they utilised formalised legal authority to enact laws 
preventing unapproved persons from teaching religion. 
As religious teachings become formally mandated to abide by state fatwas, this also 
changes how fatwas function in the Muslim community. Legally, state fatwas are non-
binding, except if legislated as law, or used as a basis for court judgements. As such, 
the role of state fatwas merely is instructive especially among religious teachers 
because they are equipped to access the multitude of international fatwas, and even 
classical ones. In addition, they are also trained to interpret the very sources of Islamic 
law, enabling them to issue their own fatwas. By making sure that local religious 
educational content abides by state fatwas, this risks hindering the democratisation of 
knowledge among religious teachers as well as their students. And despite the initial 
non-binding nature of state fatwas, and that these religious teachers are not employees 
of the religious bureaucracy, the ARS binds state fatwas on them, leaving little room 
to publicly interpret religion. This is not to say that there is no space for other religious 
opinions to be taught, as there are many ways for a teacher to relay or even endorse 
contradictory opinions in the classrooms and homilies. Yet by being mandated and 
formalised, at the same time constricting non-approved religious views, this ultimately 
reinforces the authority of state fatwas in Singapore. 
Even before the ARS, state fatwas are the only form of religious instruction that is 
legally and bureaucratically recognised in the country, and therefore command 
substantial authority over Muslims in Singapore. With the ARS, it forces the 
acceptance of state fatwas even among religious teachers, and further strengthens the 
position of state fatwas as a powerful religious norm-setter for the Muslim community 
in the country. 
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This also reflects the extent of policy feedback that state fatwas can affect. The 
formalised authority of state fatwas was demonstrated in earlier chapters through the 
negotiations and contestations taking place within bureaucratic and legal boundaries. 
In this chapter the informal authority of state fatwas became formally entrenched 
among Islamic religious teachers. As key religious interlocuters in the society, having 
them abide by state fatwas facilitates the regulation of the Muslim community through 
religious norms. Even though state fatwas do not directly affect this particular legal 
enactment (unlike, e.g. the organ donation policy), I argue that they became the key 
beneficiary behind it; the ARS boosts their formal legal presence among a crucial 
group of religious elites in Singapore. 
State fatwas therefore represent a major platform for religious projects; not only is the 
Muslim community reminded of their relevance in the weekly Friday sermons, they 
also become formally embedded in every religious class as well. The ARS formally 
guarantees the dissemination of state fatwas through religious teachers, an action 
which was previously exercised voluntarily. The formalised connection of state fatwas 
in religious teachings also creates a new platform to shape Statist Islam among 
Muslims in Singapore. 
5 Conclusion 
I have traced the role of online fatwas in contesting local religious authority, and the 
latter’s response in preserving its domestic position. To conclude this chapter as well 
as to briefly sum up my assessment of the empirical cases (i.e. Chapters 4 to 6), I wish 
to raise two points: the modern consequences of state regulation of religion, and the 
legal-bureaucratic manifestation of Statist Islam. 
5.1 The Modern Consequences of State Regulation of Religion 
This chapter focused on the proliferation of online fatwas and religious opinions that 
spread radical religious ideas among Muslims, calling them to commit violent acts in 
the name of religion. This is a phenomenon most pronounced in the aftermath of 9/11 
and subsequent attacks, wars, and invasions, which only perpetuate the rise of militant 
groups. Exploiting the internet, these groups issued religious decrees calling on 
Muslims to join the war and invoke revenge attacks on Western targets. Local religious 
bodies countered these radical fatwas by issuing their own decrees, ranging from 
opinions by individual ulama, to collective declarations, to state fatwas. 
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The media have always presented themselves as a challenge for any established power. 
In Singapore as well as many authoritarian states, there is a clear tendency to regulate 
the media, so much so that mainstream media became synonymous with the state. Yet 
the internet is a beast different from its predecessors; unlike print media or television 
there is no effective way to contain the flow of information online, especially since it 
empowers almost anyone to publish whatever they desire. As such, when it becomes 
impossible to regulate the medium, a different strategy is employed, and that is by 
empowering the ‘approved’ opinion. 
In authoritarian states, invoking the law to promote one opinion over another is not 
exactly a novel way to manage the flow of information. However what is significant 
in the case of secular Singapore is that state fatwas were used to fend off non-approved 
religious ideas. After all, I have sufficiently established that state fatwas in Singapore 
– despite proximity to the state – exercise a degree of autonomy to resist and contest 
state decisions. Therefore by making state fatwas the benchmark of ‘approved’ 
religious opinions, it not only demonstrates the expanding role of religious decrees 
within the secular legal framework, but also marks a surprising consequence of state 
co-optation and management of religion. In this case, the state is left with little choice 
but to rely on its religious constituency as the resident expert to define acceptable 
religious praxis and mitigate against radical decrees. With the legal-bureaucratic 
authority already endowed to the trusted religious bureaucracy, the only rational 
outcome in combatting foreign religious ideas is through the further empowerment of 
the religious bureaucracy, or in this case its most relevant arm: official state fatwas. 
As a result, systemic measures were undertaken by the religious bureaucracy to 
counter radical fatwas. The religious machinery was deployed in order to preserve 
local fatwas. Through standardised Friday sermons, the religious bureaucracy actively 
discredited extremist religious ideas and implicitly legitimated the secular system of 
governance. The pulpit stressed obtaining religious education from recognised local 
sources and called on Muslims to engage only properly accredited religious teachers. 
The subtext was to support established local religious instructions, which refers to 
state fatwas above all others.  
A new system to accredit Islamic religious teachers was also introduced. It ensures 
that the content of their classes, lectures, and homilies abide by local religious norms. 
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More importantly the accreditation system explicitly forbids any religious content that 
contradicts state fatwas. The ARS formally enforces the position of state fatwas in 
daily classes held in mosques, homes, and other private institutions. The scheme sets 
moral and educational criteria for religious teachers in Singapore and mandates that 
only locally-relevant religious instructions which abides by state fatwas should be 
taught by the religious teachers. This formalises the relationship between state fatwas 
and religious teachers, making the latter subordinate to the former, and legally forcing 
asatizah to abide by them. This ultimately strengthens the position of state fatwas as 
the main form of religious instruction in the country. 
This underlines the consequences of managing religious demands through state 
machinery. Weaving religious interests with state resources creates a hybrid set of 
secular-religious interests that intertwine according to the structural potentials and 
opportunities that arise. While on one hand it can be argued that the state takes an even 
closer role in the monitoring of religious affairs, it is also hard to deny that religious 
demands are present in the very legal-bureaucratic mechanism that the state runs on. 
In effect, this enables religious interests to be pushed through this state-linked 
medium, thus facilitating the shaping of a ‘national’ religious praxis. This brings me 
to my second point, and that is the formation of Statist Islam. 
5.2 Facilitating Fatwas to Shape Statist Islam  
I have previously demonstrated how state fatwas command a consistent following 
among religious teachers,637 who also form a reliable channel for the fatwas to 
propagate. In this chapter we examined the ARS which binds state fatwas on religious 
teachers. This represents how the informal authority of state fatwas became formalised 
through a new law, which created new ways for them to be relevant especially at the 
legal-bureaucratic level, thereby embedding their institutional relevance for some time 
to come.  
The ARS marks a significant formalisation of religious authority in Singapore in 
recent times.  It not only demonstrates the reach of the religious bureaucracy, but 
underlines the formal role that state fatwas play today in defining religious knowledge, 
which situates them at an advantageous position to shape Statist Islam. The expansion 
of state fatwas’ legal status to define religious teachings facilitates their capacity to 
 
637 See the discussion on population control policy in Chapter 4.  
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shape a nationally-defined religious praxis. Previous chapters have demonstrated how 
state fatwas invoked their bureaucratic authority to sway state policies. Where the law 
is concerned, however, state fatwas have limited ‘formal’ recourse to go against court 
decisions, so much so that they had to accommodate court judgments (see Chapter 5). 
Linking this chapter back to these earlier case studies, it becomes apparent that the 
modern legal relevance of state fatwas is not contingent solely on the courts, but also 
the lawmakers.  
I have shown in this chapter that the legal expansion of state fatwas was made possible 
through the available structural potentials, which stemmed from – in part – concerns 
over religious radicalism and extremism. This opportunity then facilitates the religious 
bureaucracy to flex its arm that wields state fatwas and expanded their role in 
Singapore law. 
With this, state fatwas are further entrenched in shaping the normative form of 
religious praxis in the country. Even before the ARS, state fatwas could contest state 
policies and court judgements, not only through formal channels of communication 
but also informal channels which enabled them to directly instruct the Muslim 
community. A key conduit between these fatwas and the Muslim audience are the 
interlocuters; not the media, but the religious teachers whose role is not simply to 
disseminate these fatwas to their students, but also to assess them and – in the process 
– legitimate state fatwas.  
Because the ARS stipulates that these religious teachers cannot contradict state fatwas, 
the former now has to legally abide by the latter. This ensures that the religious 
position of state fatwas is also the position maintained by these religious teachers. The 
‘official’ version of religious praxis is preserved through a law which ensures its 
‘uniformity’ from the top to the bottom, i.e. from the state fatwas all the way to the 
content that the asatizah teach their students. As a result, the ARS promotes a more 
consistent message between the different layers of religious actors. 
I have to reiterate however that legalistic conformity does not necessarily guarantee 
adherence. For example just because state fatwas are supposed to legally follow court 
decisions, this does not mean that they lack any room to contest them. Similarly it 
would also be hasty to assume that the new law ensures the complete support of state 
fatwas by religious teachers with no room for them to exercise some form of 
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resistance. However my point here is that this highly legalised development marks a 
new legal-bureaucratic manner in which Statist Islam is shaped in Singapore. The 
religious bureaucracy, whose legal-bureaucratic link enables it to affect a form of 
policy feedback, had become empowered in the state and legislation processes. This, 
in turn, enabled the expansion of state fatwas’ legal capacity over religious teachers. 
As a result, state fatwas now have legal power to define a vast range of religious 
praxes, beyond the specific religious observations mentioned in AMLA. This new 
legal enactment therefore significantly facilitates the role of fatwas to define Statist 
Islam in Singapore.  
The regulation of religion therefore does not only benefit the state; proximity to the 
state also opens the door for the religious bureaucracy to expand their legal-
bureaucratic relevance. This weaving of state-religious interests is threaded onto the 
very legal-bureaucratic channels designed to regulate religious demands. As a result, 
state fatwas gained an immensely powerful platform to contest and inform state 
decisions on religious issues, while working within legal-bureaucratic limitations. 
Opportunities emerged which pushed state fatwas in new positions and expanded their 
legal influence over religious issues. These developments ultimately bolstered their 
capacity to directly define religious praxis in the country. From shaping Statist Islam 
through traditional-societal connections, bureaucratic links, and specific legal 
provisions, Singapore state fatwas are now further empowered to define a vast range 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
This thesis was guided by the question: What political function do state fatwas play in 
the modern secular state? To answer this, my research traced some of the different 
ways through which state fatwas matter in the everyday life of Singapore Muslim 
citizens, as well as how these religious instructions claim modern relevance in an 
authoritarian secular milieu. A key finding of this thesis is that the co-optation of 
fatwas to regulate religion also embedded them in the workings of the state, and 
pushed state fatwas to play a more prevalent role within state structures. This finding 
matters because it challenges the dominant position on state-religious relationship in 
Southeast Asia, in which the functions of co-opted religious institutions are largely 
ignored,638 and their potential in affecting change through bureaucratic channels is 
under-researched. 
In analysing the relationship between fatwas and the state, my research sought to move 
beyond the two dominant understandings of state-religious relations that characterise 
the field of Political Islam and Southeast Asian Studies. I explored something of a 
middle path between two popular explanations of state-religious dynamics: Islamism, 
and state co-optation of religious actors and institutions. For the former, religious elites 
are understood as entities that tirelessly confront attempts of state control by trying to 
capture state structures, such as through political parties and social movements.639 The 
latter is meanwhile rooted in the state being a powerful actor that effectively controls 
religious institutions and undertakes multiple projects in order to maintain power and 
legitimacy.640 Situated between these two approaches, my thesis took a more nuanced 
position in analysing the dynamic of state-religious relationship. I position myself 
within a sociologically-infused approach in which state religious policies, institutions, 
and transformations are understood as always at least partially embedded within a 
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wider social context. This thesis sets out to understand the role that state-linked 
religious elites play in both reaffirming and resisting statist control of religion. To this 
end, I examined the role of state fatwas or religious decrees in negotiating, informing, 
and defining a national standard of religious praxis. Instead of surveying more overtly 
politicised state-religious confrontations – be it through manoeuvres of Islamic 
political parties or mass campaigns of social activists – I honed in on state fatwas as a 
key site within which the broader state-religious dynamics play out. Accordingly, my 
research also scrutinises how state-recognised religious institutions (which issue 
fatwas) play a relatively subtle, yet effective role in resisting and negotiating statist 
demands. 
2 Argument and Contribution 
I now turn to look at the key arguments, contributions, and the implications of my 
research. This section will be divided into two parts. I will firstly examine the main 
empirical notions addressed in this thesis, which also discuss the limits of my 
methodological approach. I then turn to the conceptual elements that were invoked 
and developed in analysing state-religious relationship.  
2.1 Empirical Arguments and Contributions 
State fatwas in Singapore arguably command inherent religious authority in the eyes 
of the Muslim community, yet it is only through the mechanisms of the modern state 
that their authority is expanded even further. The result of being situated within state 
bureaucracy – while not without its challenges – enabled state fatwas to benefit from 
state decisions and legal developments. Coupled with a state behaviour that 
continuously regulates religious affairs, state fatwas became not only entrenched in 
the state machinery, but also expanded their religious authority within the modern 
legal-bureaucratic structures.  
2.1.1 Consequences of Co-opting Religion 
Drawing upon the Singaporean case and yet seeking to contribute to a far wider 
literature on Islamic politics both inside and outside of the Southeast Asian region, 
this thesis advanced two key empirical arguments. Firstly, the state policy of 
regulating religious affairs has led to the embeddedness of religious institutions within 
the state bureaucracy. Because bureaucratisation elevates the position of state fatwas 
over ‘non-official’ fatwas, this link not only increases their capacity to shape state 
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decisions but also strengthens their societal acceptance in the Muslim community. 641 
Secondly, as a consequence of this persistent regulation of religious affairs, the role of 
state fatwas was cemented within state structures and the legal framework, which then 
changes the capacity of the state. For example, state fatwas now define how the state 
polices religious affairs by determining which Islamic religious teachings are legal or 
otherwise. As a result in Singapore, the role of religion in state structures has become 
far more notable. In the context of the secular authoritarian Singapore state, there is a 
certain irony that statist religious activity has become ever more prominent, a 
development seen in how the state allows state-linked religious institutions such as 
MUIS to expand its jurisdiction of religious affairs.642 But rather than seeing these 
developments as incompatible with state authoritarianism, my thesis posits that the 
contemporary Singaporean state is in many ways the product of religious compromises 
that have opened up some scope for societal contestation, with state fatwas playing a 
central role to this politics of contestation. 
To demonstrate my points above, I have shown how state fatwas can serve as key sites 
within which negotiations and resistances to the implementation of state policies take 
shape. This process of negotiation has also led to the considerable expansion of the 
role of state fatwas in secular law. I demonstrated the gradual growth of state fatwas’ 
legal relevance over time with the creation of several enactments to regulate Islamic 
affairs, and how, in recent years, new laws were introduced to make state fatwas the 
legal benchmark for religious teachings. The formal recognition of fatwas into what 
they are today follows a steady development of religious institutions’ legal evolution 
for over a century. In Chapter 3, I highlighted how the modern religious bureaucracy 
in Singapore governing Muslim affairs can be traced back to colonial-era petitions by 
members of society. These petitions advocated for the bureaucratisation of religious 
elites, with the intent to standardise the administration of religious affairs in Singapore. 
Gradually, legal enactments began to regulate a wider scope of religious issues. 
Moreover, the growth and strengthening of the religious bureaucracy was particularly 
impacted by the short-lived merger between Singapore and Muslim-majority 
Malaysia. As a result, Singapore’s subsequent independence in 1965 saw an extensive 
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co-optation of religious elites into the state-sanctioned religious bureaucracy, thereby 
establishing an official fatwa-issuing body. 
Legislation enacted following Singapore’s independence some half a century ago 
formed the legal basis of the modern religious bureaucracy. The key legislation 
governing Muslim law, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), outlined the 
regulation of religious affairs in Singapore, as well as the function of state fatwas, the 
appointment of Fatwa Committee members, and a standardised fatwa-issuing 
procedure. Thus the recent legal enactment (discussed in Chapter 6) that expanded 
fatwas’ authority to define acceptable religious teachings should not be taken as a 
surprise, rather as a continuation of legal evolution spanning over a century. This 
evolution resulted in fatwas, for the first time in Singapore’s history, being elevated to 
a legal position whereby Islamic religious teachings cannot contradict them. This also 
signals the state’s growing reliance on fatwas, which underlines their increased 
relevance in state structures. 
I argue that the recognition of fatwas by the state stems from its broader authoritarian 
policy of regulating societal demands (including religious ones). This led to the co-
optation and bureaucratisation of religious institutions into the state, resulting in the 
official state recognition of fatwas. State fatwas therefore became accessible to statist 
demands, while gaining access to state resources and developing a cognizance of state 
logic. This allowed the authority of state fatwas to grow and increased their capacity 
to contest state decisions. In Chapter 4, I detailed how fatwas can shaped state policies 
through their involvement in the policymaking process. Through bureaucratic 
linkages, state fatwas were made central to how Singapore’s organ donation policy 
was formed. The key outcome here was that the state policy for Muslim organ donation 
had to adhere to what was decreed in the fatwas. Similarly in Chapter 5, I demonstrated 
how state fatwas represent an authoritative interpretation of AMLA by religious elites. 
Although this interpretation and the relevant fatwas were rejected by the court, fatwas 
still provided a channel for religious elites to contest court decisions. State fatwas 
therefore epitomised a mode of state-religious contestations and negotiations. 
This thesis also sheds light on the negotiation of religious demands in a secular 
authoritarian context. My research therefore examines an anomaly, yet fascinating 
dynamic that illustrates how state authoritarianism manifests in Singapore. State 
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fatwas in Singapore operate in a unique manner hardly seen in other countries. Their 
proximity to the state means proximity to a secular political authority, which 
undermines the traditional characteristic of fatwas that typically serve as an extension 
of Muslim political authority. In other words, while an embedded legal-bureaucratic 
position in a Muslim polity can possibly boost the legitimacy of fatwas, the same in a 
non-Muslim country may potentially be detrimental to them. 
Taking fatwas as a vehicle of religious demand that is embedded in a secular 
authoritarian state therefore enables us to understand the mechanisms through which 
co-optation of religious interests has taken shape in Singapore. This feature of 
authoritarian governance takes place as a direct result of the bureaucratisation of 
religious institutions, as it provides positional authority to the co-optees. The co-
optation of fatwas both enables and limits religious demands, and underlines how 
religious elites exercise political pragmatism to pursue religious objectives. Unlike in 
Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia where the societal influence of fatwas 
has the potential to affect political change due to the large Muslim population,643 even 
with strong societal adherence to fatwas such a scenario will not be possible in 
Singapore where Muslims are the minority. As such, state fatwas operate as a useful 
channel within which religious demands can contest state decisions. From the state’s 
point of view, while these fatwas can potentially pose a challenge to its authority, they 
also remain useful in centralising religious instructions. The alternative to that, where 
multiple independent fatwa issuers vie for societal authority, is a nightmare of sorts 
for the authoritarian state that obsessively regulates realms of contestation. Therefore 
a single centralised fatwa body is preferable, even if it means granting it legal-
bureaucratic powers. This represents a unique characteristic of state-religious 
relationship in Singapore that delicately balances between control and freedom.  
One reason that explains my decision to focus on fatwas is the access I have to the 
research materials. Given the materials on state fatwas that I managed to accrue, 
focusing on them became the most intuitive choice. The materials which I had access 
to for my research – key among them confidential fatwa minutes of meetings, relevant 
documents published by the fatwa body, and interviews with the muftis – have enabled 
me to portray a better understanding of religious bureaucrats’ negotiation of state 
 
643 See section on Indonesia below. 
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decisions. This access also forms my unique empirical contribution to existing 
literature on state-religious relationships that have largely relied on open-source 
documents and not classified ones as my thesis does.  
I had almost unfettered access to minutes of fatwa meetings which revealed not only 
the content, but also discussions on how each state fatwa came to be. This means the 
minutes of meetings contain all the fatwas ever issued by the Fatwa Committee, 
something which is yet to be made available to the public. In addition my research is 
also backed by interviews with muftis, which helped me to get a clearer context on the 
events I covered. My familiarity with the empirical subject is aided by my background 
in Islamic Studies which enabled me to detect the nuances in these documents and 
interviews. I was therefore able to provide a much fuller context on the fatwa-issuing 
process in Singapore, and more importantly apply this in analysing the larger state-
religious relationship, as well as its consequences. 
However there are limitations to relying on confidential documents. Perhaps the most 
obvious one is that I cannot cite these documents except with the explicit consent of 
the content owner. This meant that I had to convince MUIS to allow me to cite these 
materials. Given that my thesis challenges the dominant narrative on religious co-
optation (which says that co-optees have little autonomy), I assumed that my research 
will be welcomed by MUIS. I was surprised then when they told me not to cite the 
fatwa minutes of meetings for a journal article that I wrote, which was derived from 
sections of this thesis. The reason I was given was that they disagreed with how I 
interpreted the events on organ donation, in which I argued that state policy became 
the catalyst for fatwa amendments. Rather, according to MUIS, the reason for the 
amendment was purely theological, and the timing of the policy was merely incidental. 
This is despite the minutes of meetings clearly stating that Fatwa Committee members 
acknowledged, and acted on, state pressure.644 In the end, however, I managed to get 
another source to corroborate my argument, and subsequently got the article 
published. As for this thesis, I have chosen to have it embargoed. 
I must be note here that despite MUIS’ disagreement over how the minutes of meeting 
were interpreted, they commendably did not stop me from citing them in my thesis. 
Yet I have chosen to have my thesis embargoed as I embark on the next phase of 
 
644 See Chapter 4 for details. 
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research which will take a more comparative approach by looking at how Singapore’s 
experience compares to neighbouring states. Whilst the thesis is under embargo, I will 
further develop this comparative dimension between Singapore and other Southeast 
Asian countries, namely Malaysia and Indonesia. This embargo would thus give me 
time to expand some of the chapters into the next iteration of this research.  
In addition to the practical methodological concerns which I have addressed above, 
there are also several case-related limitations when delving too deep within a particular 
case. Among them is one that concerns how other non-fatwa factors (both religious 
and non-religious) can affect state-religious relationships. I have argued that state 
fatwas are central to how religious negotiation takes place with the state, with 
significant consequences evident through Islamic religious praxis. Yet religious praxis 
can also be dictated by religious elites through other channels. This is because Statist 
Islam can be also negotiated at the micro level through other non-fatwa discourses 
such as the content of textbooks in madrasahs, specific narratives taken by the ulama 
and asatizah in their sermons and classes, and even the activism of organised and 
loosely-organised religious groups. Then there is the issue surrounding religious 
groupings based on theological schools, in this case between the dominant Sunni sects. 
In Southeast Asia, this concerns the Sufi traditionalists and Salafi reformists, bearing 
shades of historical similarities to the traditionalist Kaum Tua (Old Faction) versus the 
reformist Kaum Muda (Young Faction) debate in the colonial era.645 The Sufis are 
associated with the traditionalist school and established a prominent presence in 
Southeast Asia. They hold an entrenched position in the religious bureaucracy which 
places them in prime seats to inform the state on religious affairs. The Salafis 
meanwhile are religious reformists who claim legitimacy through puritanical 
orthodoxy. Yet the focus of this thesis is the relationship of religious bureaucrats and 
the state. In examining this dynamic, state fatwas took centre stage in representing the 
negotiation of religious elites, which then subsumes the differences between various 
theological schools. 
 
645 William Roff, Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua: Innovation and Reaction Amongst the Malaya 1900-1941 
(Journal South-East Asian History, 1962); Roff, ‘Patterns of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s-1990s: 
Exemplars, Institutions, and Vectors’; Anthony C Milner, ‘The Impact of the Turkish Revolution on 
Malaya’, Archipel 31, no. 1 (1986): 117–30; Othman and Hanifah Haris, ‘The Role of Egyptian 
Influences on the Religious Dynamics and the Idea of Progress of Malaya’s Kaum Muda (Young 
Faction) before the Second World War’. 
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Aside from religious elites, there are also others that can assert influence in shaping 
state-religious relationship. However they are not necessarily ‘religious’, yet can have 
a considerable impact on religious issues. I am referring to the growing social 
movement focusing on issues such as LGBT rights and women’s rights. These 
movements can very well influence the direction of Statist Islam that has thus far been 
driven by religious bureaucrats embedded in the state, so much so that the latter can – 
as my thesis argued – affect state decisions. As the state, driven by political 
expediency, shows greater willingness to accommodate ‘other’ non-religious groups 
in its decisions,646 the status quo of state-religious dynamic is entering a new phase 
where contrasting moral and religious ideals collide. This development deserves closer 
scrutiny as it challenges the relationship of traditional religious elites to the state and 
can reconfigure how state fatwas shape Statist Islam. 
However these developments do not mean that state fatwas will be ousted by new 
actors that seek relevance in some form of state recognition. Nor am I convinced that 
this will push the authority of religious institutions to the periphery, especially not 
those already entrenched in the state such as the fatwa-issuing body. In fact I contend 
that the Durkheimian theory of individualisation of religion, which dismisses 
organised religions and religious institutions to the periphery, remains to be a uniquely 
‘Western’ experience. There are several reasons for this which do not require 
repetition here (see Chapter 2). The most salient point that I wish to raise here is that 
state fatwas are already embedded in state structures (e.g. Chapter 6 detailed how 
fatwas gained the right to legally define ‘acceptable’ religious teachings). As new 
actors emerge to challenge the status quo of state-embedded religious institutions, state 
fatwas stand to play an even greater role as they can exploit existing forms of 
positional advantage within the state to further preserve their right to interpret and 
shape religious praxis. Furthermore the newfound legal authority that allows fatwas to 
set the right from wrong of Islamic religious teachings also allows them to define what 
is the ‘correct’ religious behaviour for Muslims in Singapore. State fatwas are 
therefore placed at the centre of these emerging contestations for religious and moral 
 
646 Chua Lynette J., ‘Pragmatic Resistance, Law, and Social Movements in Authoritarian States: The 
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legitimacy. As new actors emerge to challenge the status quo, state fatwas will remain 
crucial in defining state-religious relationship for some time to come. 
2.1.2 The Politics of (Selected) Fatwas in Singapore 
In focusing on the experience of one country for my thesis, I acknowledge that there 
are concerns surrounding single case study analysis. The most common of which 
includes the supposed lack of methodological rigour. Many have cautioned that using 
a single case study can remove the author from serious methodological 
considerations,647 and whether the hypothesis of qualitative single case study analysis 
is valid and can be generalised.648 Such criticisms are addressed by developing 
methodological techniques that link it to the larger epistemological root,649 as well as 
qualifying the objective of particularisation to gather better depth of a unique 
context.650 As my thesis demonstrated, the generalisability of case studies can also be 
increased by selecting atypical cases – instead of representative or random samples – 
which reveal more useful information as they unravel the dynamic of involved 
actors.651 From the analytical point of view then, single case study analysis can connect 
between unique cases, and can be replicated to provide immense empirical benefits.652 
(Later in this chapter, I will demonstrate how the presented theories can be expanded 
and replicated for other cases.)  
It is therefore clear then that despite its singular focal point, single case study analysis 
can provide a properly sophisticated and empirically rich account of a specific case. 
This is particularly appropriate for phenomena that are less amenable to more typical 
concepts, and those whose discussions have been treated with a rather subjective 
 
647 B. Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 
(1 April 2006): 219–45, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363; Lee Peter Ruddin, ‘You Can 
Generalize Stupid! Social Scientists, Bent Flyvbjerg, and Case Study Methodology’, Qualitative 
Inquiry 12, no. 4 (1 August 2006): 797–812, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800406288622; Zeev Maoz, 
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Evaluating Methodology in International Studies, 2002, 163; Robert K Yin, ‘Case Study Research: 
Design and Methods (Applied Social Research Methods)’, London and Singapore: Sage, 2009. 
648 Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, 
and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
649 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005). 
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approach. The unique case of a country – i.e. Singapore in this thesis – does not quite 
fit within the spectrum of an ‘ideal’ empirical case or concept concerning Islamism 
(that typically relates to Muslim-majority milieus). This subsequently leads to a line 
of inquiry that, based on the objectives of Islamism, explains why the application of 
the theory on Singapore is limited, yet adaptable by synthesising it with another 
concept. The in-depth single case study that I have presented in the preceding chapters 
therefore challenges another assumption related to state-religious dynamics, and that 
is the co-optation of religious elites. This allowed me to discuss the unique in-depth 
perspective of religious bureaucrats in Singapore, and led me to further develop the 
concept of co-optation to (a) qualify the nature of co-optative relationship and its 
consequences, and (b) examine a central theme which is under-researched and of 
which its practical application is potentially game-changing: official state-sanctioned 
fatwas. 
Another related issue is the selection of particular cases concerning official fatwas. To 
quickly recap, this thesis presented three sets of case studies on (1) fatwas and state 
policy, (2) fatwas and court judgement, and (3) the legal incorporation of fatwas. An 
empirical limitation lies in the types of fatwas chosen for the case studies. Although 
the reason for the selection was already explained in the introduction chapter, I will 
expand here on why certain other fatwas and events were omitted. The fatwas that I 
have covered were selected in order to illustrate their position when addressing issues 
that were contradictory to the positions of the state and the court. I chose fatwas that 
are ‘negative’ to official decisions – instead of ‘positive’ samples – because they 
demonstrate the extent of legal-bureaucratic recognition. Cases where state fatwas 
align with state policies and legal decisions will only reinforce the perception that the 
fatwa committee is ineffectual at asserting its independent view. There are several 
examples to this, such as the state fatwa’s endorsement of the state’s wastewater 
reclamation project for public consumption.653 Wastewater is impure for ritual 
cleansing and even after undergoing treatment, there was scepticism on its religious 
permissibility.654 While examining ‘positive’ cases can still identify the unique basis 
of state fatwas, it would not reveal their legal-bureaucratic dynamic against the state 
 
653 ‘Fatwa Muis: Airbaru Boleh Diminum [Muis Fatwa: Newater Can Be Consumed]’, Berita Harian, 
19 July 2002. 
654 Muhammad Haniff Hassan, ‘Meragui Kesucian Newater [Doubting the Purity of Newater]’, 
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and state structure as the involved actors stand on the same side of an issue. Negative 
cases fill this gap as they clearly push the boundary of this formal relationship that 
hinges between co-optation and contestation.  
Negative cases therefore demonstrated the constraints that come with legal-
bureaucratic relationship and allowed contestations to occur, as captured in Chapters 
4 and 5 when the traditional-societal authority of these fatwas was asserted against 
state and legal demands. Had I chosen positive samples, these contestations would not 
be visible. Because my thesis challenges the dominant narrative which argues that 
religious bureaucracy is controlled by the state, negative cases demonstrated how co-
optation can result in unintended results, which as I pointed out can also empower the 
co-optees. 
There are also other events in Singapore that relate to state fatwas but were not 
included in my research, specifically those that demonstrated the fatwas’ silence. A 
notable example is the hijab debate in 2002 and 2013. In 2002, four schoolgirls wore 
the hijab over their school uniform. They were told by their school to remove the hijab 
or risk expulsion. The girls (or their parents) persisted with the hijab over the next few 
days which then led to their suspension. This was described by international media as 
“the most potent act of civil disobedience that Singapore has seen in years”.655 
Government ministers representing the ruling party were quick to justify the banning 
of hijab in schools, citing the preservation of “common space,”656 maintaining national 
integration and identity formation,657 and warning of “competing demands from other 
communities to assert their own identities.”658 Muslim government ministers from the 
ruling party also rallied against the girls, and pleaded to the families to abandon the 
cause and “think of the children’s future.”659 The issue was so widespread that it 
invited comments from other countries in the region. Officials in neighbouring 
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Muslim-majority countries of Malaysia, Brunei, and Bangladesh chimed in to criticise 
the ban, which the Singapore government regarded as interference in domestic 
affairs.660 The highest religious official in the country, the Mufti of Singapore, later 
issued a statement saying the children’s education should take precedence over the 
hijab.661 The mufti’s statement was contested and led to condemnations against the 
religious bureaucracy. Eventually, some of the girls returned to school, without hijab, 
while others moved abroad, bringing the issue to an uneasy pause.662 
In 2013, the hijab issue resurfaced again when a lecturer questioned in a job forum 
why Muslim nurses are not allowed to wear the hijab, citing female Muslim students 
who did not take up the profession due to the sartorial restriction.663 Subsequently, an 
online petition was launched to campaign for the hijab to be allowed in uniformed 
services. The petition was however shut down, but the online momentum was 
maintained on various social media websites, which criticised MUIS as well as the 
Muslim ministers for not doing enough to protect religious rights.664 The previous 
Mufti of Singapore was quoted in the news saying that the petition could breed 
misunderstanding and asked whether it represents the views of all Muslim women as 
not everyone wants to wear the hijab.665 This understandably exacerbated the online 
criticism against the religious bureaucracy, reminiscent of what happened in 2002. 
This forced the current mufti to address the controversy through his personal social 
media page.666 In it, he related his initial reluctance to comment on the issue due to his 
position as a civil servant, but he decided to do it anyway as he was “worried” about 
the “vulgar and uncouth” criticism especially directed at the former mufti who had 
questioned the online petition.667 As a result, the issue took a turn to emphasise online 
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decorum rather than the right for Muslim women to wear the hijab. The state also 
responded, but compared to 2002 its response was more ambivalent, opting for 
discussions with Muslim community and religious leaders, and even signalling that 
the state’s position is an evolving one.668 In a posting on social media, the Prime 
Minister even mentioned a specific timeline by saying: “On the tudung [i.e. hijab] 
issue, the [state] position is not frozen. Attitudes will shift and arrangements will get 
updated. We have gradually evolved over the last decade… In 5, 10 years’ time, I am 
confident that we will not be in the same situation as today.”669 The issue remains 
unresolved until now. 
These examples highlight the significant role state fatwas play in society, especially 
in cases where the fatwa body refrains from issuing an official decree on controversial 
issues. Yet the reason I did not include this case in my thesis is because I focus on 
fatwas’ role within pre-approved spaces of contestation, whereas the state has 
arbitrarily decided to flex its bureaucratic muscle to deny recognising the hijab as a 
uniform. Furthermore there was no official fatwa issued on the matter, something 
which my access to confidential key documentation affirms. According to a source 
who served in the Fatwa Committee, there was no fatwa on the hijab because no one 
– either from the public or the state – petitioned for a religious ruling on the matter.670 
While it is safe to say that religious elites view hijab as a compulsory attire for adult 
female Muslims, the episode underlines a crucial factor in the function of state fatwas: 
that they have to adhere to proper bureaucratic protocol. As outlined in AMLA, state 
fatwas are issued only upon request. Since no questions were asked, no fatwas were 
issued. Although my source claimed that an irshād (religious guidance) was published 
in the earlier 2002 hijab episode, I could not find evidence for this. The only public 
announcement in this regard that I found was the mufti’s personal statement iterating 
that children’s education is prioritised over the hijab.671 
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This particular example shows the overarching authoritarian dynamic that state fatwas 
operate in. While there is room for state fatwas to assert their demands, it is also clear 
that the state’s arbitrary regulation of religious affairs is a key obstacle that restricts 
the authority of state fatwas, and religious demands in general. However the point that 
this thesis makes is that even with these restrictions in mind, state fatwas continuously 
exhibit a tendency to contest state decisions. In the case studies I mentioned, even 
contesting on ‘approved’ issues can result in surprising consequences that ultimately 
demonstrates the authority of state fatwas. After all, state regulation is an arbitrary and 
messy thing, which means that fatwas – already having an established position in the 
state – can subtly advance religious demands within the established state and legal 
structures. 
To sum up this empirical section, my thesis has provided a unique perspective on 
statist religious policies by shedding important light on the under-researched function 
of religious bureaucrats and its consequences. In analysing the experience of state 
fatwas in Singapore, I have shown the effects of religious regulation through legal-
bureaucratic co-optation. While this allowed the state to control religious demands in 
the country, it also entrenched and expanded (Islamic) religious relevance in the 
modern state and legal structures. With this empirical background in mind, the 
following section will address the wider conceptual approach that explains state-
religious relationship. 
2.2 Conceptual Arguments and Contributions 
My thesis advanced several key concepts, chief among them Statist Islam and policy 
feedback. Statist Islam is a concept I developed to analyse the consequences of state-
religious relationship. Policy feedback meanwhile is an existing concept which 
explains how policies affect politics. Although policy feedback is typically applied to 
broad-based policy programmes, I used it instead to understand how authoritarian 
religious policies eventually led to the entrenchment of religious interests in state 
structures. In addition, my thesis also integrated the conceptions of legal-bureaucratic 
and traditional-societal authority, as well as soft law and hard law in relation to state 
fatwas. These three groups of concepts – Statist Islam, policy feedback, and authority 
and law – will be elaborated below. 
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2.2.1 Statist Islam 
The first key concept, Statist Islam, is my unique theoretical contribution in the thesis. 
It represents how, even when operating within statist restrictions, numerous factors 
and actors can affect the development of a national-level Islamic praxis. Statist Islam 
differs from its earlier usage that refers to religious projects set by the state, in which 
the state instrumentalises the Islamic faith through various religious programmes in 
order to gain legitimacy.672 Other times, Statist Islam is used to refer to religious 
agendas advocated by religious elites through their position in the state, which 
resembles how Islamist actors pursue their objectives.673 I have to note that the usage 
of Statist Islam in previous literature was made in passing as a cursory label, rather 
than as an in-depth concept that explains a particular phenomenon. My conception of 
Statist Islam differs in that it is a detailed concept that seeks to make sense of the 
dynamics between the state and religious elites by combining the two opposing 
perspectives on state-religious relationship, i.e. Islamising the state and state-ising 
Islam, into one. It also acknowledges that state-religious relationship is shaped by 
various other factors, for example non-religious societal actors (which I mentioned 
earlier).  
Statist Islam is a concept that emerges out of my understanding of how Islamic 
institutions operate within a Muslim-minority secular authoritarian state, where the 
highly regulated domains of contestation motivate, if not force, religious elites to 
pursue religious goals through state-approved avenues such as the religious 
bureaucracy and, of course, state fatwas. Yet entering into these highly-regulated 
avenues does not necessarily cancel out the agency of the aforementioned religious 
elites, because by being co-opted by the state they also gained access to new platforms 
that can contest state decisions. The development of Statist Islam is also rooted in my 
reading of certain aspects of the political sociology literature, specifically policy 
feedback which explains how co-opted actors assert their positional advantage to 
affect and inform state decisions on religion, resulting in an amalgamated, nationwide 
form of Islamic praxis, i.e. Statist Islam. 
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To recapitulate, I argue that even where religion is highly regulated, religious praxis 
is not merely formed by statist demands and regulations, but also the agency of social 
and religious elites that meshes and combines to create a version of ‘accepted’ Islamic 
religious observance. This thesis had focused on state fatwas as a mode of contestation 
that shapes Statist Islam. One of the consequences of co-opting fatwas is that they get 
to define which religious content is legal or illegal (as explained in Chapter 6). While 
this might seem as another state measure to regulate religious affairs, I posit that 
having fatwas define what is legally right or wrong changes the capacity of the secular 
state. This is because rather than state fatwas being placed at the receiving end of state 
and legal demands (as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5), the situation is reversed as 
various apparatus of the secular state can now be called to fulfil the demands of fatwas 
(as they define the legal right and wrong of religious teachings). To this effect, this 
means that state fatwas can invoke state apparatus to preserve their authority, as the 
state is legally bound to police religious issues according to terms set by them. 
My case studies therefore demonstrated how the amalgamation of state-religious 
negotiation plays out to affect religious praxis, i.e. Statist Islam. Statist Islam is 
developed to capture the larger consequences of contestations that shape religious 
praxis. As a concept, Statist Islam allows me to analyse the macro consequences of 
constant state encroachment on religious affairs. Instead of looking at state-religious 
relationship as a one-sided affair (in which the state merely co-opts religious elites to 
provide a moral veneer for its activities), it is also important to recognise the role of 
religious elites and their modes of resistance. This leads to a nuanced understanding 
of the effect of state regulation on religious affairs, as the co-optation of fatwas by the 
state also comes with unanticipated consequences. 
Statist Islam represents the combined effects on religious observance stemming from 
statist restrictions and interventions. Because it provides a general concept of religious 
observance, there are several ways on how this can be further expanded. This is done 
by comparing how other factors (besides state fatwas) play a part in shaping religious 
praxis. The comparison can be observed at various levels: state bureaucracy, private 
businesses, and social actors, all of which are affected – directly or indirectly – by 
statist interpretation and policy on religion. For example, businesses are known to take 
specific marketing choices that can affect the visibility of religious observations, such 
as by providing more halal food choices for consumers, and possibly attract other 
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businesses to do the same. It was pointed out that the halal market can even reconfigure 
spheres of secular and religious expressions.674 Also, Sloane-White conceptualised 
Corporate Islam as a way for Malaysian businesses to project and interpret forms of 
religiosity on their employees and companies, especially as these forms of corporate 
religiosity cannot be separated from established state policies.675 Müller meanwhile 
analyses how spiritual healers interpreted state-led Islamisation projects to fit their 
own narratives, creating “hybrid pathways to orthodoxy”.676 I pointed out above that 
recent social movements also have an increasing say on how state policies are shaped, 
and this includes women’s rights groups and LGBT activists. Because state decisions 
are not immune from these voices, its policies can also be shaped by them. These 
policies – whether related to the economy, law, or health – can in turn encroach on 
traditional religious norms espoused in state fatwas, and therefore contest how Statist 
Islam is formed. Therefore Statist Islam can be adapted in various other disciplines 
such as conventional anthropological surveys, sociological studies, as well as themes 
concerning the political economy of religion. 
2.2.2 Policy Feedback 
The second key concept featured in my thesis is policy feedback, which provides an 
analytical tool for understanding how fatwas operate in ways that enable religious 
bureaucrats to assert authority and to resist statist interpretations of religion (as well 
as the apposite consequences). As explained in Chapter 2, I understand the concept of 
policy feedback in a way similar to how it is employed by the likes of Skocpol, Soss, 
and Béland,677 which explains that policies “set political forces in motion and shape 
political agency.”678 In my thesis, I examined how new religious constituencies – 
formed by state policies – sought to preserve and expand their privileged position. 
Policy feedback is a concept that is rarely employed in understanding state-religious 
relations – which is all the more surprising given that state-religious relations provide 
 
674 Johan Fischer, ‘Feeding Secularism: The Halal Market in London’, Diaspora 14, no. 2/3 (2005). 
675 Sloane-White, Corporate Islam: Sharia and the Modern Workplace. 
676 Müller, ‘Hybrid Pathways to Orthodoxy in Brunei Darussalam: Bureaucratised Exorcism, 
Scientisation and the Mainstreaming of Deviant-Declared Practices’. 
677 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers; Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Retrospect and 
Prospect The 2007 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture’; Joe Soss, ‘Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, 
Political Learning, and Political Action’, American Political Science Review 93, no. 2 (1999): 363–
80; Béland, ‘Reconsidering Policy Feedback’. 
678 Sarah K. Bruch, Myra Marx Ferree, and Joe Soss, ‘From Policy to Polity: Democracy, 
Paternalism, and the Incorporation of Disadvantaged Citizens’, American Sociological Review 75, no. 
2 (April 2010): 205, https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122410363563. 
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a clear example of the ways through which a set of ideas (i.e. religious values and 
norms) is the focus of continual contestations between the state and society, leading 
to the continual reinterpretation of (or the need to actively and continually defend) 
policy goals. Examples of this are seen in the case study chapters. Chapter 4 showed 
how state fatwas were petitioned by policymakers which affected a nationwide organ 
donation policy for Muslims. Chapter 5 demonstrated how fatwas on inheritance law 
were contested in court. While these fatwas were overruled by the court and amended 
to bridge the apparent differences between Islamic and civil laws, the message behind 
the initial overruled fatwas were nonetheless retained. Chapter 6 meanwhile illustrated 
how state fatwas gained more legal relevance through a new law that mandates 
religious teachers to abide by them in their teachings. These cases assessed state-linked 
fatwas as a crucial instrument that represents religious demands vis-à-vis the state and 
law. 
In each situation, policy feedback takes very different forms for different reasons. The 
first set of case studies (Chapter 4) examined how state fatwas relate to two state 
policies: one on population control programme and the other on organ donation. The 
former demonstrated that the bureaucratic relationship between the state and fatwa 
body did not hinder fatwas’ autonomy to contest state policies. In fact the bureaucratic 
relationship cemented the relevance of fatwas to the state; as state fatwas gained 
positional authority, their official position made them the point of reference for 
religious instruction in Singapore and also shifted the preference of the Muslim 
community to seek local instead of overseas fatwas. The bureaucratic link also resulted 
in the increased societal recognition of state fatwas among the Singapore Muslim 
community, so much so that the fatwas could oppose state policies with no apparent 
bureaucratic consequences. The second case study on organ donation examined how 
state policies can affect state fatwas, and vice versa. Here, the fatwas were petitioned 
by policymakers and this effectively tied state decision to them. This placed state 
fatwas at an advantageous position to shape state decision concerning policies that 
affect religious praxis. Moreover, when that fails – i.e. when ignored by the state – 
state fatwas were still able to challenge policies by directly addressing the Muslim 
community, which demonstrated the informal traditional-societal channels that fatwas 
exploit. Policy feedback occurred, in this sense, due to the state decision that made 
fatwas legally and bureaucratically relevant in the first place. This made them the focal 
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point for religious instruction in the country; their legal-bureaucratic authority not only 
gave them relevance to state policies, but enabled them to challenge it too. 
The second set of case studies (Chapter 5) shifted the focus from state fatwas’ 
bureaucratic significance to their legal relevance. I examined three court cases on 
inheritance law. Central to these cases is how the Islamic legislation AMLA is 
interpreted; while the court saw it as a legislation that restricts the legal boundary of 
state fatwas, the fatwa issuers saw it as a starting point to expand the legal role of 
fatwas. In these cases, the civil court judged against the fatwas and ordered the 
distribution of wealth according to civil law, and not according to what the fatwas 
decreed. While this means that the legal relevance of state fatwas is only as valid as 
what the civil court judged it to be, closer scrutiny showed that these judgements had 
limited effect on the autonomy of state fatwas. Even as the fatwas were amended to 
comply with the court interpretation of AMLA, I showed that the principle message 
of these amended fatwas remains unchanged. As the amended fatwas retained their 
original message, the informal traditional-societal authority of fatwas, therefore, 
became a channel to manoeuvre around court decisions and shape Statist Islam. This 
proved that as a site of contestation, the court has limited recourse to affect what is 
decreed in state fatwas. This also showed that the authority of state fatwas is not 
fundamentally tied to legal or bureaucratic limitations. Rather there is room for them 
to assert religious instruction on the Muslim community despite the courts judging 
otherwise, whilst simultaneously claiming legal and bureaucratic relevance (after all 
these amended fatwas were issued in their ‘official’ capacity). Policy feedback is 
therefore epitomised in how the legal position of state fatwas allowed them to interpret 
AMLA differently from the court, and to insist on the validity of their position despite 
the court objection. In other words, the state policy that placed fatwas as state-
sanctioned religious instruction had elevated the traditional-societal authority of 
official fatwas, that court decisions bore limited effect to it. 
The final case study (Chapter 6) looked at how the legal authority of state fatwas has 
grown in the last few years. This stems from an increased concern over radical fatwas 
that spread via the internet. Here I examined two ways in which state fatwas were 
reinforced vis-à-vis their foreign counterpart. Firstly, the pulpit was invoked as weekly 
Friday sermons prepared by the Office of the Mufti (the secretariat of the Fatwa 
Committee) repeatedly sought to discredit the validity of radical foreign fatwas. 
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Secondly, a new law was put in place to accredit religious teachers or asatizah. This 
new law not only mandates the centralised registration of asatizah but also prohibits 
religious teachings that contradict state fatwas. From informal instructions that shape 
normative religious praxis, state fatwas are now legally binding in religious teachings 
in Singapore. This expanded the legal role of fatwas; previously their formal relevance 
was limited to legal-bureaucratic dealings, but now it becomes legally mandated for 
asatizah to follow fatwas in their teachings. This changes the role of state fatwas to 
set the definition of legal religious content. Essentially this marks how state fatwas 
affect policy feedback on religious matters in Singapore, which can be traced back to 
the incessant state policy of continuous regulation of religious affairs. New concerns 
led to the need to co-opt religious institutions in new areas – in this case the expertise 
to define what is ‘desirable’ religious teachings – which made state fatwas the 
benchmark of legal religious teachings. 
These events demonstrated how policies can result in unintended consequences for the 
state. In this sense policy feedback should not be understood as a description of the 
mechanisms employed by the state to co-opt societal forces, but as a process of 
continual negotiation and contestation that frequently results in unanticipated 
outcomes. In the Singaporean context, a feature of the authoritarian rule has long been 
the way in which the state closely manages platforms which can potentially challenge 
its dominance. Common platforms where state power is challenged, such as trade 
unions and public universities, became regulated through acts of co-optation.679 This 
invariably means that the state becomes directly entangled in demands that would 
otherwise remain outside its purview. As a consequence, co-opted interests – be they 
women’s rights, the status of the arts, socio-economic issues, and of course religious 
matters – fall almost squarely within state responsibility. For religious matters 
specifically, this micro-management approach then raises the positional authority of 
religious elites who were selected to broker between state and religious demands, and 
ultimately allows them to be the voice that the state has to listen to. Although legal 
and bureaucratic restrictions arise when operating so close to the state, the fact that 
state fatwas can become a mode to challenge, negotiate, and inform statist 
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interpretations of religion underlines how state-sanctioned religious decrees function 
in the modern state. 
I demonstrated that policy feedback functions conceptually as expected even on state 
programmes that are not broad-based (i.e. state policies on a religious minority as 
opposed to economic programmes), and more notably even in authoritarian contexts 
away from Western liberal democratic countries where it is typically applied.680 
Although my starting point was the autonomous state – a powerful entity which is 
placed in a sphere separated from other groups in the society – this does not mean the 
total separation of the state from other actors in its decision-making process. Rather I 
applied the neo-Weberian viewpoint in which the state is an entity that cannot be 
insulated from non-state influences. This reflects the permeability and malleability of 
even the most authoritarian states to interventions from various groups that seek to 
expand their sphere of influence through state structures. This argument resonates 
soundly with how the Singapore government constantly regulates domains of 
contestations by co-opting social activists and channelling demands through state-
approved channels. As a result, while the state might effectively contain dissent and 
contestation against its authority, it also co-opts the problems and demands of social 
activists, thereby changing the dynamic of the state. I have to be explicit in that I do 
not deny the power asymmetry between the state and co-opted actors, for the co-optees 
themselves acknowledged how state decisionmakers can assert considerable 
pressure.681 Rather what I emphasise here is the consequence of this active co-optation 
on state decisions; that despite the power asymmetry state decisions can be changed, 
whether in the shorter term through policy negotiations (see Chapter 4), or in the long 
run through the legal-bureaucratic evolution of the co-opted constituent’s function 
within state and legal structures (see Chapters 3 and 6). 
My case studies sufficiently explained the role of policies in facilitating the rise of new 
bureaucratic constituencies with an advantaged position. The constituent I focused on, 
the fatwa-issuing body, benefited from legal and bureaucratic connections as a result 
 
680 See for example Béland, ‘Reconsidering Policy Feedback’; Mettler, ‘Bringing the State Back in to 
Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the GI Bill for World War II Veterans’; Mettler and 
Soss, ‘The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship’; Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers 
and Mothers; Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Retrospect and Prospect The 2007 Johan Skytte 
Prize Lecture’. 
681 See the organ donation case study in Chapter 4 when the fatwa committee deliberated between 
balancing state pressure and their own religious position. 
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of state policies on religious regulation. These state fatwas represent the sectoral 
interest of particular religious elites associated with the religious bureaucracy and 
enabled them to be consulted in state decisions. This recognition also enabled state 
fatwas to assert their societal position on religious issues, as ‘official’ fatwas were 
preferred over other local fatwas and became the benchmark for acceptable religious 
teachings in Singapore. Therefore as a consequence of state policies, new groups 
gained the capacity to preserve and expand their interests through legal-bureaucratic 
recognition. It cannot be overstated that the formalised legal-bureaucratic authority of 
religious institution is central to the relevance of state fatwas today; not only to the 
state, but also the Muslim community. Due to the way the modern state works, many 
facets of everyday life depend on the state and its apparatus, which then impact 
religious observances. Some examples include state policies which encroach on 
personal and religious choices, as well as laws that can restrict or expand the function 
of religious institutions. For state fatwas, the link that they have to the state puts them 
in an ‘official’ position, which places them as the highest formal instruction to regulate 
religious praxis where state demands and religious interests intersect. 
Despite the application of policy feedback to new areas, there are limitations to its use 
in my thesis. A key point is that my application of policy feedback is unique in the 
sense that it is used to examine religious bureaucratic constituencies. As my thesis 
concerns state fatwas, it analyses the role of state-linked religious elites in affecting 
state decisions. Therefore I did not examine how religious policies relate to the politics 
of mass voters and citizens. Because of that, my thesis did not address how policies 
that regulate religion (or even how the composite of Statist Islam) can affect the 
political action of the Singapore Muslim community. Also while policy feedback can 
explain the observable interaction between religious demands and state decisions, it 
does not assess the full extent to which religious bureaucrats engage with the state. 
Aside from clear decisions made through fatwas, there are always smaller pockets of 
inter-personal negotiations that escaped my analysis, which can be examined in future 
research. 
2.2.3 Authority and Law 
State fatwas represent how religious instructions seek to find a balance between 
different sets of interests, namely that of the state and the religious elites. These 
interests combine unique sets of demands spanning authoritarian state logic, secular 
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legal intent, and religious logic and morality. My thesis argues that these interests are 
manifest through two types of authority: traditional-societal authority and legal-
bureaucratic authority. Both of these forms of authority underline how negotiations 
take place through policy feedback, and consequently shape Statist Islam. 
These forms of authority also highlight the ways in which state fatwas function today. 
Traditional-societal authority enables state fatwas to assert their religious reverence 
over Muslim followers. After all, at their core, fatwas provide religious directions for 
Muslims to conduct their everyday lives. Essentially, the majority of fatwas concern 
religious rituals which have almost no bearing on politics or the state, and therefore 
remained consistent throughout changes in time and political systems. This is why 
even though Singapore had no official fatwa body in the colonial era, demand for 
fatwas persisted and led petitioners to seek overseas fatwas (see Chapter 3).  
As Singapore gained independence, this created the opportunity for the establishment 
of a long-desired fatwa body. In order to do so, fatwas have to first be legally 
recognised, and therefore entrenched within a specific set of legislations designed to 
administer Islamic law in Singapore. This legal recognition concurrently permitted the 
bureaucratisation of religious institutions – which includes a fatwa body – that 
sanctioned the state to have a direct link in the administration of religious affairs. A 
fatwa body was therefore established within the religious bureaucracy and connected 
to the larger state bureaucracy, which not only tied it to state regulations but also gave 
state fatwas ‘positional’ legal-bureaucratic recognition. This recognition in the modern 
state appended the ‘state’ prefix in state fatwas, and more importantly accorded them 
with the necessary legal-bureaucratic authority through which religious demands can 
be asserted. 
My thesis argued that the relationship between the state and state fatwas cannot be 
reduced to a straightforward subjugation of religious institutions. I have highlighted 
cases in which fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic authority was asserted to contest state 
policies, which demonstrated a form of reciprocity between the state and fatwas 
(Chapter 4). When the legal status of state fatwas was challenged as elements of 
secular and sacred laws collide, court decisions were contested through amended 
fatwas and related statements (Chapter 5). Over time as new forms of religious 
regulation were introduced to monitor religious teachings, state fatwas provided the 
246 
 
necessary expertise in drawing the boundary between what is and what is not 
acceptable in the Singapore state (Chapter 6). 
In examining state fatwas’ legal-bureaucratic and traditional-societal authority, it 
becomes apparent that both these forms of authority are crucial to achieve their 
maximum reach of religious influence. My case studies have shown that fatwa issuers 
exercise ‘relational authority’ to ensure fatwas’ reverence in the Muslim community 
and relevance in the modern state, i.e. by switching between these forms of authority 
when it suits them. The combination of these forms of authority embody the key 
channels that keep fatwas revered and relevant today. Fatwa issuers possess the 
autonomy to engage either one of them according to what benefits their interest the 
most, for example by asserting legal relevance when dealing with the courts, and 
relying on societal influence when legal recognition is in deficit. In other words, 
multiple channels of authority allow state fatwas to circumvent state demands and 
legal restrictions, and directly assert their influence on the Muslim community. 
In asserting religious authority through the legal-bureaucratic channel, state fatwas 
have to adhere to various laws. Although state fatwas rely on AMLA as a hard law 
instrument that grants them the necessary legal recognition, it is through soft law that 
fatwas are able to effectively penetrate and instruct the Muslim community. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, hard law refers to the explicit letter of the law, while 
soft law is a form of encouragement and discouragement that does not overtly rely on 
a written code, and represents a voluntary form of adherence.682 Soft law is usually 
seen as a way to bolster hard written law, and thus functions as an extension to ensure 
the legal importance of hard law. In other words, both hard and soft laws are mutually 
reinforcing; if hard law necessitates legal devotion at its core, then soft law projects 
the peripheral communal pressure to abide by it. 
However, in the case of state fatwas, the relationship between hard and soft laws are 
not always reinforcing; the explicit secular hard law (i.e. AMLA) that defines the legal 
boundary of state fatwas is not necessarily reflected in ‘soft’ official fatwas. That is 
because at their core, state fatwas adhere to two different forms of hard law: the secular 
law that grants it modern legal-bureaucratic relevance, as well as Islamic religious law. 
 




My research shows that the hard law that state fatwas follow is closer to the Islamic 
religious law than the secular civil one. This denotes a crucial point that my thesis 
argues: that state fatwas represent religious demands more than anything else. This 
points towards the sectoral interests of Islamic religious elites, which as others have 
iterated can be narrowed down to “the expansion of religious institutions, the 
preservation of orthodoxy against ‘deviant’ ideas, and public morality.”683 Which is to 
say, this set of demands is based on the preservation of Islamic law and interpreted 
through state fatwas. Therefore when the formal legal-bureaucratic authority of fatwas 
is contested, the soft law characteristic becomes apparent. This soft law feature 
epitomises a vital way for state fatwas to retain their own interpretation of Islamic law, 
enabling them to inform Statist Islam beyond the secular legal-bureaucratic channel. 
Before ending this section, I acknowledge that the assessment above was based on 
Singapore’s experience. However as I will demonstrate in the next part, traditional-
societal and legal-bureaucratic forms of authority (and other concepts mentioned 
earlier) can be applied when analysing other countries as well, especially where fatwas 
are state-sanctioned and embedded within the larger legal and bureaucratic workings 
of the state. 
3 Future Research Directions: Reassessing Old and New Contexts 
By focusing on state-sanctioned religious decrees as an instrument of negotiation with 
the secular state, my thesis has implications on the way in which state fatwas are 
studied. Focusing the concepts of policy feedback and Statist Islam, my research 
provides news ways to analyse larger patterns of how religious elites resist and 
negotiate with the state. 
An obvious arena of associated research is the survey of other fatwa institutions in 
similar contexts. This is not limited to Singapore’s closest neighbours such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia, but also where official fatwa bodies operate in non-Muslim 
milieus such as Thailand, and even Russia and Eastern European countries where 
muftis and fatwas possess some degree of legal-bureaucratic recognition. Thailand has 
a state-appointed religious position known as the Chularajamontri which oversees 
religious affairs and also issues fatwas.684 While this essentially makes the position 
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similar to that of a state mufti, such influence is contested by religious elites especially 
in the restive South of the country.685 By comparing how state fatwas shape and dictate 
regional religious norms, Statist Islam can be applied to analyse the dominant religious 
praxis that represents these political contestations. It can also reveal the political 
restrictions (and advantages) that come with the position of the Chularajamontri. 
Moving beyond Southeast Asia, Russia has several muftiates which were originally 
sanctioned during the time of the tsarina Catherine the Great in the 18th century, and 
preserved by Stalin in the 20th century.686 Despite significant political changes there, 
these institutions persist today via a complicated relationship with the Russian 
government.687 Then there are countries such as Romania which do not directly 
sanction a fatwa institution, yet legally recognises such bodies as the sole 
representative of the Islamic faith and endows them with certain religious provisions 
and administrative authority through the law.688 In these cases, policy feedback can be 
invoked to conceptualise how formal legal and bureaucratic recognition of fatwas 
characterises the state-religious relationship. 
While there is considerable potential to expand research on the countries I mentioned 
above, I will demonstrate how my thesis contributes to examining patterns of religio-
political dynamics, and that is by briefly discussing the political relationship of fatwas 
in Malaysia and Indonesia. Before moving on, I have to note that for Malaysia, I opt 
for the term ‘official fatwas’ instead of ‘state fatwas’ to refer to state-sanctioned 
fatwas. This is because in Malaysia, ‘state fatwas’ can mean fatwas issued at the state 
level (as opposed to the federal level). ‘Official fatwas’ therefore is a catch-all term to 
refer to fatwas issued by any of these legally- and bureaucratically-recognised 
institutions. 
The bureaucratic hierarchy of Malaysia’s federal fatwa body bears close resemblance 
to Singapore’s. However compared to Singapore, Malaysia’s religious bureaucracy 
involves an additional layer of political actor in the form of the monarchy. 
Furthermore, the population and political dynamic is different since Malaysia is a 
 
685 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession; Yusuf, ‘Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reforming 
the Office of “Chularajmontri/Shaikh Al-Islam”’; Imtiyaz Yusuf, ‘The Role of the Chularajamontri 
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Muslim-majority country. But because Singapore’s version of religious bureaucracy 
was inspired by Malaysia’s system of religious management, it is natural to expand 
the same research theme to Malaysia. 
Indonesia meanwhile represents a slightly different dynamic. Unlike its smaller 
neighbours where fatwa institutions are linked to state bureaucracy, Indonesia’s 
highest-ranking fatwa body is somewhat separated from the state, and the relationship 
between the religious elites and state are starkly more complicated due to the political 
activism of fatwa-issuing bodies there. This can be attributed to the politically 
democratic dynamic in Indonesia, where the reformasi (reformation) movement of the 
late 1990s and the ousting of President Suharto initiated a process of democratic 
transition, something which cannot be said of Malaysia (until very recently) and 
Singapore. It is indeed a rare quality in Southeast Asian politics, which is why some 
observers call Indonesia “Southeast Asia’s most democratic nation”.689 
But the most glaring similarities between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia is rooted 
in their history and geography. Singapore’s Muslim population is anchored to its 
larger, immediate neighbours. Family links between citizens of these countries are 
common, and more so the Islam they observe which share the same theological and 
jurisprudential schools. Singapore’s own religious history is also entrenched in these 
neighbouring countries, with early generations of religious elites originating from 
Indonesia,690 as well as the muftis in peninsula Malaya filling the demand for fatwas 
from Singapore before an official fatwa body was established there.691 
Official fatwa institutions in these Muslim-majority countries provide authoritative 
religious instruction, while highlighting unique patterns of relationship with the state 
and society. I will provide a brief look into the unique characteristics of official fatwas 
in these countries and highlight the relationship of religious elites to the state. This 
sketches a brief outline of the amalgamation of religious and political interests through 
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official fatwas, through which an investigation of authoritative religious praxis can 
reveal the complexities of state-religious negotiations. This paves the way for future 
research to apply and develop the concept of Statist Islam in these countries. 
3.1 Malaysia 
Just like Singapore, Islam in Malaysia is embedded in the country’s political history. 
From the advent of Islam in early Malayan history, to British colonisation, and then 
Malaysia’s independence, there is no shortage of interaction between religion and 
politics. Unlike Singapore where the ruler was removed, a prominent legacy of pre-
colonial era persists as today’s religious authority in Malaysia lies with traditional 
Malay rulers. Although Malaysia practices a system of democratic constitutional 
monarchy in which elected representatives administer the federal government, 
traditional rulers are placed as the head of the Islamic faith both for the country and 
their respective states. 
There is a total of fourteen muftis in Malaysia; one for each of the thirteen states, as 
well as a mufti representing the Federal Territories that is directly administered by the 
federal government. While the rulers are in charge of the religious affairs of their 
respective states, their authority at the federal level is embodied through the Majlis 
Kebangsaan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam or National Council for Islamic Affairs (MKI). 
Within the MKI, a fatwa committee was formed to enable the fourteen state muftis to 
collectively issue fatwas. This grouping of Malaysian muftis is typically referred to as 
the National Fatwa Committee.692 This fatwa committee is supported by the federal 
religious institution known as JAKIM, which acts as its secretariat.693 JAKIM, the 
acronym for Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or the Department of Islamic 
Development Malaysia, is the main religious bureaucracy established by the federal 
government to administer religious affairs. In other words, JAKIM is to Malaysia what 
MUIS is to Singapore. 
I contend that the shaping of Statist Islam is unique to the set of circumstances in every 
country. Unlike in Singapore where the relationship between official fatwas and 
secular legal-bureaucratic demands depicts a contestation of two sets of distinct 
 
692 I will henceforth refer to the centralised Malaysian fatwa body as the National Fatwa Committee 
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interests, in Malaysia it is fair to assume that the demands of fatwas and the state are 
often mutual. This is because of the intertwined state-religious relationship; promoting 
religious interests can shore up the legitimacy of the Malaysian government which 
appeals to the Muslim-majority electorate, while reinforcing the relevance of state-
linked religious institutions. To understand the reason behind this, we have to trace 
the development of Islamic bureaucracy in post-colonial Malaysia. The 
bureaucratisation correlated with the Malaysian government’s attempt to project a 
public image of piousness. The rise of religious activism known as dakwah 
movements in the 1970s, followed by political campaigns to attract voters through 
religious symbolisms in the 1980s resulted in the substantial co-optation of religious 
elites and the creation of new religious institutions in the state.694 This was also 
reinforced by federal-level religious projects and the revamp of various religious 
laws.695 As religious discourse became embedded in political agendas, the Prime 
Minister’s department – which initially began as a secretariat to assist the rulers’ 
management of religious affairs – also assumed more roles to manage religious affairs 
in the country. These developments allowed religious elites to expand their role in the 
state bureaucracy.696 
Political credence and moral legitimacy in Malaysia thus became linked to religious 
symbolisms. The Malaysian government propagated top-down Islamic religious 
policies, including the creation of an Islamic university, policies endorsing Islamic 
values and virtues in the civil service, as well as support for Islamic banking and 
financial services, all which has a considerable effect on political incumbency. 
Individuals with strong religious appeal – embodied in the appointment of dakwah 
activists in important political positions – were co-opted and secured the roles of 
religious elites in the state bureaucracy. These contestations to appear more ‘Islamic’ 
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even saw both the Malaysian government and Islamist opposition claiming to be the 
torchbearer of a supposed ‘Islamic state’.697 
Therefore in Malaysia, promoting religious interests serves the political expediency of 
political parties, and further entrenches the functions of the religious bureaucracy. 
Exploiting religious agendas on the political front correlates with the development of 
the Islamic bureaucracy in Malaysia, and allowed the ascendance of religious elites 
who push religious agendas through state structures.698 This results in the expansion 
of Shariah statutes and cultivated religious bureaucrats as authoritative interpreters of 
Islamic law. These developments ultimately rooted the position of religious elites 
within state bureaucracy. 
Official fatwas in Malaysia also benefited from the expansion of religious 
bureaucracy. However the capacity of official fatwas to affect religious praxis is more 
complex due to the state-federal dichotomy of religious administration which I 
mentioned earlier. Essentially, fatwas at the state level come under the jurisdiction of 
respective state rulers. At the national level, the National Fatwa Committee acts as an 
umbrella body that bands together state muftis. What this means is that for every 
religious question, there can be two sets of official fatwas (state and federal) that are 
issued. Also since fatwas are not binding unless gazetted, a fatwa that is gazetted at 
the state level might not be legally binding at the federal level, and vice versa. These 
differences can create contradictory official fatwas and generate legal discrepancies 
between them. 
It has been observed that these differences can cause multiple official interpretations 
of a single issue.699 Yet despite conflicts at the state and federal levels, official fatwas 
still enjoy an elevated position compared to non-official fatwas. This stems from the 
formalised legal-bureaucratic authority that lends fatwas state-linked legitimacy, and 
bolsters their formal relevance and societal reverence. While individual official fatwas 
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may be at odds with each other, as a form of religious instruction, they command 
dominant religious authority in shaping religious praxis, and perpetuate religious 
policies that preserve their position in state and society. The combination of these 
factors then creates a form of Islamic praxis unique to Malaysia, i.e. Statist Islam. 
Statist Islam in Malaysia is preserved through various measures. Where fatwas are 
concerned, some Malaysian states have long made it a legal offence to issue religious 
opinions that contradict fatwas,700 something which Singapore enacted only 
recently.701 Official fatwas in Malaysia can also be legally binding on Muslim citizens 
and the Shariah court.702 Furthermore, because Malaysia observes a parallel legal 
system where both civil and religious laws operate side by side, this defines a clear 
boundary between the jurisdiction of the secular civil court and Shariah court.703 This 
means that the civil court does not have jurisdiction over religious matters, and that 
gives official fatwas a powerful platform of dissemination by way of the Shariah 
courts. Unlike in Singapore where the civil court reigns supreme, Malaysian fatwas 
can be binding on Shariah courts and remain legally superior. This gives official fatwas 
in Malaysia a significantly higher capacity to legally coerce religious praxis through 
religious institutions. 
Yet literature that discusses the politics of official fatwas in Malaysia is rather lacking. 
There is a tendency to focus on the administrative limitations of the fatwa-making 
process and not their political causes and consequences.704 Even those who take a 
critical view of religious bureaucracy have overlooked the political role of official 
fatwas.705 Therefore a large sample of academic research on fatwas in Malaysia 
emphasised on their constitutional and administrative limitations, differences in 
theological methodology, and also the varying background and composition of fatwa 
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committee members.706 Furthermore these writings often regard official fatwas (or 
even the religious bureaucracy) as an instrument that simply shore up the state’s 
political legitimacy.707 Official fatwas are therefore not fairly evaluated as something 
that can contest the state, a familiar and overbearing theme that shapes the narrative in 
the discussion on state co-optation of religious elites and institutions. 
What all these means is that in spite of claims of politicisation of fatwas in Malaysia 
by political actors,708 the dominant narrative is fixated on the instrumentalisation of 
religious institutions. There is thus a need to further explore how the bureaucratisation 
of religious institutions and ascendance of state-linked religious elites retain their 
authority in an ever-changing political landscape, with a clear emphasis on the role of 
official fatwas in this regard. Coming back to the concept of policy feedback, this 
cursory glance shows that official fatwas possess robust formal channels to affect, 
negotiate, and inform Statist Islam. Just as how the Shariah courts were assessed to 
negotiate cultural, societal, and statist interests,709 the embedded instructive role of 
official fatwas in Malaysia should be further scrutinised since they inherently function 
beyond the confined spaces of Shariah courtrooms. At the same time compared to 
Singapore, official fatwas in Malaysia operate in a largely favourable environment; 
not only does pervasive ‘hard’ legal-bureaucratic platforms such as the Syariah court 
facilitate their dissemination, their informal soft law channels that permeate various 
layers of the Muslim community is also another powerful tool. 
Where Statist Islam is concerned, the strong presence of religious narrative in 
Malaysian politics chained religious institutions to political legitimacy, and catapulted 
them into symbols of political contestations. As political parties attract voters by 
claiming religious legitimacy and promising continued support of religious 
programmes, these religious institutions also benefit from such exercises. This 
increased their relevance in state bureaucracy and expanded their capacity for policy 
feedback, which then allows them to effectively capitalise on these formalised forms 
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of legal-bureaucratic authority. However due to the embeddedness of official fatwas 
in various levels of bureaucracy, this also opens them to external influence as they are 
connected to a range of political actors. At the local state level, where the purview of 
religious affairs falls under the state monarch, each fatwa body has to answer to their 
respective rulers. At the federal level where official fatwas are grouped in a centralised 
bureaucratic body, their proximity to the federal government opens the door for 
political interference. And by being a part of the state bureaucracy, official fatwas that 
seemingly support government decisions are also attacked by opposition political 
parties.710 
To conclude this brief discussion on Malaysia, the role of official fatwas in politics 
and policies remains a fascinating, yet under-researched topic. This is where my 
research opens the door to explore the theme further, by expanding the literature on 
Malaysian fatwas to take into account their political and social relevance, and their 
impact on religious praxis. That is, by examining the role of official fatwas in shaping 
Statist Islam, and what that reveals in terms of political negotiations and even the 
preferences of Muslim voters. 
3.2 Indonesia 
Fatwa institutions in Malaysia and Singapore are sanctioned by the state, a feature 
shared by Brunei and even nearby Buddhist-majority Thailand. But for the world’s 
most populous Muslim nation Indonesia, the official fatwa body provides a refreshing 
contrast to its neighbours. 
Indonesia’s key fatwa-issuing body is positioned within a religious institution that is 
somewhat separated from the state. The Majelis Ulama Indonesia, known by its 
acronym MUI, is an umbrella body made up of several key Islamic organisations in 
the country, including the most significant “modernist Muslim movement” in the 
country the Muhammadiyah, as well as the largest Islamic group in the world, the 
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Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).711 Between these two, their members total more than fifty 
million people.712 
Although the MUI is funded by the Indonesian government,713 its formal link to the 
state is rather peculiar; it is not even considered to be a statutory board, rather a quango 
or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation.714 Even those who categorise 
the MUI as a government institution concede that it does not necessarily share the 
same position as the state in religious matters.715 
While Indonesia does have a Ministry of Religious Affairs, it has been suggested that 
the function of the MUI is more significant “when it comes to the formation of policy 
on issues of Islamic legal tradition”.716 MUI fatwas are also considered a source for 
drafting the state law in Indonesia.717 Among the reason for MUI’s dominance is the 
role that it plays in unifying various massive and influential groups under its umbrella. 
While the Muhammadiyah and the NU possess their own fatwa-issuing arms, the MUI 
condenses these multiple religious opinions (which can at times be contradictory) 
through its own fatwa-issuing wing known as Komisi Fatwa or Fatwa Commission.718 
The degree of separation between MUI fatwas and the state means that they can avoid 
taking an overly-partisan political role. Yet state fatwas in Indonesia have been shown 
to serve strategic political interventions by putting pressure on Indonesian politicians 
and steering religious policy debates towards conservatism.719 For example, prior to 
the Indonesian election in June 1999, the MUI issued a fatwa-like religious advisory 
on who to vote for, which inferred preference for Muslim candidates over non-Muslim 
ones.720 The popularity of that advice, which was covered on the front page of 
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newspapers, meant that certain political parties represented by non-Muslim candidates 
were placed at a disadvantage.721 MUI fatwas also played significant role in addressing 
social issues.722 They can also affect state decisions, as decades of fatwa development 
and amendments concerning family planning policies demonstrated. Menchik calls 
this the “co-evolution” between sacred and secular interests; the interactions between 
MUI fatwas and the secular Indonesian government led to the moderation of each 
other’s positions as both parties were taking cues from one another.723 
The fatwas that MUI issues provide a useful insight into the concept of policy feedback 
as these religious elites, despite being bureaucratically excluded from the state, still 
managed to affect state decisions. A significant part of this can be attributed to 
Indonesia’s Muslim-majority electorate, large numbers of whom still place high 
reverence for traditional religious instruction. The groups that make up the MUI also 
provide additional social and political relevance that lends authority to MUI’s fatwas. 
To recapitulate, the MUI is made up of several religious organisations such as the 
Muhammadiyah and NU, both of whom constantly blur the line between religion and 
politics. The Muhammadiyah, although not officially linked to any political party, has 
members active in electoral politics who even formed political parties.724 The NU 
meanwhile is more directly involved in politics; between 1952 to 1973, it became a 
political party and had representation in the Indonesian cabinet. Even the current 
Indonesian president’s running mate for the 2019 presidential election is a prominent 
NU member and chair of the MUI. This cooperation, should it succeed, will create a 
fascinating dynamic and new channel of authority for not only MUI, but its fatwas as 
well.  
There are claims that the political influence of these religious organisations has 
dwindled as their involvement in politics revealed corruption and rent-seeking 
behaviour.725 However at the local level, these organisations still retain strong 
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relevance,726 which partly explains the appeal of having the MUI chair running for 
Indonesia’s vice-presidency. MUI’s influence at the local level can be attributed to its 
relationship to other mass-based religious organisations that it represents. Through the 
organisations that are present in the MUI, and their connections to Indonesia’s social 
and political history, MUI fatwas therefore carry significant weight on the Muslim 
community. This in turn forces the state to take MUI’s fatwas seriously, and ultimately 
places such fatwas at an advantageous position to affect state decisions. The MUI’s 
role as the umbrella group of mass-based religious organisations is its strength, as this 
lends it the traditional-societal authority of the various groups it represents, which then 
enabled it to assert religious demands and shape state decisions, consequently shaping 
Statist Islam. 
In this light, the democratic relationship between the state and the MUI is also present 
in the conventional narratives of policy feedback theory, which examines how policies 
– in this case religious ones – create new constituents who ultimately affect the 
direction of new policies. In Indonesia these constituents do not come under direct 
state control, and is therefore very different from the religious institutions of Singapore 
and Malaysia. 
The way MUI fatwas shape and inform Statist Islam can therefore be examined 
through the sum of its parts, the religious influence and societal authority wielded by 
its member organisations as well as the MUI itself, all of which combine into 
significant traditional-societal authority. Despite the lack of a strong formal 
relationship with the state through proper legal-bureaucratic channels, MUI fatwas 
still possess sufficient collective authority for the state to consider them in its policy 
decisions. And should the chair of the MUI become the next vice-president of 
Indonesia, it is highly probable that MUI’s fatwas will command even more authority 
in shaping state decisions. 
3.3 Towards A More Nuanced State-Religious Analysis 
The two countries I mentioned above are but examples of how the concepts applied in 
this thesis can be used to expand the research beyond the borders of Singapore. By 
focusing on the role of state-linked religious institutions, and more specifically state-
sanctioned official fatwas, I have demonstrated that despite an already significant 
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research interest on religion and politics in Southeast Asia, there is still much room to 
expand this particular field by providing even more depth to existing studies.  
Even with the wide range of literature on the state-religious relationship, this is a 
research field with promising room for growth. One key factor behind this is the 
constantly changing demands of society, driven by expanding democratisation and the 
emergence of new movements that directly challenge traditional forms of authority. 
While the state-religious alliance has somewhat been mutually beneficial in the post-
colonial era of many nation-states, the changing political landscape is facilitating the 
creation of new coalitions to challenge traditional dominance. As these traditional 
political and religious actors seek to preserve their power so that they do not get 
drowned out by the changing currents, new forms of contestations emerge. This is 
where the next phase of state-religious relationship takes place, as the traditional forms 
of authority attempt to retain power amidst new political and social demands.  
This is why the theme of state-religious relationship deserves continued scrutiny. 
Analysis of this relationship cannot be restricted to current political appointments or 
temporary political alliances. Rather we need to look at deep-seated changes that are 
taking place, those that represent the institutionalised long-term role of religious 
demands in the state and vice versa. This, to me, provides a more accurate indicator 
of ongoing state-religious negotiations and compromises which reveal the gradual, yet 
significant evolution of changes to come. 
State fatwas provide an important facet of state-religious relationship because they 
demonstrate the reach of state and religious demands, as well as their consequences 
on existing institutional configurations. To fully scrutinise the role of state fatwas and 
explore new insights on state-religious negotiations, access to key materials is 
required. While I managed to do this by analysing minutes of meetings and interviews 
with members of the religious elites, similar researches can achieve this by looking at 
many other types of documentations, ranging from state archives to records of issued 
fatwas. This will provide a much more nuanced understanding on the function of co-
opted religious institutions, their exact relationship to the state, and the resulting legal 
and bureaucratic consequences.  
This thesis has shown that religious actors – especially those linked to the state – 
cannot necessarily be made to fit existing categories of religio-political activists as 
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assumed in the literature on Islamism and Post-Islamism. There are so many 
overlapping interests and negotiations taking place between independent religious 
movements and state-linked religious elites, and even the state. Therefore my research 
indirectly calls for newer, more nuanced templates of religious actors, and perhaps 
even an issue-based approach in analysing religious actors and institutions. This is 
especially useful to identify the boundaries of overlapping interests, especially since 
the fluid demands of activism at times can create new alliances in support for or against 
a particular cause.  
The multi-disciplinary perspective in this thesis combined elements of political 
science and political sociology in order to conceptualise the empirical evidence. I have 
demonstrated how policy feedback can be applied to explain the intricate relationship 
that challenges the dominant narrative of one-way state-religious relations. Rather, 
this relationship is an amalgamation of formal instructions, informal negotiations, and 
unique lines of communications on segregated audiences, all of which result in a 
unique outcome on religious praxis, i.e. Statist Islam.  Statist Islam proposes that the 
outcome of these negotiations is not always determined by a single set of demands, 
instead these initial instructions and decrees get filtered through layers upon layers of 
consultations and compromises. The resulting outcome – even in an authoritarian state 
that staunchly professes secularism – creates a unique form of authoritative religious 
praxis for a particular country. This praxis captures the outcome of legal and 
bureaucratic state-religious negotiations in the modern state. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
My thesis sets out questioning the role that fatwas play in an authoritarian secular state. 
At the informal level, many have already pointed to the potential that fatwas have in 
directing the religious orientation of Muslim communities.727 Although this is 
traditionally done through face-to-face consultations with Muslim individuals, the 
accessibility of the internet has also allowed fatwas to spread faster and further than 
ever before. This thesis also provided brief snapshots of how these new channels of 
dissemination allowed fatwas to become even more widespread, especially among 
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pockets of Muslims who are physically removed from centralised religious authority, 
such as those living in the West. 
But the focus of this thesis has always been the role of state fatwas in the modern state. 
If the internet can affect new ways for fatwas to find new audiences and relevance 
globally, then the modern state bureaucracy has a deeper impact on the local relevance 
of fatwas. Being a long-standing tradition among Muslims, the seat of the mufti 
evolved to become a public office in the medieval times, and is today linked to state 
power. While most observers took the position that the embedded role of state fatwas 
in the modern state bureaucracy is proof of instrumentalisation of religion, I qualified 
this assumption by demonstrating that this co-optation also createed new ways to 
resist, and at times empowered fatwas, against state control. State-sanctioned fatwas 
therefore play a central role in these resistances and negotiations. 
Finally, the thesis also suggests a need to examine, in more depth, the shifting 
narratives of the religious bureaucracy and how this relates to the agency of religious 
elites. My research provides a starting point by conceptualising the Singapore 
experience, which informs us about individual localised subjectivities, and also the 
way in which it represents a broader pattern of state-religious relationship in the 
modern nation-state. Moving beyond the contextual macro-analysis of fatwas, there is 
scope to extend the discussion on how, collectively, state fatwas substantively dictate 
the direction of Statist Islam in their respective countries. This can provide 
comparative developments and trajectories that occur in individual countries, which 
can then be analysed as a pattern of Statist Islam in broader contexts – not only in 
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